

FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

Duo Security Cryptographic Module

Software Version 1.0

Document Version 1.0

May 4, 2016

Prepared For:



Duo Security, Inc. 123 North Ashley Street, Suite 200 Ann Arbor, MI 48104 www.duo.com Prepared By:



SafeLogic Inc. 459 Hamilton Ave, Suite 306 Palo Alto, CA 94301 www.safelogic.com

Abstract

This document provides a non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for the Duo Security Cryptographic Module.

Table of Contents

1	Intro	duction	4
	1.1	About FIPS 140	.4
	1.2	About this Document	.4
	1.3	External Resources	.4
	1.4	Notices	.4
	1.5	Acronyms	.4
2	Duo	Security Cryptographic Module	6
	2.1	Cryptographic Module Specification	.6
	2.1.1	Validation Level Detail	.6
	2.1.2	Approved Cryptographic Algorithms	.6
	2.1.3	Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms	.9
	2.1.4	Non-Approved Mode of Operation	.9
	2.2	Module Interfaces1	1
	2.3	Roles, Services, and Authentication1	2
	2.3.1	Operator Services and Descriptions1	.2
	2.3.2	2 Operator Authentication1	.3
	2.4	Physical Security	3
	2.5	Operational Environment1	3
	2.6	Cryptographic Key Management1	4
	2.6.1		
	2.6.2		
	2.6.3	Key/CSP Storage1	.6
	2.6.4	Key/CSP Zeroization1	.6
	2.7	Self-Tests1	6
	2.7.1	Power-On Self-Tests1	⊾7
	2.7.2	2 Conditional Self-Tests1	.8
	2.7.3	Cryptographic Function1	.8
	2.8	Mitigation of Other Attacks	8
3	Guid	ance and Secure Operation1	.9
	3.1	Crypto Officer Guidance	9
	3.1.1	Software Installation1	.9
	3.1.2	2 Additional Rules of Operation1	.9
	3.2	User Guidance1	9
	3.2.1	General Guidance1	.9

List of Tables

Table 1 – Acronyms and Terms	5
Table 2 – Validation Level by FIPS 140-2 Section	6
Table 3 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Certificates	8
Table 4 – Logical Interface / Physical Interface Mapping	12
Table 5 – Module Services, Roles, and Descriptions	13
Table 6 – Module Keys/CSPs	15
Table 7 – Power-On Self-Tests	17
Table 8 – Conditional Self-Tests	18

List of Figures

igure 1 – Module Boundary and Interfaces Diagram11
--

1 Introduction

1.1 About FIPS 140

Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules specifies requirements for cryptographic modules to be deployed in a Sensitive but Unclassified environment. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) run the FIPS 140-2 program. The NVLAP accredits independent testing labs to perform FIPS 140-2 testing; the CMVP validates modules meeting FIPS 140-2 validation. *Validated* is the term given to a module that is documented and tested against the FIPS 140-2 criteria.

More information is available on the CMVP website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html.

1.2 About this Document

This non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Duo Security Cryptographic Module from Duo Security, Inc. provides an overview of the product and a high-level description of how it meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2. This document contains details on the module's cryptographic keys and critical security parameters. This Security Policy concludes with instructions and guidance on running the module in a FIPS 140-2 mode of operation.

The Duo Security Cryptographic Module may also be referred to as the "module" in this document.

1.3 External Resources

The Duo Security website (<u>www.duo.com</u>) contains information on Duo Security services and products. The Cryptographic Module Validation Program website contains links to the FIPS 140-2 certificate and Duo Security contact information.

1.4 Notices

This document may be freely reproduced and distributed in its entirety without modification.

