Enhanced Bandwidth Efficient Modem (EBEM) Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy Document Number 1179470, Rev. 009 August 4, 2016 Prepared by: ViaSat, Inc. 6155 El Camino Real Carlsbad, CA 92009 Copyright ViaSat, Inc. 2016. May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision]. ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 009, August 4, 2016 Record of Review and History Document Rev. Rationale Release Date Affected Pages Number 1148155 001 Initial Release in Agile October 31, 2012 All 1179470 001 Updated for Simplex Encryption/TxPI/AH March 13, 2015 All ECP 1179470 002 Updated in response to InfoGard and CMVP August 7, 2015 All Comments for Simplex Encryption/TxPI/AH ECP 1179470 003 Updated in response to InfoGard and CMVP October 7, 2015 All Comments 1179470 004 Updated in response to CMVP Comments October 16, 2015 All 1179470 005 Updated in response to CMVP Comments October 27, 2015 3, 5 1179470 006 Updated for FW v02.07.02. November 12, 1, 3, 4 2015 1179470 007 Updated for Remote Administrator and ESEM March 25, 2016 All Services and PPPoE Enhancements ECP 1179470 008 Updated in response to CMVP Comments June 22, 2016 3-5 1179470 009 Updated in response to CMVP Comments June 26, 2016 1, 6 ii ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 009, August 4, 2016 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. MODULE OVERVIEW.......................................................................................................................................... 1  2. SECURITY LEVEL ................................................................................................................................................ 2  3. MODES OF OPERATION ..................................................................................................................................... 3  APPROVED MODE OF OPERATION ............................................................................................................................... 3  4. PORTS AND INTERFACES.................................................................................................................................. 6  5. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY ................................................................................. 6  ASSUMPTION OF ROLES .............................................................................................................................................. 6  6. ACCESS CONTROL POLICY .............................................................................................................................. 9  ROLES AND SERVICES ................................................................................................................................................ 9  DEFINITION OF CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS (CSPS)...................................................................................... 11  DEFINITION OF PUBLIC KEYS: ................................................................................................................................. 12  DEFINITION OF CSPS AND PUBLIC KEY MODES OF ACCESS .................................................................................... 13  7. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .................................................................................................................... 17  8. SECURITY RULES .............................................................................................................................................. 17  9. SELF-TESTS ......................................................................................................................................................... 19  10. PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY..................................................................................................................... 20  PHYSICAL SECURITY MECHANISMS ......................................................................................................................... 20  OPERATOR REQUIRED ACTIONS .............................................................................................................................. 20  11. MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY ........................................................................................... 23  12. REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................................... 24  13. DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................... 24  LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Image of the Cryptographic Module ............................................................................................. 1  Figure 2: Block Diagram .............................................................................................................................. 2  Figure 3: Tamper Seal locations on the Strategic EBEM (8 Seals) ............................................................ 21  Figure 4: Tamper Seal locations on the Tactical EBEM (8 Seals).............................................................. 22  Figure 5: Tamper Seal Location of Expansion Port with Blank Plate Installed (2 Seals) .......................... 22  Figure 6: Tamper Seal Location on Expansion Port with ESEM Installed (1 Seal) ................................... 22  LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Module Security Level Specification ............................................................................................. 2  Table 2: Approved Algorithms and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions.......................................... 3  Table 3: Roles and Required Identification and Authentication ................................................................... 6  Table 4: Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms ....................................................................................... 