# FIPS 140-2 Security Policy

BlackBerry Cryptographic Kernel Versions 3.8.7.0 and 3.8.7.1 Document Version: 1.2 BlackBerry Certifications, Research In Motion



© 2011 Research In Motion Limited. All rights reserved.

www.blackberry.com

This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.



# **Document and contact information**

Version	Date	Description
1.0	September 20, 2011	Document creation
1.1	September 29, 2011	Added certificate numbers from CAVP and updated with comments received from CGI
1.2	January 16, 2012	Updated Table of Contents to include Appendix A

Contact	Corporate office
BlackBerry Certifications	Research In Motion
certifications@rim.com	295 Phillip Street
(519) 888-7465 ext. 72921	Waterloo, Ontario
	N2L 3W8
	Canada
	www.rim.com: www.blackberry.com





# **Table of Contents**

DO	CUM	IENT AND CONTACT INFORMATION	2
ТА	BLE	OF CONTENTS	3
LIS	ST OF	FIGURES	4
LIS	ST OF	TABLES	5
1	INT	RODUCTION	6
1	.1		. 6
1	.2	OVERVIEW	6
1	.3	FIPS 140-2 SECURITY LEVELS	7
2	CR	YPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SPECIFICATION	8
2	2.1	SECURITY FUNCTIONS	8
2	2.2	MODES OF OPERATION	9
	2.2.	1 Switching to FIPS 140-2 Approved Mode of Operation	9
	2.2.	2 Verifying the Module is in FIPS 140-2 Approved Mode of Operation	9
2	2.3	CONFORMANCE TESTING AND FIPS-COMPLIANCE	9
2	2.4	CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY	9
2	2.5	DETERMINING MODULE VERSION	10
3	CR	YPTOGRAPHIC MODULE PORTS AND INTERFACES 1	11
4	RO	LES, SERVICES AND AUTHENTICATION 1	12
4	l.1	Roles1	12
4	1.2	SERVICES 1	12
4	1.3	AUTHENTICATION 1	12
5	PH	YSICAL SECURITY 1	14
6	CR	YPTOGRAPHIC KEYS AND CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS 1	15
6	6.1	Key Zeroization1	16
7	SEL	_F-TESTS1	17
7	7.1	INVOKING THE SELF-TESTS	18
8	МІТ	IGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS 1	19
AP	PENI	DIX A ACRONYMS	20







# **List of Figures**

Figure 1: BlackBerry Solution Architecture	6
Figure 2: Physical Boundary	. 10





# **List of Tables**

Table 1: Summary of Achieved Security Levels per FIPS 140-2 Section	. 7
Table 2: Approved Security Functions	. 8
Table 3: Implementation of FIPS 140-2 Interfaces	11
Table 4: Module Services	12
Table 5: Role Selection by Module Service	13
Table 6: Cryptographic Keys and CSPs	15
Table 7: Module Self-Tests	17
Table 8: Attack Types	19





# **1** Introduction

### **1.1** Identification

The following information identifies this document:

- Title: FIPS 140-2 Security Policy BlackBerry Cryptographic Kernel Versions 3.8.7.0 and 3.8.7.1
- Version: 1.2

## 1.2 Overview

BlackBerry® is the leading wireless solution that allows users to stay connected to a full suite of applications, including email, phone, enterprise applications, the Internet, SMS, and organizer information. BlackBerry is a totally integrated package that includes innovative software, advanced BlackBerry wireless devices and wireless network service, providing a seamless solution. The BlackBerry architecture is shown in the following figure:



Figure 1: BlackBerry Solution Architecture

BlackBerry devices are built on industry-leading wireless technology, allowing users to receive email and information automatically with no need to request delivery. Additionally, users are notified when new information arrives, making it easier to stay informed.

BlackBerry devices also provide an intuitive user experience. Users simply click on an email address, telephone number, or URL inside a message to automatically begin composing the new email, make the call, or link to the web page. BlackBerry device users can also easily navigate through icons, menus, and options with the trackpad or touch screen, and quickly compose messages or enter data using the device keyboard.

Each BlackBerry handheld<sup>1</sup> device contains the BlackBerry Cryptographic Kernel, a firmware module that provides the cryptographic functionality required for basic operation of the device. The BlackBerry Cryptographic Kernel meets the requirements of the FIPS 140-2 Security Level 1.