1.5 Acronyms

The following table defines acronyms found in this document:

Acronym	Term			
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard			
ANSI	American National Standards Institute			
API	Application Programming Interface			
BT	BlueTooth			
CMVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program			
СО	Crypto Officer			
CSEC	Communications Security Establishment Canada			
CSP	Critical Security Parameter			
DES	Data Encryption Standard			
DH	Diffie-Hellman			
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator			
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm			
EC	Elliptic Curve			
EMC	Electromagnetic Compatibility			
EMI	Electromagnetic Interference			
FCC	Federal Communications Commission			
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard			
GPD	General Purpose Device			
GUI	Graphical User Interface			
НМАС	(Keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code			
КАТ	Known Answer Test			
MAC	Message Authentication Code			
MD	Message Digest			
NVLAP	National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program			
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology			
OS	Operating System			
PKCS	Public-Key Cryptography Standards			
PRNG	Pseudo Random Number Generator			
PSS	Probabilistic Signature Scheme			
RF	Radio Frequency			
RNG	Random Number Generator			
RSA	Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman			
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm			
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer			
Triple-DES	Triple Data Encryption Algorithm			
TLS	Transport Layer Security			
USB	Universal Serial Bus			

Table 1 – Acronyms and Terms

2 Duo Security Cryptographic Module

2.1 Cryptographic Module Specification

The Duo Security Cryptographic Module provides cryptographic functions for Two-Factor Authentication in the Duo Mobile application.

The module's logical cryptographic boundary is the shared library files and their integrity check HMAC files. The module is a multi-chip standalone embodiment installed on a General Purpose Device.

All operations of the module occur via calls from host applications and their respective internal daemons/processes. As such there are no untrusted services calling the services of the module.

2.1.1 Validation Level Detail

FIPS 140-2 Section Title	Validation Level
Cryptographic Module Specification	1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	1
Roles, Services, and Authentication	1
Finite State Model	1
Physical Security	N/A
Operational Environment	1
Cryptographic Key Management	1
Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility	1
Self-Tests	1
Design Assurance	3
Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A

The following table lists the level of validation for each area in FIPS 140-2:

Table 2 – Validation Level by FIPS 140-2 Section

2.1.2 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms

The module's cryptographic algorithm implementations have received the following certificate numbers from the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program:

Algorithm	CAVP Certificate for Android
AES	2125
ECB (e/d; 128 , 192 , 256)	
CBC (e/d; 128 , 192 , 256)	
CFB1 (e/d; 128 , 192 , 256)	
CFB8 (e/d; 128 , 192 , 256)	
OFB (e/d; 128 , 192 , 256)	
CTR (ext only; 128, 192, 256)	
CCM (KS: 128, 192, 256)	
CMAC (Generation/Verification) (KS: 128, 192, 256)	
GCM (KS: AES_128(e/d), AES_192(e/d), AES_256(e/d)) GMAC_Supported	
XTS ((KS: XTS_128((e/d) (f/p)) KS: XTS_256((e/d) (f/p))	
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC- SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512	1296
DSA, DSA 2	666
FIPS 186-2	
PQR Ver: Sig Ver- 1024-bit	
FIPS 186-4	
PQG Gen : 2048 & 3072 (using SHA-2)	
PQG Ver : 1024, 2048 & 3072 (using SHA-1 and SHA-2)	
Key Pair: 2048-bit & 3072-bit	
Sig Gen: 2048-bit & 3072-bit (using SHA-2)	
Sig Ver : 1024-bit. 2048-bit & 3072-bit (using SHA-1 & SHA-2)	
ECDSA, ECDSA2	319
FIPS 186-2	
PKG : Curves (P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B-	
409 & B-571)	
PKV: Curves All P, K & B	
FIPS 186-4	
PKG : Curves (P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B-	
409 & B-571)	
PKV : Curves All P, K & B	
Sig Gen: (P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B-409	
& B-571) (SHA-2)	
Sig Ver : Curves P-192, P224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-163, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-	
163, B-233, B-283, B-409 & B-571 (any SHA size)	
K-409 & K-571 (SHA-1)	
RSA (X9.31, PKCS #1.5, PSS)	1094
FIPS 186-2	
ANSIX9.31	