7  Table 5: Services Authorized for Roles ........................................................................................................ 9  Table 6: CSP Access Rights within Services .............................................................................................. 14  Table 7: Public Key Access Rights within Services ................................................................................... 16  Table 8: Power Up Self-tests ...................................................................................................................... 19  Table 9: Conditional Self-tests.................................................................................................................... 20  Table 10: Critical Function Tests ................................................................................................................ 20  Table 11: Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms ................................................................ 21  iii ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 009, August 4, 2016 1. Module Overview The Enhanced Bandwidth Efficient Modem (EBEM) Cryptographic Module is a multi-chip standalone module as defined in the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140-2. The module has multiple configurations as shown below: Category Hardware Version Firmware Versions Strategic P/N 1010162, Version 1 02.08.13 P/N 1010162 with ESEM, Version 1 02.08.13 (also referred to as P/N 1091549, Version 1) P/N 1075559, Version 1 02.08.13 P/N 1075559 with ESEM, Version 1 02.08.13 (also referred to as P/N 1091551, Version 1) P/N 1047117: Tamper seal applied over the N/A ESEM Tactical P/N 1010163, Version 1 02.08.13 P/N 1010163 with ESEM, Version 1 02.08.13 (also referred to as P/N 1091550, Version 1) P/N 1075560, Version 1 02.08.13 P/N 1075560 with ESEM, Version 1 02.08.13 (also referred to as P/N 1091552, Version 1) P/N 1047117: Tamper seal applied over the N/A ESEM The cryptographic boundary is realized as the external surface of the EBEM enclosure. The EBEM is a high-speed, high performance, flexible and compatible Single Channel Per Carrier (SCPC) modem. The EBEM incorporates the latest technology in advanced modulation and coding, while providing backwards interoperability with the majority of existing SCPC modems. It offers optimal power and bandwidth efficiency with 16-ary modulation and Turbo-coding. It supports a large range of user data rates, from 64 kbps up to 155 Mbps. Figure 1: Image of the Cryptographic Module 1 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 009, August 4, 2016 Figure 2: Block Diagram 2. Security Level The cryptographic module meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 2 security of FIPS 140-2. Table 1: Module Security Level Specification Security Requirements Section Level Cryptographic Module Specification 3 Module Ports and Interfaces 2 Roles, Services and Authentication 2 Finite State Model 2 Physical Security 2 Operational Environment N/A Cryptographic Key Management 2 EMI/EMC 2 Self-Tests 2 Design Assurance 3 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A 2 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 009, August 4, 2016 3. Modes of Operation Approved mode of operation In FIPS mode, the cryptographic module supports the following FIPS Approved algorithms: Table 2: Approved Algorithms and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions Algorithm Algorithm Description CAVP Implementation Cert. # EBEM AES AES [FIPS 197, SP 800-38A] 3449 CTR 1 Functions: Encryption, Decryption (in FPGA for data) Modes: ECB (Encryption only), CTR (Encryption and Decryption) Key sizes: 256 bits EBEM AES AES [FIPS 197, SP 800-38A] 3450 CTR 2 Functions: Encryption, Decryption (in FPGA for data) Modes: ECB (Encryption only), CTR (Encryption and Decryption) Key sizes: 256 bits EbemCrypto AES [FIPS 197, SP 800-38A] 3879 Functions: Encryption, Decryption (in Processor for CSPs) Modes: ECB Key sizes: 256 bits AES Key [SP 800-38F] 3879 Wrap Functions: Wrap, Unwrap (for CSPs) (KTS) Key sizes: 256 bits Caveat: Key establishment methodology provides 256 bits of encryption strength. DRBG [SP 800-90A] 1107 Functions: CTR DRBG Security Strengths: 256 bits ECDSA [FIPS 186-4] 839 Functions: Signature Verification (for firmware images, and feature files) Curves/SHA sizes: P-521 with SHA-512 ECDSA [FIPS 186-4] 839 Functions: Key Pair Generation, Signature Generation, Signature Verification (for key transport messages) Curves/SHA sizes: P-384 with SHA-384 3 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 009, August 4, 2016 Algorithm Algorithm Description CAVP Implementation Cert. # HMAC [FIPS 198-1] 2521 Functions: Generation, Verification (for SMAT and PBKDF2 authentication) SHA sizes: SHA-384, SHA-512 KAS [SP 800-56A] 76 Schema: Ephemeral Unified Parameter sets/Key sizes: EE Supports 256 bits of security. KAS [SP 800-56A] 76 Schema: One Pass DH Parameter sets/Key sizes: ED Supports 192 bits of security. SHA [FIPS 180-4] 3201 Functions: Digital Signature Generation, Digital Signature Verification, non-Digital Signature Applications SHA sizes: SHA-384, and SHA-512 NetSNMP* KDF KDF [SP 800-135] 747 Functions: SNMP KDF (CVL) OpenSSH* KDF KDF [SP 800-135] 454 Functions: SSH KDF (CVL) OpenSSL SHA SHA [FIPS 180-4] 3202 Functions: non-Digital Signature Applications SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512 SHA-256 uClibc SHA [FIPS 180-4] 2689 Functions: non-Digital Signature Applications SHA sizes: SHA-256 In FIPS mode, the cryptographic module supports the following non-Approved, but allowed algorithms and protocols:  NDRNG – Hardware Non-Deterministic RNG. The NDRNG output is used to seed the FIPS Approved DRBG. The NDRNG produces entropy in 128-byte blocks.  