

FIPS 140 - 2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for:

## Toshiba TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Solid State Drive (PX model) Type A



TOSHIBA CORPORATION

Rev 2.0.0

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## Overview

The Toshiba TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Solid State Drive (listed in Section 1.1 Product Version) is used for solid state drive data security. This Cryptographic Module (CM) provides various cryptographic services using FIPS approved algorithms. Services include hardware-based data encryption, cryptographic erase, and FW download.

This CM is multiple-chip embedded, and the physical boundary of the CM is the entire SSD. The logical boundary is SAS interface (same as the physical boundary). The physical interface for power-supply and for communication is one SAS connector. The CM is connected with host system by SAS cable. The logical interface is the SAS, TCG SWG, and Enterprise SSC.

The CM has the non-volatile storage area for not only user data but also the keys, CSPs, and FW. The latter storage area is called the “system area”, which is not logically accessible / addressable by the host application.

The CM is intended to meet the requirements of FIPS140-2 Security Level 2 Overall. The Table below shows the security level detail.

Section	Level
1. Cryptographic Module Specification	2
2. Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	2
3. Roles, Services, and Authentication	2
4. Finite State Model	2
5. Physical Security	2
6. Operational Environment	N/A
7. Cryptographic Key Management	2
8. EMI/EMC	2
9. Self - Tests	2
10. Design Assurance	2
11. Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A
<b>Overall Level</b>	<b>2</b>

Table 1 - Security Level Detail

Interface	Ports
Data Input	SAS connector
Control Input	SAS connector
Data Output	SAS connector
Status Output	SAS connector
Power Input	SAS connector

Table 1-1 - Physical/Logical Port Mapping

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## Acronyms

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
CM	Cryptographic Module
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator

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EDC	Error Detection Code
FW	Firmware
HMAC	Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication code
KAT	Known Answer Test
LBA	Logical Block Address
MSID	Manufactured SID
NDRNG	Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
PCB	Printed Circuit Board
POST	Power on Self-Test
PSID	Printed SID
SED	Self-Encrypting Drive
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SID	Security ID

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## Section 1 – Module Specification

The CM has one FIPS 140 approved mode of operation and CM is always in approved mode of operation. The CM provides services defined in Section 2.1 and other non-security related services.

### Section 1.1 – Product Version

The following models are validated with the following FW version and HW version:

HW version: A0 with PX04SVQ080B, PX04SVQ160B, PX04SRQ384B [1]

A1 with PX04SVQ080B, PX04SVQ160B, PX04SRQ384B [2]

FW version: ZZ01 [1], NA01 [2]

The PX04SxQxxxB with ZZ01 and NA01 varies “Product ID” value of INQUIRY command according to customer requirements. These “Product ID” values are X440\_TPM3V800AMD, X577\_TPM3V800AMD, X365\_TPM3V1T6AMD, X366\_TPM3V1T6AMD, X358\_TPM3V3T8AME and X359\_TPM3V3T8AME.

## Section 2 – Roles Services and Authentication

This section describes roles, authentication method, and strength of authentication.

Role Name	Role Type	Type of Authentication	Authentication	Authentication Strength	Multi Attempt strength
EraseMaster	Crypto Officer	Role	PIN	$1/2^{48} < 1/1,000,000$	$15,000 / 2^{48} < 1 / 100,000$
SID	Crypto Officer	Role	PIN	$1/2^{48} < 1/1,000,000$	$15,000 / 2^{48} < 1 / 100,000$
BandMaster0	User	Role	PIN	$1/2^{48} < 1/1,000,000$	$15,000 / 2^{48} < 1 / 100,000$
BandMaster1	User	Role	PIN	$1/2^{48} < 1/1,000,000$	$15,000 / 2^{48} < 1 / 100,000$
...	...	...	...	...	...
BandMaster8	User	Role	PIN	$1/2^{48} < 1/1,000,000$	$15,000 / 2^{48} < 1 / 100,000$

**Table 2** - Identification and Authentication Policy

Per the security policy rules, the minimum PIN length is 6 bytes. Therefore the probability that a random attempt will succeed is  $1/2^{48} < 1/1,000,000$  (the CM accepts any value (0x00-0xFF) as each byte of PIN). The CM waits 4msec when authentication attempt fails, so the maximum number of authentication attempts is 15,000 times in 1 min. Therefore the probability that random attempts in 1min will succeed is  $15,000 / 2^{48} < 1 / 100,000$ . Even if TryLimit<sup>1</sup> is infinite, the probability that random attempts is same.

