BROCADE

Brocade® DCX, DCX 8510-8, DCX-4S and DCX 8510-4 Backbones, 6510 FC Switch, 6520 FC Switch, 7800 Extension Switch

FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

Document Version 1.0

Brocade Communications

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Document History

Version	Summary of Changes	Publication Date
1.0	Initial Release	August 1,2014

1 Module Overview

The Brocade 6510, 6520, 7800, DCX, DCX 8510-8, DCX-4S and DCX 8510-4 are multiple-chip standalone cryptographic modules, as defined by FIPS 140-2. The cryptographic boundary for DCX, DCX 8510-8, DCX-4S and DCX 8510-4 backbone is the outer perimeter of the metal chassis including the removable cover, control processor blades, core switch blades, and port blades or filler panels. The cryptographic boundary of the 6510 FC Switch, 6520 FC Switch, 7800 Extension Switch is the outer perimeter of the metal chassis including the removable cover. The power supply units are not included in the cryptographic boundary. The module is a Fibre Channel and/or Gigabit Ethernet routing switch that provides secure network services and network management.

For each module to operate in a FIPS approved mode of operation, the tamper evident seals supplied in FIPS Kit P/N Brocade XBR-000195 must be installed as defined in Appendix A.

The Crypto-Officer is responsible for storing and controlling the inventory of any unused seals. The unused seals shall be stored in plastic bags in a cool, dry environment between 60° and 70° F (15° to 20° C) and less than 50% relative humidity. Rolls should be stored flat on a slit edge or suspended by the core.

The Crypto-Officer shall maintain a serial number inventory of all used and unused tamper evident seals. The Crypto-Officer shall periodically monitor the state of all applied seals for evidence of tampering. A seal serial number mismatch, a seal placement change, a checkerboard destruct pattern that appears in peeled film and adhesive residue on the substrate are evidence of tampering. The Crypto-Officer shall periodically view each applied seal under a UV light to verify the presence of a UV wallpaper pattern. The lack of a wallpaper pattern is evidence of tampering. The Crypto-Officer is responsible for returning a module to a FIPS approved state after any intentional or unintentional reconfiguration of the physical security measures.

A validated module configuration is comprised of Fabric OS v7.2.1 (P/N: 63-1001421-01) installed on, a switch or backbone and a set of installed blades. The below platforms may be used in a validated module configuration:

Firmware	
Fabric OS v7.2.1	

Table 1 - Firmware Version

Switch	SKU	Part Number	Brief Description
	BR-6510-24-16G-F	80-1005232-03 ¹	6510,24P,16GB SFP,NON-PORT ² SIDE AIR FLOW
	BR-6510-24-16G-R	80-1005267-03 ¹	6510,24P,16GB SFP,PORT SIDE ² AIR FLOW
	BR-6510-24-8G-F	80-1005268-03 ¹	6510,24P,8GB SFP,NON-PORT SIDE AIR FLOW
6510	BR-6510-24-8G-R	80-1005269-03 ¹	6510,24P,8GB SFP,PORT SIDE AIR FLOW
	BR-6510-48-16G-F	80-1005271-03	6510,48P,16GB SFP,NON-PORT SIDE AIR FLOW, 24-PORT POD LICENSE
	BR-6510-48-16G-R	80-1005272-03	6510,48P,16GB SFP, PORT SIDE AIR FLOW, 24-Port POD LICENSE
	BR-6520-48-8G-F	80-1007245-03	6520, 48 port 8G, SWL SFP, non-port side exhaust. Includes three fan FRUs and two 1100W AC power supplies
	BR-6520-48-8G-R	80-1007246-03	6520, 48 port 8G, SWL SFP, port side exhaust. Includes three fan FRUs and two 1100W AC power supplies
6520	BR-6520-48-16G-F	80-1007242-03	6520, 48 port 16G, SWL SFP, non-port side exhaust. Includes three fan FRUs and two 1100W AC power supplies
	BR-6520-48-16G-R	80-1007244-03	6520, 48 port 16G, SWL SFP, port side exhaust. Includes three fan FRUs and two 1100W AC power supplies
	BR-6520-96-16G-R	80-1007257-03	6520, 96 port, 16G, SWL SFP, port side exhaust. Includes three fan FRUs and two 1100W AC power supplies
	BR-7800F-0001	80-1002607-07 ³ 80-1006977-02 ⁴	7800,UPG LIC,22P,16 8 SWL
7800	BR-7800F-0002	80-1002608-07 ³ 80-1006980-02 ⁴	7800,UPG LIC,22P,16 8 LWL
	BR-7800-0001	80-1002609-07 ³ 80-1006979-02 ⁴	7800,6P,8GB SWL SFP

Table 2 - Switch Platforms

Table 2 Notes

- 1. Ports 25 48 are physically present but disabled. A POD license is required to enable ports 25 48.
- 2. Port side and non-port side air flow indicates whether the fan direction causes air to be drawn into the port side air vents or exhausted from the port side air vents.
- 3. Serviceable assembly.
- 4. Production assembly.
- 5. Serviceable and production assemblies are functionally equivalent. The part number assigned to each production assembly was created to support the release of new agency labels with new CCC mark, humidity and altitude marks.