The following are protocols and algorithms for which “no security is claimed”. These are considered plaintext communication channels for the purposes of this module. This is allowed in FIPS mode because the ViaSat EBEM's proprietary FIPS Approved key establishment and encryption algorithms (as shown in Table 2) protect sensitive information that is sent over the Telnet, SSH, SNMPv1, SNMPv3, FTP, and SFTP protocols. o Telnet – no security is claimed. Uses no algorithms. * This protocol has not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP. 4 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 009, August 4, 2016 o SSH – no security is claimed. Uses the following algorithms:  Protocol Defined Algorithm Names:  Ciphers: aes128-ctr, aes192-ctr, aes256-ctr, aes128-cbc, 3des-cbc, aes192-cbc, aes256-cbc  Key Exchange Algorithms: ecdh-sha2-nistp256, ecdh-sha2- nistp384, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha-256, diffie-hellman- group-exchange-sha1, diffie-hellman-group14-sha1  Public Key Algorithms: Ssh-dss, Ssh-rsa, Ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, Ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, Ecdsa-sha2-nistp521  MACs: hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512  Corresponding FIPS Algorithms:  Ciphers: AES (non-compliant), TDES (non-compliant)  Key Exchange Algorithms: EC Diffie-Hellman (curves P-256 and P-384; provides 128 or 192 bits of strength), Diffie-Hellman (2048-bit; provides 112 bits of strength), SHA (non-compliant)  Public Key Algorithms: DSA (non-compliant), RSA (non- compliant), ECDSA (non-compliant), SHA (non-compliant)  MACs: HMAC (non-compliant), SHA (non-compliant) SNMPv1 – no security is claimed. Uses no algorithms. o SNMPv3 – no security is claimed. Uses the following algorithms: o  Protocol Defined Algorithm Names: HMAC-MD5, HMAC-SHA, AES, DES  Corresponding FIPS Algorithms: HMAC (non-compliant), SHA (non- compliant), AES (non-compliant), MD5, DES FTP – no security is claimed. Uses no algorithms. o SFTP – no security is claimed. Uses the following algorithms: o  Same as SSH above.  SP 800-132 PBKDF2 – no security is claimed. Anything imported into the module encrypted using PBKDF keys is considered plaintext for the purposes of this module. This is allowed in FIPS mode because the ViaSat EBEM's proprietary FIPS Approved key establishment and encryption algorithms (as shown in Table 2) protect sensitive information that is sent encrypted by PBKDF keys. Corresponding FIPS Algorithm: PBKDF (non-compliant). The EBEM cryptographic module does not contain a Non FIPS Approved mode. The FIPS Approved mode of operation is indicated by the banner. When an Operator or Administrator connects to the module using Telnet, SSH, FTP, or SFTP, the banner indicates that the module is in FIPS Approved mode (“Module is in FIPS Approved Mode”). Additionally, if the firmware version is one that has a FIPS certificate, then the user knows they are operating in a FIPS Approved mode of operation. The unauthenticated service “Display status” allows a user to view the firmware version by scrolling to “GeneralSW Version”. 5 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 009, August 4, 2016 4. Ports and Interfaces The cryptographic module provides the following physical ports and logical interfaces:  J1 OVERHEAD (NON-INTELSAT): Data input, data output  J3 EXT REF: Control input  J4 DATA 1 (422/530): Data input, data output, control input  J5 DATA 2 (COMSEC): Data input, data output, control input  J7 DATA 3 (HSSI): Data input, data output  J6 TX L-BAND: Data output, status output  J8 RX L-BAND: Data input, control input  J9 TX 70/140 MHz: Data output, status output  J12 RX 70/140 MHz: Data input, control input  J20 10/100/1000 (only available with ESEM installed): Data input, data output, status output (status is only PADQ link quality packets during an active PPPoE session)  100-240V~ 60Hz/50Hz: Power port, power input  J13 ANT HANDOVER (only available in Tactical versions): Control input  J10 ALARM: Status output  J11 SERIAL: Data input, data output, control input, status output  J2 10/100 BASE-T: Data input, data output, control input, status output  Keypad: Control input, data input  LCD: Status output, Data output  Zeroize buttons: Control input  LEDs: Status outputs  Speaker: Status outputs 5. Identification and Authentication Policy Assumption of roles The EBEM cryptographic module supports five distinct operator roles (Operator, Administrator, Peer Modem, and ViaSat, Inc.). The cryptographic module shall enforce the separation of roles using role-based and identity-based operator authentication. Table 3: Roles and Required Identification and Authentication Type of Role Description Authentication Data Authentication Operator A “User” from the FIPS Identity-based User name and Password 140-2 perspective. Administrator A “Crypto Officer” from Identity-based User name and Password the FIPS 140-2 perspective. 6 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 009, August 4, 2016 Type of Role Description Authentication Data Authentication Peer Modem The modem at the other Role-based HMAC Key, also referred to as end of the RF link, with SMAT (Shared Modem whom the TEK Authentication Token) negotiation occurs. Identity and Authentication (IA) FIPS 186-4 ECDSA Signature Identity-based Key Pair ViaSat, Inc. Signer of firmware Identity-based FIPS 186-4 ECDSA Signature image files and feature Key files. A ViaSat trust anchor used to validate authenticity when loading these files on modem. Table 4: Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms Authentication Strength of Mechanism Mechanism Password The password is a minimum of 8-characters chosen from upper and lowercase letters, 10 digits, and 10 special characters. The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is 1/72^8 which is less than 1/1,000,000. The module will lockout after a maximum of 5 consecutive failed login attempts. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within one minute is 5/72^8 which is less than 1/100,000. HMAC Key The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is the strength of the embedded SHA-384 function 1 / 2^192 which is less than 1/1,000,000. When the HMAC key is manually entered at the front panel. No more than 10 unique authentication attempts can occur in any one minute period. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within one minute is 10 / 2^192 which is less than 1/100,000. When the HMAC key is entered (encrypted) over the SSH M&C interface via the LCT, it takes 20 seconds to fill so no more than 3 attempts can occur in any one minute period. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is 3 / 2^192 (which is < 1/100,000) due to a maximum of three attempts per minute. 7 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 009, August 4, 2016 Authentication Strength of Mechanism Mechanism FIPS 186-4 Using the EBEM’s ECDSA implementation, the probability that a random ECDSA IA attempt will succeed is the strength of the embedded SHA-384 function, Signature Key or 1 / 2^192, which is less than 1/1,000,000. The IA key pair takes 20 seconds to fill so no more than 3 attempts can occur in any one minute period. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is 3 / 2^192 (which is < 1/100,000) due to a maximum of three attempts per minute. FIPS 186-4 Using the EBEM’s ECDSA implementation, the probability that a random ECDSA attempt will succeed is the strength of the embedded SHA-512 function, Firmware/Feature or 1 / 2^256, which is less than 1/1,000,000. Signature Key If the signature verification fails, the user must reboot before transferring a different firmware image to the modem and trying the validation again. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is 1 / 2^256 (which is < 1/100,000) due to a maximum of one attempt per minute. 8 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 009, August 4, 2016 6. Access Control Policy Roles and Services Table 5: Services Authorized for Roles Unauthenticated Administrator Peer Modem ViaSat, Inc. Operator Service Description Telnet, SSH, SNMPv1, Remotely connect to the EBEM using X X SNMPv3, FTP, or Telnet, SSH, SNMPv1, SNMPv3, FTP SFTP Access or SFTP. These protocols are used to establish access to the module for the Operator and Administrator to perform other services, as described in this table. Circuit Establishment Configure an encrypted or unencrypted X X circuit Encryption Use HMAC (with SMAT) or ECDSA X Establishment and signature verification (with IA PKC) to Authentication authenticate the AES encrypted pipeline. Change Own One may change one’s own password X X Password after authentication with the module Set/Change Set Administrator and Operator’s User X Administrator, Names & Passwords. Unlock accounts Operator User Names and change role type. & Passwords Set/Change SNMPv1 Initialize or change the password for X Password authenticating the SNMPv1 user. Enable/Disable Configure module exclusive bypass X encryption settings SMAT Entry and SMAT Entry (may initiate SMAT X Rollover rollover if a circuit is established) Encryption Perform encryption on an established X encrypted circuit with a peer modem. Cryptographically Cryptographically validate and load an X Validate image uploaded firmware image or feature file. Zeroize (authenticated) Actively overwrite all CSPs. Then the X X module must be powered down. Note: Zeroize not available from Front Panel menu (only unauthenticated zeroize available) 9 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 009, August 4, 2016 Unauthenticated Administrator Peer Modem ViaSat, Inc. Operator Service Description Configure System Adjust the module’s system time. X Time Configure Access to Enable/disable remote access via FTP, X Unsecure Protocols SNMPv1, and Telnet. Configure password Set minimum password X policy length/complexity requirement and password expiration period. Change/Monitor Adjust all modem and ESEM X X Modem and ESEM parameters. Monitor status of all configuration, view modem parameters and statistics. statistics View or clear audit logView or clear audit log, which logs X actions of all users and the associated access method. Upload/Install Feature Upload a firmware image or a feature X File or Firmware Image file. This will later be validated by the ViaSat, Inc. role. Issue/Fill/Delete Issue/Fill/Delete key material needed for X Simplex PKI Key authentication and key establishment for Material PKI circuits. This includes: Trust Anchor, Certificate Authority certificates, CRLs, IA /KE certificates, and IA/KE private keys. View Filled PKI View IDs and type of key material that X X Information is filled in the modem. User Login Login to the modem configuration X interfaces (i.e. SSH, Telnet, (S)FTP, Front Panel, and SNMP) Power On Power on the modem X Power Off Power off the modem X Reset Reset the modem X X X Display Status Show non-security relevant status of the X cryptographic module via the front panel. Zeroize Actively overwrite all Critical Security X (unauthenticated) Parameters (CSPs) through SNMPv1, or the front panel. Then the module must be powered down. 10 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 009, August 4, 2016 Unauthenticated Administrator Peer Modem ViaSat, Inc. Operator Service Description Self-Tests Perform a suite of Power On Self Tests X (POSTs). All POSTs are initiated automatically without operator intervention Antenna Handover Command sent from ship to modem to X Service switch antennas Local/Remote Switch to Local (which only allows X commands through the Front Panel) or switch to Remote (which allows access via remote protocols like SSH). Alarm Mute Mute the audible alarm. X Note: Operator and Administrator roles are permitted access to the module via the front panel as well as remote interfaces (Telnet, SSH, FTP, SFTP, SNMPv1, and SNMPv3). Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) The following are CSPs contained in the module:  SMAT (HMAC Key): Used to authenticate the peer modem role (within a given community of modems) during the initial key agreement messages related to secure circuit establishment. This key is used during re-key operations to authenticate a peer modem. The HMAC algorithm in the EBEM modem uses the SMAT as input, so only EBEM modems configured with the same SMAT will correctly authenticate each other. Authentication of peer modem using this parameter takes place while the modems are performing ECC CDH in key agreement, and the authentication is a 512-bit value.  DRBG Seed: 384 bytes (3072 bits) of random data generated from an entropy source (non-deterministic) used to initialize the Deterministic Random Bit Generator (per NIST SP 800-90A).  DRBG Internal State: The internal state of the NIST SP 800-90A CTR DRBG. These are values “V” and “Key”.  SMAT Circuit TxTEK (Transmit Traffic Encryption Key): A 256-bit AES CTR mode traffic encryption key. This key is used to protect data sent over SMAT-authenticated RF circuits from modems to peer modems.  SMAT Circuit RxTEK (Receive Traffic Encryption Key): A 256-bit AES CTR mode traffic decryption key. This key is used to decrypt protected data sent over SMAT- authenticated RF circuits from peer modems. This key is an exact match of a peer modem’s TxTEK for symmetric AES cryptographic communication. 11 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 009, August 4, 2016  PKI Circuit TxTEK (Transmit Traffic Encryption Key): A 256-bit AES CTR mode traffic encryption key. This key is used to protect data sent over PKI-authenticated RF circuits from modems to peer modems.  PKI Circuit RxTEK (Receive Traffic Encryption Key): A 256-bit AES CTR mode traffic decryption key. This key is used to decrypt protected data sent over PKI-authenticated RF circuits from peer modems. This key is an exact match of a peer modem’s TxTEK for symmetric AES cryptographic communication.  PKI Circuit KEK: A 256-bit AES key used to encrypt the TxTEK for PKI-authenticated circuits before it is output in the Key Transport message.  Static IA Private Key: Used to digitally sign the Ephemeral KE public key sent in Key Transport messages for PKI-authenticated circuit establishment.  Ephemeral KE Private Key: Used to derive the PKI Circuit KEK to encrypt the TEK sent in Key Transport messages for PKI-authenticated circuit establishment.  Static KE Private Key: Used to derive the PKI Circuit KEK used to decrypt the TEK received in Key Transport messages for PKI-authenticated circuit establishment.  SMAT Circuit Ephemeral Private Key: Module’s private key used for SMAT-based circuit establishment with peer modem, per NIST SP800-56A C (2e, 0s, ECC CDH).  Key Fill Ephemeral Private Key: Private key used for Key Fill KEK establishment with LCT, per NIST SP800-56A C (2e, 0s, ECC CDH).  Key Fill KEK: A 256-bit AES key used to encrypt private keys filled into the modem.  ECC CDH Primitive Shared Secret: FIPS SP800-56A C(2e, 0s, ECC CDH) and C(1e, 1s, ECC CDH), key agreement schemes and used with the Concatenation KDF to establish key material for SMAT/PKI authenticated circuits and private key fill.  Bypass Flag: Determines if a circuit is processed as plaintext or ‘encryption enabled.’  Administrator Password(s): 8-character minimum, 20-character maximum, chosen from upper and lowercase letters, 10 digits, and 10 special characters; used to authenticate the Administrator and will lockout after 3 to 5 (configurable by Administrator) failed attempts.  Operator Password(s): 8-character minimum, 20-character maximum, chosen from upper and lowercase letters, 10 digits, and 10 special characters; used to authenticate the Operator and will lockout after 3 to 5 (configurable by Administrator) failed attempts.  Local Unique Key (LUK): A 256-bit AES key used to encrypt CSPs so they can be stored on the RAM or flash file system. Definition of Public Keys: The following are the public keys contained in the module.  Firmware/Feature Trust Anchor – FIPS 186-4 ECDSA Public Key: Used to validate the authenticity of signed code images and/or feature files  SMAT Circuit Ephemeral Public Key: Module’s public key used for SMAT- authenticated circuit establishment with peer modem, per NIST SP800-56A C (2e, 1s, ECC CDH). 12 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 009, August 4, 2016  SMAT Circuit Remote Modem’s Ephemeral Public Key: Peer Modem’s public key used for circuit establishment, per NIST SP800-56A C (2e, 1s, ECC CDH).  PKI Circuit Trust Anchor – ECDSA Public Key: Used to validate ECDSA signatures of CA, IA and KE public key certificates for PKI-authenticated circuits.  PKI CA Public Key – Certificate Authority public key used to validate ECDSA signatures of IA and KE public key certificates for PKI-authenticated circuits.  Static IA Public Key: Used to digitally sign (per FIPS 186-4 ECDSA) and validate the signature the KE Public Key sent in Simplex Key Agreement messages for PKI- authenticated circuit establishment.  Ephemeral KE Public Key: Used to derive the PKI Circuit KEK used to encrypt/decrypt the AES-wrapped TEK for PKI-authenticated circuits, per NIST SP 800-56A C (1e, 1s, ECC CDH).  Receiver Static KE Public Key: Used to derive the PKI Circuit KEK used to encrypt/decrypt the AES-wrapped TEK for PKI-authenticated circuits, (per FIPS 186-4 ECDSA). Received over the air.  Remote IA Public Key: Used to validate authenticity (digital signature) of received Key Transport messages for PKI-authenticated circuit establishment, (per FIPS 186-4 ECDSA). Received over the air.  Remote Ephemeral KE Public Key: Used to derive the PKI Circuit KEK used to decrypt the AES-wrapped TEK received in Key Transport messages for PKI-authenticated circuit establishment, per NIST SP 800-56A C (1e, 1s, ECC CDH).  Key Fill Ephemeral Public Key: Ephemeral public key generated and used when inputting a static private key or SMAT into the modem (per NIST SP 800-56A C (2e, 0s, ECC CDH).  