<sup>1</sup> TryLimit is the upper limit of failure of authentication of each role.

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## Section 2.1 – Services

This section describes services which the CM provides.

Service	Description	Role(s)	Keys & CSPs	RWX(Read,Write,Execute)	Algorithm(CAVP Certification Number)	Method
Band Lock/Unlock	Block or allow read (decrypt) / write (encrypt) of user data in a band. Locking also requires read/write locking to be enabled	BandMaster0 ... BandMaster8	Table MAC Key	X	HMAC-SHA256 (#2231)	SECURITY PROTOCOL IN(TCG Set Method Result)
Cryptographic Erase	Erase user data (in cryptographic means) by changing the data encryption key	EraseMaster	MEK(s) RKey Table MAC Key	W X X	Hash_DRBG(#867) AES256-CBC(#3485) HMAC-SHA256 (#2231)	SECURITY PROTOCOL IN(TCG Erase Method Result)
Data read/write(decrypt/encrypt)	Encryption / decryption of unlocked user data to/from band	None <sup>2</sup>	MEKs	X	AES256-XTS-R(#3487) AES256-XTS-W(#3486)	SCSI READ/WRITE Commands
Firmware Download	Enable / Disable firmware download and load a complete firmware image, and save it. If the code passes “Firmware load test”, the device is reset and will run with the new code.	SID	PubKey  Table MAC Key	X  X	RSASSA-PKCS #1-v1_5(#1795)  HMAC-SHA256 (#2231)	SECURITY PROTOCOL IN(TCG Set Method Result), SCSI WRITE BUFFER
RandomNumber generation	Provide a random number generated by the CM	None	Seed	R	Hash_DRBG(#867)	SECURITY PROTOCOL IN(TCG Random Method Result)
Reset(run POSTs)	Runs POSTs and delete CSPs in RAM	None	N/A	N/A	N/A	Power on reset
Set band position and size	Set the location and size of the LBA range	BandMaster0 ... BandMaster8	Table MAC Key	X	HMAC-SHA256 (#2231)	SECURITY PROTOCOL IN(TCG Set Method Result)
Set PIN	Setting PIN (authentication data)	EraseMaster, SID, BandMaster0 ... BandMaster8 <sup>3</sup>	RKey Table MAC Key	X X	AES256-CBC(#3485) HMAC-SHA256 (#2231) SHA256(#2879)	SECURITY PROTOCOL IN(TCG Set Method Result)
Show Status	Report status of the CM	None	N/A	N/A	N/A	SCSI REQUEST SENSE
Zeroization	Erase user data in all bands by changing the data encryption key, initialize range settings, and reset PINs for TCG	None <sup>4</sup>	RKey  Table MAC KEY MEKs  PIN	X,W  X,W W W	AES256-CBC(#3485)  HMAC-SHA256 (#2231) Hash_DRBG(#867)	SECURITY PROTOCOL IN(TCG RevertSP Method Result)

**Table 3 - FIPS Approved services**

Algorithm	CAVP Certification Number
AES256-CBC	#3485
AES256-XTS-R	#3487
AES256-XTS-W	#3486
SHA256 (SEC CPU)	#2879
HMAC-SHA256 (SEC CPU)	#2231
RSASSA-PKCS#1-v1_5	#1795
Hash_DRBG	#867

**Table 4 - FIPS Approved Algorithms**

<sup>2</sup> The band has to be unlocked by corresponding BandMaster beforehand.

<sup>3</sup> For PIN of themselves.

<sup>4</sup> Need to input PSID, which is public drive-unique value used for the TCG RevertSP method. The PSID is printed on identification label of the module.


Algorithm	Description
NDRNG	Hardware RNG used to seed the approved Hash_DRBG. Minimum entropy of 8 bits is 7.53.

Table 4-1 - Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms

## Section 3 – Physical Security

The CM has the following physical security:

- Production-grade components with standard passivation
- Exterior of the drive is opaque
- Five tamper-evident security seals are applied to the CM in factory
  - Three opaque and tamper-evident security seals (VOID LABEL H, VOID LABEL J and VOID LABEL K) are applied to side of the CM and edge of OUTER SHEET<sup>5</sup>. These seals prevent cover removal and an attacker to access the PCB
  - Two opaque and tamper-evident security seals (VOID LABEL F and VOID LABEL G) are applied to side of the CM. These seals prevent cover removal
- The tamper-evident security seals cannot be penetrated or removed and reapplied without tamper-evidence



<sup>5</sup> OUTER SHEET is an opaque seal covering some holes of the top cover. It cannot leave "VOID" message, but leaves the evidence of the cut.