Key Gen: 2048-bit, 3072-bit & 4096-bit	
Sig Gen: 2048-bit, 3072-bit & 4096 bit (any SHA size)	
Sig Ver: 1024-bit, 1536-bit, 2048-bit, 3072-bit & 4096-bit (any SHA size)	
PKCS1 V1 5	
Sig Gen: 2048-bit, 3072-bit & 4096-bit (any SHA size)	
Sig Ver: 1024-bit, 1536-bit, 2048-bit, 3072-bit & 4096-bit (any SHA size)	
PSS	
Sig Gen: 2048-bit, 3072-bit & 4096-bit (any SHA size)	
Sig Ver: 1024-bit, 1536-bit, 2048-bit, 3072-bit & 4096-bit (any SHA size)	
FIPS 186-4	
ANSIX9.31	
Sig Gen: 2048-bit (using SHA-2)	
Sig Ver: 1024-bit, 2048-bit, & 3072-bit (any SHA size)	
PKCS1 V1 5	
Sig Gen: 2048-bit & 3072-bit (using SHA-2)	
Sig Ver: 1024-bit, 2048-bit, & 3072-bit (any SHA size)	
PSS	
Sig Gen: 2048-bit & 3072-bit (using SHA-2)	
Sig Ver: 1024-bit, 2048-bit, & 3072-bit (any SHA size)	
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	1849
Triple-DES	1351
TECB(KO 1 e/d, KO 2 d only)	
TCBC(KO 1 e/d, KO 2 d only)	
TCFB1(KO 1 e/d, KO 2 d only)	
TCFB8(KO 1 e/d, KO 2 d only)	
TCFB64 (KO 1 e/d , KO 2 d only)	
TOFB(KO 1 e/d, KO 2 d only)	
CMAC(KS: 3-Key; Generation/Verification; Block Size(s): Full / Partial)	
SP 800-90 DRBG (Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG)	233
CVL (ECC CDH KAS)	28
Table 3 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Certificates	

Table 3 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Certificates

2.1.3 Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms

The module supports the following non-FIPS 140-2 approved but allowed algorithms:

- RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
- EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)

2.1.4 Non-Approved Mode of Operation

The module supports a non-approved mode of operation. The algorithms listed in this section are not to be used by the operator in the FIPS Approved mode of operation.

The following algorithms are disallowed as of January 1, 2016 per the NIST SP 800-131A algorithm transitions:

- Random Number Generator Based on ANSI X9.31 Appendix A.2.4
- Two-Key Triple DES Encryption

The following algorithm is disallowed as of October 29, 2015 per the removal from NIST SP 800-90A:

• Dual EC DRBG

The following algorithms are disallowed as of January 1, 2014 per the NIST SP 800-131A algorithm transitions:


•	FIPS 186-2 DSA (using S	SHA-1):	PQG Gen- 1024-bit
			Key Gen- 1024-bit
			Sig Gen- 1024-bit
•	FIPS 186-4 DSA	PQG Gen, 1024	I-bit (any SHA size)
		Key Gen, 1024-	-bit
		Sig Gen, 1024-l	bit (any SHA size), 2048-bit & 3072-bit using SHA-1
•	FIPS 186-2 RSA	ANSIX9.31	
		Key Gen 1024 8	& 1536
		ANSIX9.31	
		Sig Gen 1024 8	a 1536 (any SHA size); 2048, 3072 & 4096 using SHA-1
		PKCSI V1 5	
		Sig Gen 1024 8	1536 (any SHA size); 2048, 3072 & 4096 using SHA-1
		PSS	

Sig Gen 1024 & 1536 (any SHA size); 2048, 3072 & 4096 using SHA-1

- FIPS 186-4 RSA ANSIX9.31 Sig Gen 1024 using SHA-1
 PKCSI V1 5 Sig Gen 1024 using SHA-1
 PSS Sig Gen 1024 using SHA-1
 FIPS 186-2 ECDSA PKG: Curves P-192, K-163 & B-163 Sig Gen Curves All P, K & B
 FIPS 186-4 ECDSA PKG: Curves P-192, K-163 & B-163
 Sig Gen Curves P-192, K-163 & B-163
 Sig Gen Curves P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B-409 & B-571) (using SHA-1) P-192-, K-163 & B-163 (any SHA size)
- CVL (ECC CDH KAS) (non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)

FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: Duo Security Cryptographic Module

2.2 Module Interfaces



The figure below shows the module's physical and logical block diagram:

Figure 1 – Module Boundary and Interfaces Diagram

The interfaces (ports) for the physical boundary include the Data/power port, WIFI / BT Transceiver, RF Transceiver, and LCD. When operational, the module does not transmit any information across these physical ports because it is a software cryptographic module. Therefore, the module's interfaces are purely logical and are provided through the Application Programming Interface (API) that a calling daemon can operate. The logical interfaces expose services that applications directly call, and the API provides functions that may be called by a referencing application (see Section 2.3 – Roles, Services, and Authentication for the list of available functions). The module distinguishes between logical interfaces by logically separating the information according to the defined API.