Backbone	SKU	Part Number	Brief Description
DCX	BR-DCX-0001	80-1001064-10 ¹ 80-1006751-01 ²	DCX,2PS,0P,2CP,2 CORE,0SFP
	BR-DCX-0002	80-1004920-04 ¹ 80-1006752-01 ²	DCX,2PS,0P,2CP,2 CORE,0 SFP,ENT BUN ⁴ ,2 WWN
DCX-4S	BR-DCX4S-0001	80-1002071-10 ¹ 80-1006773-01 ²	DCX-4S,2PS,0P,2CP,2 CORE,0SFP
	BR-DCX4S-0002	80-1002066-10 ¹ 80-1006772-01 ²	DCX-4S,2PS,0P,2CP,2 CORE,0SFP,BR,ENT BUN ⁴
DCX 8510-4	BR-DCX8514-0001	80-1004697-04 ^{1,} 80-1006963-01 ²	DCX8510-4,2PS,0P,2CP,216GCORE,0SFP
	BR-DCX8514-0002	80-1005158-04 ¹ 80-1006964-01 ²	DCX8510-4,2PS,0P,2CP,216GCORE,0SFP,ENTBUN ⁴
DCX 8510-8	BR-DCX8518-0001	80-1004917-04 ¹ 80-1007025-01 ²	DCX8510-8,2PS,0P,2CP,2 16GB,0SFP,ENT BUN ⁴

Table 3 - Backbone Models

Table 3 Notes

- 1. Serviceable assembly.
- 2. Production assembly.
- 3. Serviceable and production assemblies are functionally equivalent. The part number assigned to each production assembly was created to support the release of new agency labels with new CCC mark, humidity and altitude marks.
- 4. Enterprise Software License Bundle: Adaptive Networking, Extended Fabrics, Advance Performance Monitoring, Trunking, Fabric Watch, Server Application Optimized.

The blades listed below may be used in backbone-based validated module configurations:

Blade	Acronym ⁴	Part Number	Brlef Description
CP8 Control Processor Blade	CP8	80-1001070-071 80-1006794-01 ²	FRU,CP BLADE,DCX
CR16-4 Core Switch Blade	CR16-4	80-1004897-01	FRU, CORE BLADE, DCX8510-4
CR16-8 Core Switch Blade	CR16-8	80-1004898-01	FRU, CORE BLADE, DCX8510-8
CR4S-8 Core Switch Blade	CR4S-8	80-1002000-02 ¹ 80-1006771-01 ²	FRU, CORE BLADE, DCX-4S
CR8 Core Switch Blade	CR8	80-1001071-02 ¹ 80-1006750-01 ²	FRU, CORE BLADE, DCX
FC16-32 Port Blade	FC16-32	80-1005166-02	FRU, PORT BLADE, 32P, DCX8510, 16G SFP
FC16-48 Port Blade	FC16-48	80-1005187-02	FRU,PORTBLADE,48P,DCX8510,16GSFP
FC8-16 Port Blade	FC8-16	80-1001066-01 ¹ 80-1006936-01 ²	FRU, PORT BLADE, 16P, DCX, 8G SFP
FC8-32 Port Blade	FC8-32	80-1001067-01 ¹ 80-1006779-01 ²	FRU, PORT BLADE, 8P, DCX, 8G SFP
FC8-48 Port Blade	FC8-48	80-1001453-01 ¹ 80-1006823-01 ²	FRU, PORT BLADE, 48P, DCX, 8G SFP
FC8-64 Port Blade	FC8-64	80-1003887-01 ¹ 80-1007000-01 ²	FRU, PORT BLADE, 48P, DCX, 8G SFP
FX8-24 Port Blade	FX8-24	80-1002839-03 ¹ 80-1007017-01 ²	FRU, EXT BLADE, 8G X 12P, 10x1GBE, 2X10GBE
DCX/DCX 8510-8 Filler Panel	DCX/DCX 8510-8 Filler Panel	49-1000016-04	FILLER PANEL
DCX-4S Backbone Filler Panel	DCX-4S Backbone Filler Panel	49-1000064-02	FILLER PANEL
DCX-4S/DCX 8510-4 Filler Panel	DCX-4S/DCX8510- 4 Filler Panel	49-1000294-05	FILLER PANEL

Table 4 - Supported Blades

Table 4 Notes

- 1. Serviceable assembly.
- 2. Production assembly
- 3. Serviceable and production assemblies are functionally equivalent. The part number assigned to each production assembly was created to support the release of new agency labels with new CCC mark, humidity and altitude marks.
- 4. Acronym reference in Table 5 Backbone Blade Support Matrix.

Each backbone model supports a selected set of blades:

Backbone Model	Blades (max count)				
DCX (12 slots) ¹	CP8 (2), CR8 (2), FC8-16 (8), FC8-32 (8), FC8-48 (8), FC8-64 (8), FX8-24 (1), DCX/DCX 8510-8 Filler Panel (10)				
DCX 8510-8 (12 slots) 1	CP8 (2) ¹ , CR16-8 (2), FC8-64 (8), FC16-32 (8), FC16-48 (8), FX8-24 (1), DCX/DCX 8510-8 Filler Panel (10)				
DCX-4S (8 slots) ¹	CP8 (2), CR4S-8 (2), FC8-16 (4), FC8-32 (4), FC8-48 (4), FC8-64 (4), FX8-24(1), DCX-4S Backbone Filler Panel (6), DCX-4S/DCX 8510-4 Filler Panel (6)				
DCX 8510-4 (8 slots) ¹	CP8 (2), CR16-4 (2), FC8-64 (4), FC16-32 (4), FC16-48 (4), FX8-24 (1), DCX-4S/DCX 8510-4 Filler Panel (6)				

Table 5 - Backbone Blade Support Matrix

Table 5 Notes

1. Each Backbone Model shall be fully populated with a minimum of two CP8 Control Processor Blades (Part Number: 80-1001070-06 or 80-1006794-01).