The BlackBerry Cryptographic Kernel, hereafter referred to as cryptographic module or module, provides the following cryptographic services:

data encryption and decryption



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Excludes RIM 850<sup>™</sup>, RIM 950<sup>™</sup>, RIM 857<sup>™</sup>, and RIM 957<sup>™</sup> wireless handheld devices.

BlackBerry Cryptographic Kernel Versions 3.8.7.0 and 3.8.7.1



- message digest and authentication code generation
- random data generation
- digital signature verification
- elliptic curve key agreement

More information on the BlackBerry solution is available from http://www.blackberry.com/.

# 1.3 FIPS 140-2 Security Levels

The BlackBerry Cryptographic Kernel meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 1 security for FIPS 140-2 as shown in Table 1.

#### Table 1: Summary of Achieved Security Levels per FIPS 140-2 Section

Section	Level
Cryptographic Module Specification	1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	1
Roles, Services, and Authentication	1
Finite State Model	1
Physical Security	1
Operational Environment	N/A
Cryptographic Key Management	1
EMI/EMC	1
Self-Tests	1
Design Assurance	3
Mitigation of Other Attacks	1
Cryptographic Module Security Policy	1





# **2** Cryptographic Module Specification

## 2.1 Security Functions

The cryptographic module is a firmware module that implements the following FIPS-approved security functions<sup>2:</sup>

	Table 2	: Ap	proved	Security	Functions
--	---------	------	--------	----------	-----------

Algorithm	Description	Certificate Number	
		v3.8.7.0	v3.8.7.1
AES-128, AES-192 & AES-256	Encrypts and decrypts, as specified in FIPS 197. The implementation supports the ECB, CBC, CFB, OFB and CTR modes of operation.	#1798	#1800
AES-256 ECM	Encrypts and decrypts, as specified in FIPS 197. The implementation supports the ECB and CTR modes of operation.	#1799	#1801
Triple DES	Encrypts and decrypts, as specified in NIST Special Publication 800-67. The implementation supports the CBC mode of operation.	#1163	#1164
SHA-1, SHA-256 & SHA-512	As specified in FIPS 180-3	#1581	#1582
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256 & HMAC-SHA-512	As specified in FIPS 198. The implementation is based on SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 as specified in FIPS 180-3	#1063	#1064
AES CTR DRBG	As specified in NIST Special Publication 800-90. The implementation is CTR_DRBG using AES CTR mode.	#132	#133
ECDSA	Signature verification, as specified in FIPS 186-3 and ANSI X9.62. The implementation supports elliptic curve K-571.	#244	#245
RSA PKCS#1	Signature verification, as specified in PKCS #1, version 2.1	#902	#903

The module implements the following non approved security functions that, per *FIPS 140-2 Annex D: Approved Key Establishment Techniques for FIPS PUB 140-2,* may presently be used in a FIPS-approved mode of operation:

• EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement, key establishment methodology provides 256 bits of encryption strength), Per FIPS 140-2 Annex D: Approved Key Establishment Techniques for FIPS PUB 140-2, the implementation may presently be used in a FIPS-approved mode of operation. The implementation supports elliptic curves P-521 and K-571.



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> A security function is FIPS-approved if it is explicitly listed in *FIPS 140-2 Annex A: Approved Security Functions for FIPS PUB 140-2*.

BlackBerry Cryptographic Kernel Versions 3.8.7.0 and 3.8.7.1



• ECMQV (key agreement, key establishment methodology provides 256 bits of encryption strength), Per FIPS 140-2 Annex D: Approved Key Establishment Techniques for FIPS PUB 140-2, the implementation may presently be used in a FIPS-approved mode of operation. The implementation supports elliptic curves P-521 and K-571.

### 2.2 Modes of Operation

A function call is required to initialize the module in the FIPS 140-2 approved mode of operation. When the module is in the FIPS 140-2 approved mode of operation, only approved security functions and cryptographic algorithms are performed.