The API provided by the module is mapped onto the FIPS 140- 2 logical interfaces: data input, data output, control input, and status output. Each of the FIPS 140- 2 logical interfaces relates to the module's callable interface, as follows:

FIPS 140-2 Interface	Logical Interface	Module Physical Interface
Data Input	Input parameters of API function	Data/power port
	calls	WIFI / BT Transceiver
		RF Transceiver
Data Output	Output parameters of API function	Data/power port
	calls	WIFI / BT Transceiver
		RF Transceiver
Control Input	API function calls	Data/power port
		WIFI / BT Transceiver
		RF Transceiver
		LCD
Status Output	For FIPS mode, function calls	LCD
	returning status information and	
	return codes provided by API	
	function calls.	
Power	None	Data/power port

 Table 4 – Logical Interface / Physical Interface Mapping

As shown in Figure 1 – Module Boundary and Interfaces Diagram and Table 5 – Module Services, Roles, and Descriptions, the output data path is provided by the data interfaces and is logically disconnected from processes performing key generation or zeroization. No key information will be output through the data output interface when the module zeroizes keys.

2.3 Roles, Services, and Authentication

The module supports a Crypto Officer and a User role. The module does not support a Maintenance role. The User and Crypto-Officer roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing services implemented by the Module.

2.3.1 Operator Services and Descriptions

The module supports services that are available to users in the various roles. All of the services are described in detail in the module's user documentation. The following table shows the services available to the various roles and the access to cryptographic keys and CSPs resulting from services:

Service	Roles	CSP / Algorithm	Permission
Module	Crypto Officer	None	CO:
initialization			execute
Symmetric	User	AES Key, Triple-DES Key	User:
encryption/			read/write/execute
decryption			
Digital signature	User	RSA Private Key, DSA Private Key	User:
			read/write/execute
Symmetric key	User	AES Key, Triple-DES Key	User:
generation			read/write/execute

Service	Roles	CSP / Algorithm	Permission
Asymmetric key	User	RSA Private Key, DSA Private Key	User:
generation			read/write/execute
Keyed Hash	User	HMAC Key	User:
(HMAC)		HMAC SHA-1, HMAC SHA- 224, HMAC SHA-	read/write/execute
		256, HMAC SHA-384, HMAC SHA-512	
Message digest	User	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-	User:
(SHS)		512	read/write/execute
Random number	User	DRBG Seed and Seed Key	User:
generation			read/write/execute
Show status	Crypto Officer	None	User and CO:
	User		execute
Self-test	User	All CSPs	User:
			read/execute
Zeroize	Crypto Officer	All CSPs	CO:
			read/write/execute

Table 5 – Module Services, Roles, and Descriptions

2.3.2 Operator Authentication

As required by FIPS 140-2, there are two roles (a Crypto Officer role and User role) in the module that operators may assume. As allowed by Level 1, the module does not support authentication to access services. As such, there are no applicable authentication policies. Access control policies are implicitly defined by the services available to the roles as specified in Table 5 – Module Services, Roles, and Descriptions.

2.4 Physical Security

This section of requirements does not apply to this module. The module is a software-only module and does not implement any physical security mechanisms.

2.5 Operational Environment

The module operates on a general purpose device (GPD) running a general purpose operating system (GPOS). For FIPS purposes, the module is running on this operating system in single user mode and does not require any additional configuration to meet the FIPS requirements.

The module was tested on the following platforms:

• Android 4.0 on Galaxy Nexus

The cryptographic module is also supported on the following operating environments for which operational testing and algorithm testing was not performed:

• Android 2.3.3 (Gingerbread)

- Android 4.0 (Ice Cream Sandwich)
- Android 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 (Jelly Bean)
- Android 4.4 (KitKat)
- Android 5.0, 5.1 (Lollipop)
- Android 6.0 (Marshmallow)

Compliance is maintained for other versions of the respective operating system family where the binary is unchanged. No claim can be made as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when ported to an operational environment which is not listed on the validation certificate.