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The operator is required to inspect the CM periodically (every month or every two months) for one or more of the following tamper evidence. If the operator discovers tamper evidence, the CM should be removed.

- Message “VOID” on security seal or the CM
- Text on security seals do not match original
- Cutting line on security seal or OUTER SHEET
- Security seal cutouts do not match original



**Mark of alphabetic character(s) which constitute a word “VOID”**



**Cutting line (Security seals and OUTER SHEET)**

## Section 4 – Operational Environment

Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the CM operates in a “non-modifiable”, that is the CM cannot be modified and no code can be added or deleted.



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## Section 5 – Key Management

The CM uses keys and CSPs in the following table.

Key/CSP	Length	Type	Zeroize Method	Establishment	Output	Persistence/Storage
BandMaster/Erase Master/SID PINs	256	PIN	Zeroization service	Electronic input	No	SHA digest/System Area
MEKs	512	Symmetric	Zeroization service	DRBG	No	Encrypted by RKey / System Area
MSID	256	Public	N/A(Public)	Manufacturing	Output: Host can retrieve	Plain / System Area
PubKey	2048	Public	N/A(Public)	Manufacturing	No	Plain / System Area
RKey	256	Symmetric	Zeroization service	DRBG	No	Obfuscated(Plain in FIPS means) / System Area
Seed	440	DRBG seed	Power-Off	Entropy collected from NDRNG at instantiation  (Minimum entropy of 8 bits: 7.53)	No	Plain/RAM
Table MAC Key	256	HMAC Key	Zeroization service	DRBG	No	Encrypted by RKey / System Area

Note that there is no security-relevant audit feature and audit data.

## Section 6 – Self Tests

The CM runs self-tests in the following table.

Function	Self-Test Type	Abstract	Failure Behavior
Firmware Integrity Check	Power-On	EDC 32-bit	Enters Boot Error State.
SHA256 (F.E CPU)	Power-On	Digest KAT	Enters Boot Error State.
SHA256 (SEC CPU)	Power-On	Digest KAT	Enters Boot Error State.
HMAC-SHA256 (F.E CPU)	Power-On	Digest KAT	Enters Boot Error State.
HMAC-SHA256 (SEC CPU)	Power-On	Digest KAT	Enters Boot Error State.
AES256-CBC	Power-On	Encrypt and Decrypt KAT	Enters Boot Error State.
AES256-XTS-R	Power-On	Decrypt KAT	Enters Boot Error State.
AES256-XTS-W	Power-On	Encrypt KAT	Enters Boot Error State.
Hash_DRBG	Power-On	DRBG KAT	Enters Boot Error State.
RSASSA-PKCS#1-v1_5	Power-On	Signature verification KAT	Enters Boot Error State.
Hash_DRBG	Conditional	Verify newly generated random number not equal to previous one	Enters Error State.

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NDRNG	Conditional	Verify newly generated random number not equal to previous one	Enters Error State.
Firmware load test	Conditional	Verify signature of downloaded firmware image by RSASSA-PKCS#1-v1_5	Incoming firmware image is not loaded and is not saved.

When the CM continuously enters in error state in spite of several trials of reboot, the CM may be sent back to factory to recover from error state.

## Section 7 – Design Assurance

Initial operations to setup this module are following:

1. Get MSID from SAS interface.
2. Set range configurations with BandMaster(s) authority by using MSID as PIN.
3. Change BandMaster(s)/EraseMaster/SID PINs.
4. Set PortLocked in Download port to “TRUE”.

To get more details, refer to the guidance document provided with the CM.

## Section 8 – Mitigation of Other Attacks

The CM does not mitigate other attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-2 requirements.

## Appendix A – EMI/EMC

FIPS 140-2 requires the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ID, but this CM does not have FCC ID. Because this CM is a device described in Subpart B, Class A of FCC 47 Code of Federal Regulations Part 15. However, all systems using this CM and sold in the United States must meet these applicable FCC requirements.