#### 2.2.1 Switching to FIPS 140-2 Approved Mode of Operation

The operator can switch the mode of operation of the module on a BlackBerry device to the FIPS 140-2 approved mode of operation by performing the following operations:

- 1. From BlackBerry Administration Service, click Manage IT Polices.
- 2. Select the IT Policy in effect on the BlackBerry device.
- 3. Click Edit IT Policy → Security Tab.
- 4. Select Yes for Enforce FIPS Mode of Operation.
- 5. Reboot the BlackBerry handheld as instructed.

#### 2.2.2 Verifying the Module is in FIPS 140-2 Approved Mode of Operation

The operator can determine whether the module on a BlackBerry device is operating in the FIPS 140-2 approved mode of operation by performing the following operations:

- 1. On the BlackBerry device Home screen, click the Options icon.
- 2. Click Security → Security Status Information
- 3. The Security Status Information screen displays FIPS Mode of Operation Enabled

### 2.3 Conformance Testing and FIPS-Compliance

For the purposes of FIPS 140-2 conformance testing, the module was executed on the BlackBerry 9900 per FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance G.5. The module remains vendor affirmed FIPS-compliant when executed on other BlackBerry devices.

Conformance testing for BlackBerry Cryptographic Kernel Version 3.8.7.0 was performed using BlackBerry OS Version 7.0, while conformance testing for BlackBerry Cryptographic Kernel Version 3.8.7.1 was performed using BlackBerry OS Versions 7.0 and 7.1. In order for the module to remain validated on a specific handheld device, both the unchanged module and the tested operating platform shall be ported to any device.

### 2.4 Cryptographic Boundary

The physical boundary of the module is the physical boundary of the BlackBerry device that executes the module as shown in the following figure. Consequently, the embodiment of the module is a multiple-chip standalone.











# 2.5 Determining Module Version

The operator can determine the version of the module on a BlackBerry device by performing the following operations:

- 1. On the BlackBerry device Home screen, click the **Options** icon.
- 2. Click Device → About Device Versions
- 3. The About screen displays the module version, for example, Cryptographic Kernel v3.8.7.1





# **3 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces**

The module ports correspond to the physical ports of the BlackBerry device executing the module, and the module interfaces correspond to the logical interfaces to the module. The following table describes the module ports and interfaces.

FIPS 140-2 Interface	Module Ports	Module Interfaces
Data Input	keyboard, touch screen, microphone, USB port, headset jack, wireless modem, and Bluetooth® wireless radio	input parameters of module function calls
Data Output	speaker, USB port, headset jack, wireless modem, and Bluetooth wireless radio	output parameters of module function calls
Control Input	keyboard, touch screen, USB port, trackpad, BlackBerry button, escape button, backlight button, and phone button	module function calls
Status Output	USB port, primary LCD screen, and LED	return codes of module function calls
Power Input	USB port and battery	not supported
Maintenance	not supported	not supported

#### Table 3: Implementation of FIPS 140-2 Interfaces





# **4** Roles, Services and Authentication

## 4.1 Roles

The module supports user and crypto officer roles. The module does not support a maintenance role. The module does not support multiple or concurrent operators and is intended for use by a single operator, thus it always operates in a single-user mode of operation.

## 4.2 Services

The services described in the following table are available to the operator.

#### Table 4: Module Services

Service	Description
Reset	Resets the module. The module can be reset by power cycling the module.
View Status	Displays the status of the module
Perform Key Agreement	Establishes a secure channel to the module utilizing ECDH and ECMQV key agreement algorithms in transport of the new Master Key that is created outside the cryptographic boundary.
Generate Session Key	Generates a session key or a PIN session key. This service is performed automatically on behalf of the operator during the Encrypt Data service.
Encrypt Data	Encrypts data that is to be sent from the device. A session key is automatically generated through the Generate Session Key service and used to encrypt the data. The session key is encrypted with the master key and then the encrypted data and encrypted session key are ready for transmission.
Decrypt Data	Decrypts data that has been received by the device. The encrypted session key is decrypted with the master key and is then used to decrypt the data. This service is performed automatically on behalf of the operator.
Generate HMAC	Generates a message authentication code
Perform Self-Tests	Executes the module self-tests
Verify Signature	Verifies the digital signature of an IT policy received by the device. This service is performed automatically on behalf of the operator.
Wipe Handheld	Zeroizes all software device keys and user data present on device

## 4.3 Authentication

The module does not support operator authentication. Roles are implicitly selected based on the service performed by the operator. Implicit role selection is summarized in the following table, as are the keys and critical security parameters (CSPs) that are affected by each service.