The name of a backbone-based validated module configuration is formed by a concatenation of part numbers of the specific set of blades installed in the backbone.

For the DCX and DCX 8510-8 platforms:

<Backbone PN><Slot 1 PN><Slot 2 PN>....<Slot 12 PN> For the DCX-4S and DCX 8510-4 platforms: <Backbone PN><Slot 1 PN><Slot 2 PN>....<Slot 8 PN>



Figure 1 - DCX-4S and DCX

Figure 1 illustrates representative configurations of the DCX-4S (left image) and DCX (right image) cryptographic modules. These are not the only possible configurations. Other possible configurations can be created by utilizing the blade and support matrix information in Table 4 and Table 5.



Figure 2 - DCX 8510-4 and DCX 8510-8

Figure 2 illustrates representative configurations of the DCX 8510-4 (left image) and DCX 8510-8 (right image) cryptographic modules. These are not the only possible configurations. Other possible configurations can be created by utilizing the blade and support matrix information in Table 4 and Table 5.



Figure 3 - Brocade 6510

Figure 3 illustrates the Brocade 6510 cryptographic module.



Figure 4 - Brocade 6520

Figure 4 illustrates the Brocade 6520 cryptographic module.



Figure 5 - Brocade 7800

Figure 5 illustrates the Brocade 7800 cryptographic module.

2 Security Level

The cryptographic module meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 2 security of FIPS 140-2.

Security Requirements Section	Level
Cryptographic Module Specification	2
Module Ports and Interfaces	2
Roles, Services and Authentication	2
Finite State Model	2
Physical Security	2
Operational Environment	NA
Cryptographic Key Management	2
EMI/EMC	2
Self-Tests	2
DesignAssurance	2
Mitigation of Other Attacks	NA

Table 6 - Module Security Level Specification

3 Modes of Operation

3.1 Approved mode of operation

The cryptographic module supports the following Approved algorithms:

Approved Algorithm	Certificate Number
AES	731, 1595, 1596
HMAC-SHA-256	397, 933, 934
HMAC-SHA-512	933, 934
HMAC-SHA-1	397, 933, 934
RNG	1252, 1253
RSA	1389, 1390
SHS [SHA-1]	749, 1408
SHS [SHA-256]	749, 1408
SHS [SHA-512]	1407, 1408
Triple-DES	652, 1043
CVL (SP800-135 KDF)	157, 158

Table 7 - Approved Algorithms

NOTICE: Users should reference the transition tables that will be available at the CMVP Web Site (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/). The data in the tables will inform users of the risks associated with using a particular algorithm and a given key length.

The following non-Approved algorithms and protocols are allowed within the Approved mode of operation:

- RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength)
- Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength)
- HMAC-MD5 to support RADIUS authentication
- NDRNG used for seeding the Approved DRBG
- MD5 (used for password hash)

The initial state of the cryptographic module is not in a FIPS-compliant state. The cryptographic module contains four default accounts: root, factory, admin, and user. Each default account has a public, default password.

The cryptographic module may be configured for FIPS mode via execution of the following procedure:

- 1) Perform zeroization operation.
- 2) Power cycle the module.
- 3) Change passwords for all existing user accounts.
- 4) Disable Telnet, HTTP
- 5) Enable HTTPS
- 6) Do not use FTP
- a) Config Upload
- b) Config Download

- c) Support Save
- d) FW Download
- 7) Do not use MD5 and SHA1 hash and 0-3 within Authentication Protocols; Diffie-Hellman with Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol (DH-CHAP) and FCAP.
- 8) Configure to use SHA256 as the signature algorithm for FCAP authentication with group 4.
- 9) Do not define FCIP IKE or IPSec policies.
- 10) Disable Management Interface IPSec/IKE
- 11) Disable In-Band Management Interface
- 12) Disable In-Flight Encryption
- 13) Disable TACACS+ authspec mode
- 14) LDAP CA certificate should be of RSA 2048 bits signed with SHA256.
- 15) Do not configure SNMP Access List
- 16) Enable Self-Tests
- 17) Within Radius, only use PEAP MS-CHAP V2. [NOTE: This is a protocol that relies on the strength of TLSv1.0, which is utilizing RSA 2048 with SHA-256 and FIPS Approved cipher suites (AES, HMAC-SHA-1)]. Configure RADIUS server to only use PEAP MS-CHAP V2.
- 18) Enable Signed FW Download
- 19) Install removable front cover (as applicable) and apply tamper labels
- 20) Disable Boot PROM Access
- 21) Disable Factory role Access
- 22) Disable Root Access
- 23) Enable FIPS mode via the "fipscfg enable fips" command
- 24) Power-cycle the module.
- 25) Externally generated RSA key pairs shall only be imported if they are RSA 2048.
- 26) After certificate operations (e.g. importing) view "fipscfg verify fips" to validate FIPS.
- 27) For SSH sessions, execute "fipscfg enable SHA256" for SSH sessions signed/verified with SHA 256.
- 28) Execute "fipscfg verify fips" and ensure that all verifications are passed.
- 29) SSH clients and servers should support diffie-hellman-group-exchange-256 and the ability to sign/verify with SHA256 to connect to the switch.

The operator can determine if the cryptographic module is running in FIPS (Approved) vs. non-FIPS (non-Approved) mode via execution of the CLI command, "fipscfg -- show" service. The module will return the following as an indicator for the FIPS Mode of Operation: "FIPS mode is: Enabled". When operating in the non-Approved mode of operation the following will be displayed "FIPS mode is: Disabled."