LCT Key Fill Remote Ephemeral Public Key: Ephemeral public key received from the LCT and used when inputting a static private key or SMAT into the modem (per NIST SP 800-56A C (2e, 0s, ECC CDH). Received over an authenticated connection from the LCT. Definition of CSPs and Public Key Modes of Access Table 6 defines the relationship between CSPs and only those module services that access CSPs. The modes of access shown in the Table 6 are defined as follows.  Input (I): the data item is entered into the cryptographic module  Output (O): the data item is output (Note: CSPs that are output are encrypted).  Store (S): the data item is set into the persistent storage  Use (U): the data item is used within its corresponding security function  Establish (E): the data item is established via a commercially available key establishment technique  Generate (G): the data item is generated  Zeroize (Z): the data item is actively overwritten 13 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 009, August 4, 2016 Table 6: CSP Access Rights within Services CSPs Ephemeral KE Private Key Key Fill Ephemeral Private SMAT Circuit Ephemeral Administrator Password DRBG Seed and DRBG SMAT Circuit RxTEK SMATCircuit TxTEK Static KE Private Key Static IA Private Key SMAT (HMAC Key) ECC CDH Primitive PKI Circuit RxTEK PKI Circuit TxTEK Operator Password Local Unique Key PKI Circuit KEK Shared Secret Internal State Key Fill KEK Bypass Flag Private Key Service Key Telnet, SSH, SNMPv1, SNMPv3, FTP, I,U I,U or SFTP Access Circuit Establishment U I, U I, U Encryption Establishment and U G, U E E G,O I E, U U G, U U G, U E, U U I, U I, U Authentication Change Own Password I,U,S I,U,S U Set/Change Admin, Operator User I, S I, S U Names & Passwords Set/Change SNMPv1 Password I,S U Enable/Disable encryption I,S I, U SMAT Entry and Rollover I, S G, U G, U E,U E, U I,U U Encryption U U U U Cryptographically Validate image Zeroize (Authenticated) Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Configure System Time I,U Configure Access to Unsecure I,U Protocols Configure password policy I,U Change/Monitor Modem and ESEM I,U I,U configuration, view statistics View or clear audit log I,U Upload/Install Feature File or Firmware I,U Image Issue/Fill/Delete Simplex PKI Key G, U I,U, I,U, G, U E,U E, U I,U U Material S S View Filled PKI Information I,U I,U User Login I, U I, U U Power On G, U G,S Power Off Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Reset Display status O 14 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page Service Self-tests ViaSat, Inc. Alarm Mute Local/Remote Zeroize (Unauthenticated) Antenna Handover Service Z SMAT (HMAC Key) DRBG Seed and DRBG G, U Internal State Z SMATCircuit TxTEK Z SMAT Circuit RxTEK Z PKI Circuit TxTEK Z PKI Circuit RxTEK 15 PKI Circuit KEK ViaSat, Inc. Z Static IA Private Key Ephemeral KE Private Key Dissemination restricted as described on cover page CSPs Z Static KE Private Key SMAT Circuit Ephemeral Private Key Key Fill Ephemeral Private Key Key Fill KEK ECC CDH Primitive G Shared Secret Z Bypass Flag Z Administrator Password Z Operator Password August 4, 2016 EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 009, Z Local Unique Key ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 009, August 4, 2016 Table 7: Public Key Access Rights within Services Public Keys Remote Ephemeral KE SMAT Circuit Remote Ephemeral Public Key Remote IA Public Key Ephemeral KE Public Ephemeral KE Public LCT Key Fill Remote Modem’s Ephemeral Static IA Public Key PKI CA Public Key Key Fill Ephemeral Firmware/ Feature Receiver Static KE PKI Circuit Trust SMAT Circuit Trust Anchor Public Keys Public Key Public Key Public Key Anchor Service Key Key Telnet, SSH, SNMPv1, SNMPv3, FTP, or SFTP Access Circuit Establishment Encryption Establishment and Authentication G, U, I,U U U U,O G,U,O U I,U I, U O Change Own Password Set/Change Admin, Operator User Names & Passwords Set/Change SNMPv1 Password Enable/Disable encryption SMAT Entry and Rollover Encryption Cryptographically Validate image I,S Zeroize (Authenticated) Configure System Time Configure Access to Unsecure Protocols Configure password policy Change/Monitor Modem and ESEM configuration, view statistics View or clear audit log Upload/Install Feature File or Firmware Image U Issue/Fill/Delete Simplex PKI Key Material I,S I,S I,S I,S G,U,O I,U View Filled PKI Information User login Power On Power Off Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Reset Display status Zeroize (Unauthenticated) Self-tests Antenna Handover Service Local/Remote Alarm Mute 16 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 009, August 4, 2016 7. Operational Environment The FIPS 140-2 Area 6 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the EBEM device contains a limited operational environment; the cryptographic module only supports the loading and execution of code ECDSA digitally authenticated firmware signed by ViaSat, Inc. 8. Security Rules This section documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of FIPS 140-2, Level 2.  The cryptographic module shall support defined roles with a defined set of corresponding services. The defined roles shall be: o Operator (FIPS 140-2 “User”) o Administrator (FIPS 140-2 “Crypto Officer”) o Peer Modem o ViaSat, Inc.  Separation of roles: The cryptographic module shall require distinct authentication for each role. Simultaneous service is permitted, but authentication is always required when switching between roles  The cryptographic module shall not support a maintenance role or maintenance interface.  The purpose, function, service inputs, and service outputs performed by each role shall be defined and appropriately restricted.  The cryptographic module shall not support the output of plaintext CSPs.  The cryptographic module design shall ensure that services that do not require authentication do not provide the ability to modify, disclose, or substitute any module CSPs, use Approved security functions, or otherwise affect module security.  