### Table 5: Role Selection by Module Service

Service	Implicitly selected role	Affected keys and CSPs	Access to keys and CSPs
Reset	user	n/a	n/a
View Status	user	n/a	n/a
Perform Key Agreement	crypto officer	ECC key pair	execute
		master key	write
Generate Session Key	user	session key or	write
		PIN session key	
Encrypt Data	user	master key or	execute
		PIN master key	
		session key or	execute
		PIN session key	
Decrypt Data	user	master key or	execute
		PIN master key	
		session key or	execute
		PIN session key	
Generate HMAC	user	HMAC key	execute
Perform Self-Tests	user	firmware integrity key	execute
Verify Signature	user	ECC public key	execute
Wipe Handheld	crypto officer	all software keys	write





# **5 Physical Security**

The BlackBerry device that executes the module is manufactured using industry standard integrated circuits and meets the FIPS 140-2 Level 1 physical security requirements.





# **6** Cryptographic Keys and Critical Security Parameters

The following table describes the cryptographic keys, key components, and CSPs15utilized by the module.

Key or CSP	Description
Master Key	A Triple DES or AES-256 key used to encrypt and decrypt Session Keys. The Master Key is always generated outside the cryptographic boundary. The key is passed into the module for temporary use in the following ways:
	<ul> <li>in plaintext as parameters to an API call when connected directly to the USB port of a workstation operating BlackBerry Desktop Manager, or</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>encrypted by the current Master Key if utilizing key agreement with the BlackBerry Enterprise Server.</li> </ul>
Session Key	A Triple DES or AES-256 key used to encrypt and decrypt data. The module generates session keys using the implemented AES CTR DRBG in accordance to SP 800-90.
PIN Master Key	A master key that is specifically a Triple DES key used to encrypt and decrypt PIN session keys. The PIN master key is generated outside the cryptographic boundary. The key is passed into the module for temporary use in the following ways:
	<ul> <li>in plaintext, as parameters to an API call when connected directly to the USB port of a workstation operating BlackBerry Desktop Manager</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>encrypted by the current master key if utilizing key agreement with the BlackBerry Enterprise Server.</li> </ul>
PIN Session Key	A session key that is specifically a Triple DES key used to encrypt and decrypt data for PIN messaging. The module generates PIN session keys using the implemented AES CTR DRBG in accordance to SP 800-90.
ECC Key Pair	A key pair used to perform key agreement over elliptic curves
ECC Session Key	An ECC session key, that is specifically a short lived ephemeral key, is used during key agreement during Master Key transport and is zeroized after use.
ECC Public Key	A public key used to verify digital signatures over elliptic curves and part of the Key Agreement process
НМАС Кеу	A key used to calculate a message authentication code using the HMAC algorithm
RSA Public Key	A public key used to verify digital signatures in the Firmware Integrity Test
ECDSA Public Key	A public key used to verify digital signatures in the Firmware Integrity Test

 Table 6: Cryptographic Keys and CSPs







# 6.1 Key Zeroization

The BlackBerry security solution provides multiple protective features to ensure algorithmic keys and key components are protected. Similarly, data, and specifically key removal through zeroization, is an integral part of the BlackBerry security solution. A user can also request a zeroization at any time by navigating to **Options** and selecting **Wipe Handheld** using the **Options > Security > Security Wipe**. The BlackBerry Enterprise Server administrator may also zeroize the device remotely to wipe all device data and keys.

Furthermore, session keys that are created per datagram are destroyed after each data fragment is sent.