3.2 Non-Approved mode of operation

In non-Approved mode, an operator will have no access to CSPs used within the Approved mode. When switching between FIPS and non-FIPS mode of operation, the operator is required to perform zeroization of the module's plaintext CSPs.

NOTICE: The module provides the following non-FIPS approved algorithms only in non-FIPS mode of operation. The use of any such service is an explicit violation of this Security Policy and is explicitly disallowed by this Security Policy.

Crypto	Role	Additional Details
Function/Service	a. / a.*	
Cipher suites for SSL	N/A*	aes-128-cbc, aes-128-ecb, aes-192-cbc, aes-192-ecb, aes-256-cbc, aes-
and TLS		256-ecb, bf, bf-cbc, bf-cfb, bf-ecb, bf- ofb, cast, cast-cbc, cast5-cbc,
		cast5-cfb, cast5-ecb, cast5-ofb, des, des-cbc, des-cfb, des-ecb, des-ede,
		des-ede- cbc, des-ede-cfb, des-ede-ofb, des-ede3, des-ede3-cbc, des-
		ede3-cfb, des-ede3-ofb, des-ofb, des3, desx, rc2, rc2-40- cbc, rc2-64-cbc,
Marana Diarata CCI	NI / A *	rc2-cbc, rc2-cfb, rc2-ecb, rc2-ofb, rc4, rc4-40
Message Digests SSL and TLS	N/A*	md2, md4, md4, rmd160
Message	Crypto-Officer	Ciphers: aes-128-ctr, aes-192-ctr, aes-256-ctr, arcfour256, arcfour128,
authentication		aes-128-cbc, 3des-cbc, blowfish- cbc, cast128-cbc, aes-192-cbc, aes-256-
algorithms and		cbc, arcfour
ciphers for		
configuring SSH		Macs: hmac-md5, hmac-sha-1, umac-64, hmac-ripemd160, hmac-sha-1- 96, hmac-md5-96
Common	Crypto-Officer	FCAP and HTTPS are supported with certificates of any size (512 to 2048
Certificates for FCAP		and above) signed with MD5, SHA1, SHA256
and HTTPS		
SNMP	Crypto-Officer	SNMPv1 and SNMPv3; Algorithms: SHA1 and MD5
RADIUS or LDAP	Crypto-Officer	PAP and CHAP authentication method for RADIUS (all considered as plaintext)
		RADIUS and LDAP are supported with CA certificates of any size (512 to 2048 and above) signed with MD5, SHA1, SHA256 LDAP uses TLS connections in non-FIPS mode without certificates
Telnet	N/A	
		N/A
HTTP	N/A	N/A
FTP	Crypto-Officer	Config Upload, Config Download, Support Save, FW Download, autoftp
FCIP IKE or IPSec	N/A	Management Interface IPSec/IKE (disabled for management interface)
In-Band	N/A	N/A
Management		
Interface	Cruchto Officiar	DCA key size < 2049 bits for SCIL and TLS
RSA Diffie-Hellman	Crypto-Officer	RSA key size < 2048 bits for SSH and TLSDH key size < 2048 bits for SSH
	Crypto-Officer	-
In-Flight Encryption	Crypto-Officer	IKE: DH 2048 keys with SHA1 for key exchange and HMAC-SHA1-512 for IKE protocol
		DH-CHAP: Diffie Hellman with NULL DH, 1024, 1280, 1536 and 2048 keys with MD5 and SHA1 hash algorithm
		FCAP: Certificates with any key size signed by MD5, SHA1
TACACS+ authspec mode	Crypto-Officer	PAP or CHAP authspec is supported

Table 8 – Functions / Services available in non-FIPS mode

*NOTE: This feature "IS NOT" available to the operator after FIPS mode has been enabled (i.e. this feature is permanently disabled).

4 Ports and Interfaces

The cryptographic module provides the following physical ports and logical interfaces:

- Fiber Channel: Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output
- 1 GbE & 10 GbE: Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output
- Ethernet Ports: Control Input, Status Output
- Serial port: Control Input, Status Output
- USB: Data Input, Data Output, Status Output
 - o Brocade USB flash device, XBR-DCX-0131
- Power Supply Connectors: Power Input, Data Output, Status Input
- LEDs: Status Output (1)

4.1 LED Indicators

- 1) Blades:
 - a) Blade Power LED
 - b) Blade Status LED
 - c) Fibre Channel port status LED
 - d) Fibre Channel port speed LED
 - e) USB port Status LED
 - f) Active CP LED
 - g) Ethernet port (SERVICE) Link LED
 - h) Ethernet port (SERVICE) Activity LED
 - i) Ethernet port (MGMT) Link LED
 - j) Ethernet port (MGMT) Activity LED
 - k) ICL port LINK LED
 - I) ICL port ATTN LED
- 2) Backbone:
 - a) WWN Status Interface LED
 - b) FAN power LED
 - c) FAN status LED
- 3) Switches:
 - a) Switch Power LED
 - b) Switch Status LED
 - c) Ethernet port Link LED
 - d) Ethernet port Activity LED
 - e) Gigabit Ethernet (GE) port status LED
 - f) Gigabit Ethernet (GE) port activity LED
 - g) Fiber Channel port status LED