The cryptographic module shall support exclusive bypass capabilities. The cryptographic module shall require two independent internal actions to enter into the bypass state. The authorized operator shall be able to determine when bypass capability is selected as follows: Bypass LED illuminated  A defined methodology shall be enforced to control access to the cryptographic module prior to initialization. The module shall arrive to the end customer with a default Administrator password that shall be changed before any services are allowed.  Re-authentication shall be required upon power cycling the module.  The cryptographic module shall support role-based or identity-based authentication for all security relevant services; re-authentication shall be required to change roles.  Feedback provided during the authentication process shall not weaken the strength of the implemented authentication mechanisms. During password entry, the module shall not display the entered values in a readable form; all inputs will be echoed back to the display as asterisks.  The cryptographic module’s finite state machine shall provide a clear description of all states and corresponding state transitions. The design of the cryptographic module shall disallow the ability to simultaneously occupy more than one state at a time.  The cryptographic module’s physically contiguous cryptographic boundary shall be defined including all module components and connections (ports), information flows, 17 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 009, August 4, 2016 processing, and input/output data. All vendor-defined non-security relevant circuitry shall be argued for exclusion from the cryptographic boundary.  All cryptographic module data output shall be inhibited when the module is in an error state any during self-tests.  Data output shall be logically disconnected from the processes performing key generation, manual key entry, and zeroization.  All physical ports and logical interfaces shall be defined; the cryptographic module shall be able to distinguish between data and control for input and data and status for output. In addition, the cryptographic module shall support a power interface.  All of the implemented integrated circuits shall be standard quality, production-grade components.  The cryptographic module shall contain an opaque tamper evident enclosure.  CSPs shall be protected against unauthorized disclosure, modification, and substitution. Public keys and critical settings shall be protected against unauthorized modification and substitution.  The cryptographic module shall support key generation using an Approved RNG listed in FIPS PUB 140-2 Annex C.  The cryptographic module shall enforce an entity association for all keys that are input to/output from the cryptographic module; an entity association shall be enforced for all keys stored within the cryptographic boundary.  Key establishment techniques supported by the cryptographic module shall be commercially available as allowed under the requirements of FIPS PUB 140-2 Annex D.  The cryptographic module shall provide the ability to zeroize all plaintext CSPs. Note: To fully complete the Zeroize Service, the unit must be manually power-cycled.  Power-up self-tests shall not require operator actions. The cryptographic module shall provide an indicator upon successful self-test completion as follows: o Fault LED off  The cryptographic module shall enter an error state upon failure of any self-test and shall provide an indicator upon failure as follows: o Fault LED on  Upon entering an error state, the cryptographic module shall inhibit all data outputs, inhibit cryptographic operations, and shall provide error status. The status output shall not contain any CSPs or other sensitive information that could be used to compromise the cryptographic module.  The loading of non-FIPS-validated firmware versions will invalidate the FIPS module.  The tamper evident seals described in Section 10 shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS Approved mode of operation.  The module has the following restrictions on concurrent operators: o While an Administrator, or Operator is logged into the Front Panel, SSH, SNMPv1, SNMPv3, FTP, and SFTP protocols users cannot configure EBEM modem. 18 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 009, August 4, 2016 9. Self-Tests The cryptographic module shall support the following self-tests: Table 8: Power Up Self-tests Test Target Description Firmware 32-bit EDC performed over all executable code Integrity FPGA AES KATs: EBEM AES CTR 1 Encryption only (because CTR mode utilizes Encrypt ECB encrypt for both encryption and decryption) Modes: ECB Key sizes: 256 bits FPGA AES KATs: EBEM AES CTR 2 Encryption only (because CTR mode utilizes Decrypt ECB encrypt for both encryption and decryption) Modes: ECB Key sizes: 256 bits AES KATs: EbemCrypto, separate encryption and decryption tests Modes: ECB Key sizes: 256 bits AES Key Wrap KATs: Separate wrap and unwrap tests. Key sizes: 256 bits DRBG KATs: CTR DRBG Security Strengths: 256 bits ECDSA KAT: FIPS 186-4 Signature Verification Curves/Key sizes: P-521 with SHA-512 ECDSA PCT: FIPS 186-4 Signature Generation, Signature Verification Curves/Key sizes: P-384 with SHA-384 HMAC KATs: Generation, Verification SHA sizes: SHA-384, SHA-512 KAS KATs: Ephemeral Unified, per IG 9.6 – ECCCDH Primitive Computation and KDF using P-521 curve. Parameter Sets/Key sizes: EE KAS KATs: One Pass DH, per IG 9.6 – ECCCDH Primitive Computation and KDF using P-384 curve. Parameter Sets/Key sizes: ED KDF KATs: SNMP KDF KDF KATs: SSH KDF SHA KATs: EbemCrypto SHA-384, SHA-512 SHA KATs: OpenSSL SHA SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512 SHA KATs: SHA-256 uClibc SHA-256 19 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 009, August 4, 2016 Table 9: Conditional Self-tests Test Target Description NDRNG NDRNG Continuous Test performed when a random value is requested from the NDRNG. DRBG DRBG