The GPD(s) used during testing met Federal Communications Commission (FCC) FCC Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) and Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) requirements for business use as defined by 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part15, Subpart B. FIPS 140-2 validation compliance is maintained when the module is operated on other versions of the GPOS running in single user mode, assuming that the requirements outlined in NIST IG G.5 are met.

2.6 Cryptographic Key Management

Keys and CSPs	Storage Locations	Storage Method	Input Method	Output Method	Zeroization	Access
AES Key	RAM	Plaintext	API call	None	power cycle	CO: RWD
			parameter		cleanse()	U: RWD
Triple-DES Key	RAM	Plaintext	API call	None	power cycle	CO: RWD
			parameter		cleanse()	U: RWD
RSA Public Key	RAM	Plaintext	API call	None	power cycle	CO: RWD
			parameter		cleanse()	U: RWD
RSA Private Key	RAM	Plaintext	API call	None	power cycle	CO: RWD
			parameter		cleanse()	U: RWD
DSA Public Key	RAM	Plaintext	API call	None	power cycle	CO: RWD
			parameter		cleanse()	U: RWD
DSA Private Key	RAM	Plaintext	API call	None	power cycle	CO: RWD
			parameter		cleanse()	U: RWD
HMAC Key	RAM	Plaintext	API call	None	power cycle	CO: RWD
			parameter		cleanse()	U: RWD
Integrity Key	Module	Plaintext	None	None	None	CO: RWD
	Binary					U: RWD
EC DSA Private	RAM	Plaintext	None	None	power cycle	CO: RWD
Кеу					cleanse()	U: RWD

The table below provides a complete list of Critical Security Parameters used within the module:

Keys and CSPs	Storage Locations	Storage Method	Input Method	Output Method	Zeroization	Access
EC DSA Public	RAM	Plaintext	None	None	power cycle	CO: RWD
Кеу					cleanse()	U: RWD
EC DH Public	RAM	Plaintext	None	None	power cycle	CO: RWD
Components					cleanse()	U: RWD
EC DH Private	RAM	Plaintext	None	None	power cycle	CO: RWD
Components					cleanse()	U: RWD
HMAC DRBG	RAM	Plaintext	None	None	power cycle	CO: RWD
Entropy					cleanse()	U: RWD
HMAC DRBG V	RAM	Plaintext	None	None	power cycle	CO: RWD
Value (Seed					cleanse()	U: RWD
Length)						
HMAC DRBG Key	RAM	Plaintext	None	None	power cycle	CO: RWD
					cleanse()	U: RWD
HMAC DRBG	RAM	Plaintext	None	None	power cycle	CO: RWD
init_seed					cleanse()	U: RWD

R = Read W = Write D = Delete

Table 6 – Module Keys/CSPs

The application that uses the module is responsible for appropriate destruction and zeroization of the key material. The module provides functions for key allocation and destruction which overwrite the memory that is occupied by the key information with zeroes before it is deallocated.

2.6.1 Random Number Generation

The module uses SP800-90A DRBGs for creation of asymmetric and symmetric keys.

The module accepts input from entropy sources external to the cryptographic boundary for use as seed material for the module's Approved DRBGs. This external entropy source provides an estimated minimum amount of 93 bits of entropy, which limits the strength of the generated key.

The module performs continual tests on the random numbers it uses to ensure that the seed and seed key input to the Approved DRBGs do not have the same value. The module also performs continual tests on the output of the Approved DRBGs to ensure that consecutive random numbers do not repeat.

2.6.2 Key/Critical Security Parameter (CSP) Authorized Access and Use by Role and Service/Function

An authorized application as user (the User role) has access to all key data generated during the operation of the module.

2.6.3 Key/CSP Storage

Public and private keys are provided to the module by the calling process and are destroyed when released by the appropriate API function calls or during power cycle. The module does not perform persistent storage of keys.

2.6.4 Key/CSP Zeroization

The application is responsible for calling the appropriate destruction functions from the API. The destruction functions then overwrite the memory occupied by keys with zeroes and deallocates the memory. This occurs during process termination / power cycle. Keys are immediately zeroized upon deallocation, which sufficiently protects the CSPs from compromise.