	Port/Interface Type							
Model	Fibre Channel Ports	1 GbE & 10 GbE	Ethernet	Serial Port	USB	Power Supply Connectors	LED	
DCX-4S	256	24	4	2	2	2	4	
DCX	512	24	4	2	2	4	30	
DCX 8510-4	192	12	4	2	2	2	4	
DCX 8510-8	384	12	4	2	2	4	30	
6510	48	0	1	1	1	2	54	
6520	96	0	1	1	1	2	107	
7800	16	8	1	1	1	2	32	

Table 9 - Port/Interface Quantities

Blade	LED	Blade	LED
CP8 Control Processor	8	FC8-16 Port Blade	18
CR16-4 Core Switch Blade	4	FC8-32 Port Blade	34
CR16-8 Core Switch Blade	4	FC8-48 Port Blade	50
CR4S-8 Core Switch Blade	6	FC8-64 Port Blade	66
CR8 Core Switch Blade	4	FX8-24 Port Blade	26
FC16-32 Port Blade	34		
FC16-48 Port Blade	50		

Table 10 - DCX-4S, DCX, DCX 8510-4, and DCX 8510-8 blade LED counts

5 Identification and Authentication Policy

5.1 Assumption of Roles

The cryptographic module supports the operator roles. The cryptographic module enforces the separation of roles using role-based operator authentication. An operator must enter a username and its password to log in. The username is an alphanumeric string of maximum 40 characters. The password is an alphanumeric string of 8 to 40 characters randomly chosen from the 96 printable and human-readable characters. Upon correct authentication, the role is selected based on the username of the operator and the context of the module. At the end of a session, the operator must log-out. The module supports a maximum of 256 operators, five Radius servers and five LDAP servers that may be allocated the following roles:

Role	Type of Authentication	Authentication Data	FOS RBAC Role
Admin(Crypto-Officer)	Role-based operator authentication	Username and Password	Admin
User (User role)	Role-based operator authentication	Username and Password	User, BasicSwitchAdmin, SwitchAdmin, Operator
SecurityAdmin	Role-based operator authentication	Username and Password	SecurityAdmin
Fabric Admin	Role-based operator authentication	Username and Password	FabricAdmin

Maximum Permissions (for a user-defined role)	Role -based operator authentication	Username and Password	N/A
LDAP Server	Role -based operator authentication	LDAP Root CA certificate	N/A
RADIUS Server	Role -based operator authentication	RADIUS Shared Secret	N/A
Host/Server/Peer Switch	Role -based operator authentication	PKI (FCAP) or Shared Secret (DH-CHAP)	N/A

Table 11 - Roles and Required Identification and Authentication

Authentication Mechanism	Strength of Mechanism
	The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is $1/96^8$ which is less than $1/1,000,000$.
Password	The module can be configured to restrict the number of consecutive failed authentication attempts. If the module is not configured to restrict failed authentication attempts, then the maximum attempts possible within one minute is 20. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within one minute is 20/96^8 which is less than 1/100,000.
Digital Cignature	The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is $1/2^{112}$ which is less than $1/1,000,000$.
Digital Signature Verification (PKI)	The module will restrict the number of consecutive failed authentication attempts to 10. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within one minute is $10/2^{112}$ which is less than $1/100,000$.
	The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is $1/96^8$ which is less than $1/1,000,000$.
Knowledge of a Shared Secret	The maximum possible authentication attempts within a minute is 16 attempts. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within one minute is 16/96^8 which is less than 1/100,000.

Table 12 - Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms

Service Name	Description	FOS Interface
Fabric Element Authentication	Fabric element authentication, including selection of authentication protocols, protocol configuration selection and setting authentication secrets.	authutil secauthsecret
FIPSCfg	Control FIPS mode operation and related functions.	fipscfg
Zeroize	Zeroize all CSPs.	fipgscfgzeroize
		firmwarecommit firmwaredownload
FirmwareManagement	Control firmware management.	firmwaredownloadstatus
РКІ	PKI configuration functions, including FOS switch certificates and SSL certificates.	seccertutil
RADIUS	RADIUS configuration functions.	aaaconfig
LDAP	LDAP configuration functions.	aaaconfig
UserManagement	User and password management.	passwd passwdconfig userconfig

Table 13 - Service Descriptions

6 Access Control Policy

6.1 Roles and Services

	User	Admin	FabricAdmin	SecurityAdmin	Maximum Permissions	LDAP Server	RADIUS Server	Host Server/Peer Switch
Fabric Element Authentication		х		х	х			х
FIPSCfg		Х		Х	Х			
Zeroize		Х		Х	Х			
FirmwareManagement	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х			
РКІ	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х			
RADIUS		Х		Х	Х		Х	
LDAP		Х		Х	Х	Х		
UserManagement		Х		Х	Х			

Table 14 - Services Authorized for Roles

6.2 Unauthenticated Services

The cryptographic module supports the following unauthenticated services:

- Self-tests: This service executes the suite of self-tests required by FIPS 140-2. Self-tests may be initiated by power-cycling the module.
- Show Status: This service is met through the various status outputs provided by the services provided above, as well as the LED interfaces.