Continuous Test performed when a random value is requested from the DRBG. ECDSA ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every ECDSA key pair generation (static and ephemeral per IG 9.9). Firmware Load FIPS 186-4 ECDSA P-521 with SHA-512 signature verification performed when firmware is loaded. DRBG Health Performed conditionally per SP 800-90A Section 11.3. Required per IG Checks C.1. SP 800-56A Pairwise key validation (per IG 9.6) Assurances Exclusive Bypass Test verifies which mode (Bypass or Encryption) the module is in Bypass Test by checking a flag value, which is stored in FLASH and whose integrity is verified by a 32-bit EDC (CRC). Manual Key Manual Key Entry Test performed via Error Detection Code Entry Table 10: Critical Function Tests Test Target Description BIT Verification of FPGA loading 10. Physical Security Policy Physical Security Mechanisms The EBEM multi-chip standalone cryptographic module includes the following physical security mechanisms.  Production-grade components  Production-grade opaque enclosure with 10 (ten) tamper evident seals applied during manufacturing if the Expansion Port on the module has the Blank Plate installed  Production-grade opaque enclosure with nine (9) tamper-evident seals if the EBEM contains an ESEM card (eight (8) seals applied during manufacturing and one (1) rectangular tamper-evident seal applied by the Crypto-Officer  Protected vents Operator Required Actions The Administrator (FIPS 140-2 “Crypto Officer”) is required to periodically inspect the tamper evident seals, enclosure, and vents as shown in Table 11. If suspicious markings are found, the cryptographic module should be zeroized and returned to the manufacturer (contact ViaSat, Inc. at www.viasat.com) for inspection/maintenance. 20 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 009, August 4, 2016 Table 11: Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms Physical Security Recommended Frequency of Inspection/Test Guidance Mechanisms Inspection/Test Details Tamper Evident Seals As specified per end user Visually inspect the seals for policy tears, rips, dissolved adhesive, and other signs of malice. Opaque enclosure As specified per end user Visually inspect the enclosure for policy broken screws, bent casing, scratches, and other questionable markings. Protected vents As specified per end user Visually inspect the vents for policy tears, bent baffles, and other signs of tampering. The following diagrams depict the tamper seal locations (circled in blue): Figure 3: Tamper Seal locations on the Strategic EBEM (8 Seals) 21 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 009, August 4, 2016 Figure 4: Tamper Seal locations on the Tactical EBEM (8 Seals) Figure 5: Tamper Seal Location of Expansion Port with Blank Plate Installed (2 Seals) Figure 6: Tamper Seal Location on Expansion Port with ESEM Installed (1 Seal) 22 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 009, August 4, 2016 All tamper seals are installed at the factory except the one shown in Figure 5 for the ESEM. In the case of an EBEM that contains an ESEM (i.e., as in Figure 5), the one (1) tamper seal must be installed by the Administrator (FIPS 140-2 “Crypto Officer”). Prior to installation, the Administrator (FIPS 140-2 “Crypto Officer”) is responsible for securing and having control at all times of any unused seals. Detailed instructions for the ESEM and tamper seal installation are provided in ViaSat, Inc.’s EBEM Crypto Officer & User Guide and Software/Firmware Installation Guide, ViaSat document number 1153093, Section 11. The tamper evident seals shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS Approved mode of operation. Note: The tamper seal applied over the ESEM is HW P/N 1047117; however, the Administrator (FIPS 140-2 “Crypto Officer”) cannot order additional tamper seals from ViaSat, Inc. If the device is found to be tampered, the unit should be returned to the factory for a repair inspection. 11. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy The module has not been designed to mitigate specific attacks outside of the scope of FIPS 140- 2. 23 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 009, August 4, 2016 12. References  FIPS PUB 140-2  FIPS PUB 180-1  FIPS PUB 180-2  FIPS PUB 186-4  FIPS PUB 198  FIPS PUB 46-3  FIPS PUB 186-2  FIPS SP800-56A  FIPS SP 800-90A  FIPS SP 800-132  FIPS SP 800-38F 13. Definitions and Acronyms DEFINITION Acronym AES Advanced Encryption Standard BIT Built-in Test CAVS Cryptographic Algorithm Validation System CSP Critical Security Parameter (as defined per FIPS 140-2) CTR Counter (i.e. AES Counter mode) DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator DSA Digital Signature Algorithm EBEM Enhanced Bandwidth Efficient Modem ECB Electronic Code Book ECC CDH Elliptic Curve Cryptography Co-factor Diffie-Hellman ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm ESEM Ethernet Service Expansion Module FIFO First-in, First-out (data buffer) FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards FTP File Transfer Protocol FW Firewall HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code IA Identity and Authentication KAT Known Answer Test KDF Key Derivation Function KW Key Wrap (AES Key Wrap without Padding from SP 80038-F) LCT Local Control Terminal LED Loop Encryption Device Mbps Million Bits per Second Modem Modulator/Demodulator NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 24 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page ViaSat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 009, August 4, 2016 PBKDF Password Based Key Derivation Function PKI Public Key Infrastructure RNG Random Number Generator RX Receiver SCPC Single Channel Per Carrier SFTP Secure File Transfer Protocol SHA Secure Hash Algorithm SMAT Shared Message Authentication Token SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol TX Transmit 25 ViaSat, Inc. Dissemination restricted as described on cover page