2.7 Self-Tests

FIPS 140-2 requires that the module perform self-tests to ensure the integrity of the module and the correctness of the cryptographic functionality at start up. In addition, some functions require continuous verification of function, such as the random number generator. All of these tests are listed and described in this section. In the event of a self-test error, the module will log the error and will halt. The module must be initialized into memory to resume function.

The following sections discuss the module's self-tests in more detail.

2.7.1 Power-On Self-Tests

Power-on self-tests are executed automatically when the module is loaded into memory. The module verifies the integrity of the runtime executable using a HMAC-SHA1 digest computed at build time. If the fingerprints match, the power-up self-tests are then performed. If the power-up self-test is successful, a flag is set to place the module in FIPS mode.

ТҮРЕ	DETAIL		
Software Integrity Check	HMAC-SHA1 on all module components		
Known Answer Tests ¹	AES encrypt/decrypt		
	AES GCM		
	AES CCM		
	XTS-AES		
	AES CMAC		
	Triple-DES CMAC		
	EC Diffie-Hellman		
	HMAC-SHA1		
	HMAC-SHA224		
	HMAC-SHA256		
	HMAC-SHA384		
	HMAC-SHA512		
	• RSA		
	• SHA-1		
	• SHA-224		
	• SHA-256		
	• SHA-384		
	• SHA-512		
	• SP 800-90 DRBG (Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG,		
	CTR_DRBG)		
	Triple-DES encrypt/decrypt		
Pair-wise Consistency Tests	• DSA		
	• RSA		
	ECDSA		

Table 7 – Power-On Self-Tests

Input, output, and cryptographic functions cannot be performed while the Module is in a self-test or error state because the module is single-threaded and will not return to the calling application until the power-up self-tests are complete. If the power-up self-tests fail, subsequent calls to the module will also fail - thus no further cryptographic operations are possible.

¹ Note that all SHA-X KATs are tested as part of the respective HMAC SHA-X KAT. SHA-1 is also tested independently.

2.7.2 Conditional Self-Tests

The module implements the following conditional self-tests upon key generation, or random number generation (respectively):

ТҮРЕ	DETAIL		
Pair-wise Consistency Tests	• DSA		
	• RSA		
	ECDSA		
Continuous RNG Tests	• Performed on all Approved DRBGs, the non-		
	approved X9.31 RNG, and the non-approved		
	DUAL_EC_DRBG		

Table 8 – Conditional Self-Tests

2.7.3 Cryptographic Function

The module verifies the integrity of the runtime executable using a HMAC-SHA1 digest which is computed at build time. If this computed HMAC-SHA1 digest matches the stored, known digest, then the power-up self-test (consisting of the algorithm-specific Pairwise Consistency and Known Answer tests) is performed. If any component of the power-up self-test fails, an internal global error flag is set to prevent subsequent invocation of any cryptographic function calls. Any such power-up self-test failure is a hard error that can only be recovered by reinstalling the module². The power-up self-tests may be performed at any time by reloading the module.

No operator intervention is required during the running of the self-tests.

2.8 Mitigation of Other Attacks

The Module does not contain additional security mechanisms beyond the requirements for FIPS 140-2 Level 1 cryptographic modules.

² The initialization function could be re-invoked but such re-invocation does not provide a means from recovering from an integrity test or known answer test failure

3 Guidance and Secure Operation

3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance

3.1.1 Software Installation

The module is not available for direct download to the general public. The module and its host application are to be installed on an operating system specified in Section 2.5 or one where portability is maintained.

3.1.2 Additional Rules of Operation

- 1. The writable memory areas of the module (data and stack segments) are accessible only by the application so that the operating system is in "single user" mode, i.e. only the application has access to that instance of the module.
- 2. The operating system is responsible for multitasking operations so that other processes cannot access the address space of the process containing the module.

3.2 User Guidance

3.2.1 General Guidance

The module is not distributed as a standalone library and is only used in conjunction with the solution.

The end user of the operating system is also responsible for zeroizing CSPs via wipe/secure delete procedures.

If the module power is lost and restored, the calling application can reset the IV to the last value used.