6.3 Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)

- DH Private Keys for use with 2048 bit modulus
- Fibre-Channel Security Protocol (FCSP) CHAP Secret
- Fibre-Channel Authentication Protocol (FCAP) Private Key (RSA 2048)
- SSH/SCP/SFTP Session Keys 128, 192, and 256 bit AES CBC or TDES 3 key CBC
- SSH/SCP/SFTP Authentication Key HMAC-SHA-1
- SSH KDF Internal State
- SSH DH Shared Secret Key 2048 8192 bits
- SSH 2048 RSA Private Key
- TLS Private Key (RSA 2048)
- TLS Pre-Master Secret
- TLS Master Secret
- TLS PRF Internal State
- TLS Session Keys 128, 256 bit AES CBC, TDES 3 key CBC
- TLS Authentication Key for HMAC-SHA-1
- RNG Seed Material
- ANSI X9.31 DRNG Internal State
- Passwords
- RADIUS Secret

6.4 Definition of Public Keys

- DH Public Key (2048 bit modulus)
- DH Peer Public Key (2048 bit modulus)
- FCAP Public Key (RSA 2048)
- FCAP Peer Public Key (RSA 2048)
- TLS Public Key (RSA 2048)
- TLS Peer Public Key (RSA 2048)
- FW Download Public Key (RSA 2048)
- SSH RSA 2048 bit Public Key
- LDAP Root CA certificate (RSA 2048)

6.5 Definition of CSPs Modes of Access

Table 14 CSP Access Rights within Roles & Services defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the different module services. The modes of access shown in the table are defined as follows:

- R: Read
- W: Write
- N: No Access
- Z: Zeroize (Session Termination, "secauthsecret –remove" command and "fipscfg –zeroize" command)

	SSH/SCP/SFTP CSPs	DH Private Keys	TLS CSPs	DRNG Seed Material/Interna I State	Passwords	RADIUS Secret	FCAP Private Key	FCSP CHAP Secret
Fabric Element Authentication	Ν	N	N	RW	Ν	Ν	RW	RW
FIPSCfg	Ν	N	Ν	Ν	Ν	Ν	N	N
Zeroize	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z
FirmwareManagement	R	R	N	Ν	Ν	Ν	N	N
РКІ	RW	RW	Ν	RW	Ν	Ν	N	N
RADIUS	Ν	N	N	Ν	RW	RW	N	Ν
UserManagement	Ν	Ν	RW	RW	RW	Ν	Ν	Ν

Table 15 - CSP Access Rights within Roles & Services

	DH Public Key	FCAP Public Key	TLS Public Key	Firmware Download Public Key	SSH RSA 2048 Public Key	LDAP Root CA Certificate
Fabric Element Authentication	RW	RW	Ν	Ν	Ν	Ν
FIPSCfg	Ν	Ν	N	Ν	Ν	Ν
Zeroize	N	N	N	Ν	N	Ν
FirmwareManagement	N	N	N	RW	N	Ν
РКІ	N	N	RW	N	RW	N
LDAP	N	N	N	N	N	RW
UserManagement	N	N	N	N	N	N

Table 16 - Public Key Access Rights within Roles & Services

7 Operational Environment

The FIPS 140-2 Area 6 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the device supports a limited operational environment; only trusted, validated code RSA signed may be executed.

8 Security Rules

The cryptographic modules' design corresponds to the cryptographic module's security rules. This section documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of this FIPS140-2 Level 2 module.

- 1) The cryptographic module shall provide role-based authentication.
- 2) When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator shall not have access to any cryptographic services.
- 3) The cryptographic module shall perform the following tests:
 - a) Power up Self-Tests:
 - i) Cryptographic algorithm tests:
 - (1) Three Key TDES CBC KAT (encrypt/decrypt)
 - (2) AES (128, 192, 256) CBC KAT (encrypt/decrypt)
 - (3) HMAC SHA-1 KAT
 - (4) HMAC SHA-256 KAT
 - (5) HMAC SHA-512 KAT
 - (6) ANSI X9.31 DRNG KAT
 - (7) SHA-1 KAT
 - (8) SHA-256 KAT
 - (9) SHA-512 KAT
 - (10) RSA 2048 SHA-256 Sign/Verify KAT

- (11) SP800-135 KDF KAT
- ii) Firmware Integrity Test (128-bit EDC)
- iii) Critical Functions Tests:
 - (1) RSA 2048 Encrypt/Decrypt KAT
- b) Conditional Self-Tests:
 - i) Continuous Random Number Generator (RNG) test performed on non-approved RNG.
 - ii) Continuous Random Number Generator test performed on ANSI X9.31 DRNG.
 - iii) RSA 2048 SHA-256 Pairwise Consistency Test (Sign/Verify)
 - iv) RSA 2048 Pairwise Consistency Test (Encrypt/Decrypt)
 - v) Firmware Load Test (RSA 2048 with SHA-256 Signature Verification)
 - vi) Bypass Test: N/A
 - vii) Manual Key Entry Test: N/A
- 4) At any time the cryptographic module is in an idle state, the operator shall be capable of commanding the module to perform the power-up self-test.
- 5) Data output shall be inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
- 6) Status information shall not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the module.
- 7) The module does not support a maintenance role or maintenance interface.
- 8) The serial port may only be accessed by the Crypto-Officer when the Crypto-Officer is physically present at the cryptographic boundary, via a direct connection without any network access or other intervening systems.
- 9) In the vent of a KAT or Conditional Test failure, the operator will be notified via a message that states "<Test>...FAILED!"

9 Physical Security Policy

9.1 Physical Security Mechanisms

The multi-chip standalone cryptographic module includes the following physical security mechanisms:

- Production-grade components and production-grade opaque enclosure with tamper evident seals.
- Tamper evident seals.

9.2 Operator Required Actions

The operator is required to inspect the tamper evident seals, periodically, per the guidance provided in the user documentation.

Physical Security	Recommended Frequency of	Inspection/Test Guidance
Mechanisms	Inspection/Test	Details
Tamper Evident Seals	12 months	Reference Appendix A for a description of tamper label application for all evaluated platforms.