# 7 Self-Tests

The module implements the self-tests that are described in the following table:

Table 7: Module Self-Tests	
----------------------------	--

Test	Description
Firmware Integrity Test	The module implements an integrity test for the module software by verifying its 1024-bit RSA signature. The firmware integrity test passes if and only if the signature verifies successfully using the Firmware Integrity Key.
AES KAT	The module implements known answer tests for the AES variants. The tests pass if and only if the calculated output equals the expected output
Triple DES KAT	The module implements a KAT for Triple DES in the CBC mode of operation. The test passes if and only if the calculated output equals the expected output.
SHA-1 KAT	The module implements a KAT for SHA-1. The KAT passes if and only if the calculated output equals the expected output.
SHA-256 KAT	The module implements a KAT for SHA-256. The KAT passes if and only if the calculated output equals the expected output.
SHA-512 KAT	The module implements a KAT for SHA-512. The KAT passes if and only if the calculated output equals the expected output.
HMAC SHA-1 KAT	The module implements a KAT for HMAC SHA-1. The KAT passes if and only if the calculated output equals the expected output.
HMAC SHA-256 KAT	The module implements a KAT for HMAC SHA-256. The KAT passes if and only if the calculated output equals the expected output.
HMAC SHA-512 KAT	The module implements a KAT for HMAC SHA-512. The KAT passes if and only if the calculated output equals the expected output.
RSA Verify KAT	The module implements a KAT for RSA signature verification. The test passes if and only if the calculated output equals the expected output.
ECDSA Verify KAT	The module implements a KAT for ECDSA signature verification. The test passes if and only if the calculated output equals the expected output.
AES CTR DRBG KAT	The module implements a KAT for the AES CTR DRBG. The KAT passes if and only if the calculated output equals the expected output.
Continuous RNG Test	The module implements a continuous RNG test, as specified in FIPS 140- 2, for the implemented AES CTR DRBG
EC Diffie-Hellman KAT	The module implements a KAT for EC Diffie-Hellman. The KAT passes if and only if the calculated output equals the expected output.
ECMQV KAT	The module implements a KAT for ECMQV. The KAT passes if and only if the calculated output equals the expected output.





All self-tests (except the Continuous RNG test) are executed during power-up without requiring operator input or action. The Firmware Integrity Test is the first self-test executed during power-up.

### 7.1 Invoking the Self-Tests

The operator can invoke the power-up self-tests by resetting the module using the Reset service. The operator can also invoke all of the self-tests with the exception of the Firmware Integrity Test and Continuous RNG test by performing the following operations:

- 1. Navigate to the **Options** → **Security** → **Security Status Information**.
- 2. Click the BlackBerry button to open the options menu.
- 3. In the menu, click Verify Security Software.

When the self-tests are executed in this manner, the module displays the list of self-tests that are being executed and a pass or fail status upon completion.





# **8 Mitigation of Other Attacks**

The module is designed to mitigate multiple side-channel attacks specific to the AES algorithm. Mitigation of these attacks is accomplished through the execution of table masking, splitting, and stirring maneuvers designed to aid in the protection of cryptographic keys and plaintext data at all points during the encryption, decryption, and self-test operations.

The following table describes the types of attacks the module mitigates.

#### Table 8: Attack Types

Attack type	Description
Side-Channel	<ul> <li>attempts to exploit physical properties of the algorithm implementation using Power Analysis (for example, SPA and DPA) and Electromagnetic Analysis (for example, SEMA and DEMA)</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>attempts to determine the encryption keys that a device uses by measuring and analyzing the power consumption, or electro-magnetic radiation emitted by the device during cryptographic operations</li> </ul>





# **Appendix A Acronyms**

### Introduction

This appendix lists the acronyms that are used in this document.

### Acronyms

Acronym	Full term
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI	American National Standards Institute
API	application programming interface
САТ	compare answer test
CBC	cipher block chaining
CSP	critical security parameter
DEMA	differential electromagnetic analysis
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DPA	differential power analysis
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
EC	Elliptic curve
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ECMQV	Elliptic Curve Menezes, Qu, Vanstone
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC	keyed-hash message authentication code
IEEE	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
КАТ	known answer test
LCD	liquid crystal display
LED	light-emitting diode
OS	operating system
PIN	personal identification number
PKCS	Public Key Cryptography Standard
PUB	Publication





Acronym	Full term
RIM	Research In Motion
RNG	Random Number Generator
RSA	Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
SEMA	simple electromagnetic analysis
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS	Secure Hash Standard
SMS	Short Message Service
SPA	simple power analysis
URL	Uniform Resource Locator
USB	Universal Serial Bus