Table 17 - Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms

10 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy

The module has not been designed to mitigate any specific attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-2 requirements.

11 Definitions and Acronyms

10 GbE 10 Gigabit Ethernet

- AES Advanced Encryption Standard
- Blade Any functional assembly that can be installed in a chassis, excluding power and fan FRUs
- CBC Cipher Block Chaining
- CLI Command Line interface
- CSP Critical Security Parameter
- DH Diffie-Hellman
- FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
- FOS Fabric Operating System
- FRU Field Replaceable Unit
- GbE Gigabit Ethernet
- HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
- HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
- KDF Key Derivation Function
- KAT Known Answer Test
- LED Light Emitting Diode
- LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
- MAC Message Authentication Code
- NTP Network Time Protocol
- NOS Network Operating System
- PKI Public Key Infrastructure
- PROM Programmable read-only memory
- **RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In User Service**
- RNG Random Number Generator
- RSA Rivest Shamir and Adleman method for asymmetric encryption
- SCP Secure Copy Protocol
- SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
- SSH Secure Shell Protocol
- TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard
- TLS Transport Layer Security Protocol

12 Brocade Abbreviations


24P	24 ports
48P	48 ports
16GB	16 Gigabit
8GB	8 Gigabit
SFP	Small form-factor pluggable
LWL	long wave length
SWL	Short wave length
LIC	License
UPG	Upgrade
2PS	Two power supply modules
OP	No port blades
OSFP	Zero SFP devices provided
2CP	Two Control processor blades (see Table 4)
2 CORE	Two core switch blades (see Table 4)
ENT BUN	Enterprise Software License Bundle: Adaptive Networking, Extended Fabrics, Advance Performance Monitoring, Trunking, Fabric Watch, Server Application Optimized (see table note for Table 3)
BR	Brocade
BR WWN	Brocade World Wide Name card
WWN	World Wide Name card Ports on Demand, Defines the size of an upgrade license. For example, a 24-Port POD License
WWN POD	World Wide Name card Ports on Demand, Defines the size of an upgrade license. For example, a 24-Port POD License allows the user to enable twenty-four additional ports
WWN POD FC	World Wide Name card Ports on Demand, Defines the size of an upgrade license. For example, a 24-Port POD License allows the user to enable twenty-four additional ports Fibre Channel
WWN POD FC FCIP	World Wide Name card Ports on Demand, Defines the size of an upgrade license. For example, a 24-Port POD License allows the user to enable twenty-four additional ports Fibre Channel Fiber Channel over Internet Protocol
WWN POD FC FCIP GE	World Wide Name card Ports on Demand, Defines the size of an upgrade license. For example, a 24-Port POD License allows the user to enable twenty-four additional ports Fibre Channel Fiber Channel over Internet Protocol Gigabit Ethernet
WWN POD FC FCIP GE GBE	World Wide Name card Ports on Demand, Defines the size of an upgrade license. For example, a 24-Port POD License allows the user to enable twenty-four additional ports Fibre Channel Fiber Channel over Internet Protocol Gigabit Ethernet Gigabit Ethernet
WWN POD FC FCIP GE GBE CP8	 World Wide Name card Ports on Demand, Defines the size of an upgrade license. For example, a 24-Port POD License allows the user to enable twenty-four additional ports Fibre Channel Fiber Channel over Internet Protocol Gigabit Ethernet Gigabit Ethernet 8G Control Processor blade
WWN POD FC FCIP GE GBE CP8 CR8	World Wide Name card Ports on Demand, Defines the size of an upgrade license. For example, a 24-Port POD License allows the user to enable twenty-four additional ports Fibre Channel Fiber Channel over Internet Protocol Gigabit Ethernet Gigabit Ethernet 8G Control Processor blade 8G Core Switch Blade for DCX backbone
WWN POD FC FCIP GE GBE CP8 CR8 CR4S-8	World Wide Name card Ports on Demand, Defines the size of an upgrade license. For example, a 24-Port POD License allows the user to enable twenty-four additional ports Fibre Channel Fiber Channel over Internet Protocol Gigabit Ethernet Gigabit Ethernet 8G Control Processor blade 8G Core Switch Blade for DCX backbone 8G Core Switch Blade for DCX -4S backbone
WWN POD FC FCIP GE GBE CP8 CR8 CR8 CR4S-8 CR16-8	 World Wide Name card Ports on Demand, Defines the size of an upgrade license. For example, a 24-Port POD License allows the user to enable twenty-four additional ports Fibre Channel Fiber Channel over Internet Protocol Gigabit Ethernet Gigabit Ethernet SG Control Processor blade SG Core Switch Blade for DCX backbone SG Core Switch Blade for DCX 45 backbone 16G core switch blade for DCX 8510-8 backbone
WWN POD FC FCIP GE GBE CP8 CR8 CR4S-8 CR4S-8 CR16-8 CR16-4	 World Wide Name card Ports on Demand, Defines the size of an upgrade license. For example, a 24-Port POD License allows the user to enable twenty-four additional ports Fibre Channel Fiber Channel over Internet Protocol Gigabit Ethernet Gigabit Ethernet 8G Control Processor blade 8G Core Switch Blade for DCX backbone 8G Core switch Blade for DCX 4S backbone 16G core switch blade for DCX 8510-8 backbone 16G core switch blade for DCX 8510-4 backbone
WWN POD FC FCIP GE GBE CP8 CR8 CR8 CR4S-8 CR4S-8 CR16-8 CR16-4 FC8-16	World Wide Name card Ports on Demand, Defines the size of an upgrade license. For example, a 24-Port POD License allows the user to enable twenty-four additional ports Fibre Channel Fiber Channel over Internet Protocol Gigabit Ethernet Gigabit Ethernet 8G Control Processor blade 8G Core Switch Blade for DCX backbone 8G Core Switch Blade for DCX -4S backbone 16G core switch blade for DCX 8510-8 backbone 16G core switch blade for DCX 8510-4 backbone 8G, 16-port, Fibre Channel port blade

Appendix A: Tamper Label Application

Use ethyl alcohol to clean the surface area at each tamper evident seal placement location. Prior to applying a new seal to an area that shows seal residue, use consumer strength adhesive remove to remove the seal residue. Then use ethyl alcohol to clean off any residual adhesive remover before applying a new seal.

Brocade DCX and DCX 8510-8 Backbone

Twenty-two (22) tamper evident seals are required to complete the physical security requirements total.



• Apply three (3) seals to the right side of the chassis.

Figure 6 Brocade DCX and DCX 8510-8 Backbone chassis right side seal location

- Apply twelve (12) seals to the front side of the chassis.

Figure 7 Brocade DCX and DCX 8510-8 Backbone front side seal locations

• Apply seven (7) seals to the back side of the chassis




Figure 8 Brocade DCX and DCX 8510-8 Backbone back side seal locations




Figure 9 Brocade DCX and DCX 8510-8 Backbone flat ejector handle seal application on the port side




Figure 10 Brocade DCX and DCX 8510-8 Backbone stainless steel handle seal application on the port side




Figure 11 Brocade DCX and DCX 8510-8 Backbone filler panel seal application on the port side

Brocade DCX-4S and DCX 8510-4 Backbone

Nineteen (19) tamper evident seals are required to complete the physical security requirements total.

• Apply fourteen (14) seals to the backbone front side of the chassis.




Figure 12 Brocade DCX-4S and DCX 8510-4 Backbone front side seal locations

• Apply five (5) seals to the back side of the chassis




Figure 13 Brocade DCX-4S and DCX 8510-4 Backbone back side seal locations




Figure 14 Brocade DCX-4S and DCX 8510-4 Backbone flat ejector handle seal application




Figure 15 Brocade DCX-4S and DCX 8510-4 Backbone stainless steel ejector handle seal application




Figure 16 Brocade DCX-4S and DCX 8510-4 Backbone filler panel (PN 49-1000294-05) seal application




Figure 17 Brocade DCX-4S Backbone filler panel (PN 49-1000064-02) seal application

Brocade 6510

Two tamper evident seals are required to complete the physical security requirements.

• Apply one (1) seal to the left side. See Figure 19.






Figure 19 Brocade 6510 right side seal application





Brocade 6520

Twenty-six (26) tamper evident seals are required to complete the physical security requirements.

- 1. Relative to the left side of the Brocade 6520, apply four (4) seals along the left bottom side of the chassis. Make a 90 degree bend from the left side to the bottom side of the chassis. See Figure 21 for details on how to position each seal.
- 2. Relative to the left side of the Brocade 6520, apply one (1) seal vertically, on the left side of the switch, over the seam between the top cover and the front panel of the switch. Do not allow the seal to cover either of the rack mount screw holes on the left side of the switch. See Figure 21 for details on how to position each seal.




Figure 21 Brocade 6520 left side seal locations

- 3. Relative to the right side of the Brocade 6520, apply four (4) seals along the right bottom side of the chassis. Make a 90 degree bend from the right side to the bottom side of the chassis. See Figure 22 for details on how to position each seal.
- 4. Relative to the right side of the Brocade 6520, apply one (1) seal vertically, on the right side of the switch, over the seam between the top cover and the front panel of the switch. Do not allow the seal to cover either of the rack mount screw holes on the left side of the switch. See Figure 22 for details on how to position each seal.




Figure 22 Brocade 6520 right side seal locations

- 5. Relative to the non-port side of the Brocade 6520, apply one (1) seal over the seam between the top cover and the grill of the each of the three (3) FAN FRUs. Each seal makes a 90 bend from the top of the switch and the grill of each FAN FRU. See Figure 23 for details on how to position each seal. Apply two (2) seals over the flathead screws on the top cover near the FAN FRUs. See Figure 23 for details on how to position each seal. Five (5) seals are required to complete this step.
- 6. Relative to the non-port side of the Brocade 6520, apply two (2) seals over the seam between the chassis and the AC power module on the left non-port side of the chassis. See Figure 23 for details on how to position each seal.

- 7. Relative to the non-port side of the Brocade 6520, apply two (2) seals over the seam between the chassis and the AC power module on the right non-port side of the chassis. See Figure 23 for details on how to position each seal.
- 8. Relative to the non-port side of the Brocade 6520, apply one (1) seal to the flange of each of the three (3) FAN FRUs and the bottom of the switch. Each seal makes a 90 bend from the bottom of the switch to the flange of each FAN FRU. See Figure 23 for details on how to position each seal. Three (3) seals are required to complete this step.




Figure 23 Brocade 6520 top and non-port side seal locations

9. Relative to the bottom side of the Brocade 6520, apply four (4) seals diagonally, on the bottom side of the switch, over the seam between the front panel and the bottom panel of the switch. See Figure 24 for details on how to position each seal.




Figure 24 Brocade 6520 bottom side seal locations

Brocade 7800

Two (2) tamper evident seals are required to complete the physical security requirements.




Figure 26 Brocade 7800 right side seal locations




Figure 27 Brocade 7800 bottom seal locations