Cisco IOS 15.5M Router Security Policy Cisco Integrated Services Router (ISR) 1905 ISR, 1921 ISR, 1941 ISR, 2901 ISR, 2911 ISR, 2921 ISR, 2951 ISR, 3925 ISR, 3925E ISR, 3945 ISR, 3945E ISR, 5915 ESR and 5940 ESR Firmware Version: IOS 15.5M FIPS 140-2 Non Proprietary Security Policy Level 1 Validation Version 1.0 June 2016 © Copyright 2016 Cisco Systems, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Table of Contents 1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 3 1.1 PURPOSE ............................................................................................................................. 3 1.2 MODULE VALIDATION LEVEL ............................................................................................ 3 1.3 REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 3 1.4 TERMINOLOGY ................................................................................................................... 3 1.5 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION ............................................................................................... 4 2 CISCO ROUTERS AND MODULE DESCRIPTION ....................................................... 5 2.1 MODULE INTERFACES ......................................................................................................... 8 2.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY ............................................................................................. 9 2.3 ROLES, SERVICES, AND AUTHENTICATION ......................................................................... 9 2.3.1 User Services ................................................................................................ 9 2.3.2 Crypto Officer Services................................................................................ 10 2.4 UNAUTHENTICATED SERVICES ......................................................................................... 11 2.5 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY/CSP MANAGEMENT ...................................................................... 11 2.6 CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS ........................................................................................ 14 2.6.1 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms ............................................................ 14 2.6.2 Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode .............................. 14 2.6.3 Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms .................................................................. 15 2.7 SELF-TESTS ...................................................................................................................... 15 2.7.1 Power-On Self-Tests (POSTs) .................................................................... 15 2.7.2 Conditional tests .......................................................................................... 16 3 SECURE OPERATION ...................................................................................................... 17 3.1 INITIAL SETUP .................................................................................................................. 17 3.2 SYSTEM INITIALIZATION AND CONFIGURATION ................................................................ 17 3.3 IPSEC REQUIREMENTS AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS ............................................ 17 3.4 SSLV3.1/TLS REQUIREMENTS AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS ............................... 18 3.5 ACCESS ............................................................................................................................. 18 3.6 CISCO UNIFIED BORDER ELEMENT (CUBE) TLS CONFIGURATION .................................. 18 © Copyright 2016 Cisco Systems, Inc. 2 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. 1 Introduction Purpose 1.1 This is the non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for Cisco IOS 15.5M Router running on Cisco 1905 ISR, 1921 ISR, 1941 ISR, 2901 ISR, 2911 ISR, 2921 ISR, 2951 ISR, 3925 ISR, 3925E ISR, 3945 ISR, 3945E ISR and 5900 ESR Router (Firmware Version: IOS 15.5M). This security policy describes how the modules meet the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 1 and how to run the modules in a FIPS 140-2 mode of operation and may be freely distributed. FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the NIST website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/index.html. Module Validation Level 1.2 The following table lists the level of validation for each area in the FIPS PUB 140-2. No. Area Title Level 1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1 2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1 3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3 4 Finite State Model 1 5 Physical Security 1 6 Operational Environment N/A 7 Cryptographic Key management 1 8 Electromagnetic Interface/Electromagnetic Compatibility 1 9 Self-Tests 1 10 Design Assurance 3 11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A Overall module validation level 1 Table 1: Module Validation Level References 1.3 This document deals only with the capabilities and operations of the Cisco 1905 ISR, 1921 ISR, 1941 ISR, 2901 ISR, 2911 ISR, 2921 ISR, 2951 ISR, 3925 ISR, 3925E ISR, 3945 ISR, 3945E ISR and 5900 ESR routers in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the routers from the following sources: For answers to technical or sales related questions please refer to the contacts listed on the Cisco Systems website at www.cisco.com. The NIST Validated Modules website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/validation.html) contains contact information for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module. Terminology 1.4 In this document, these Cisco Integrated Services Router models identified above are referred to as Routers or the systems. © Copyright 2016 Cisco Systems, Inc. 3 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Document Organization 1.5 The Security Policy document is part of the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this document, the Submission Package contains: Vendor Evidence document Finite State Machine Other supporting documentation as additional references This document provides an overview of the routers and explains their secure configuration and operation. This introduction section is followed by Section 2, which details the general features and functionality of the router. Section 3 specifically addresses the required configuration for the FIPS-mode of operation. With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation Submission Documentation is Cisco-proprietary and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Cisco Systems. © Copyright 2016 Cisco Systems, Inc. 4 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. 2 Cisco Routers and Module Description Cisco 1905 ISR, 1921 ISR, 1941 ISR, 2901 ISR, 2911 ISR, 2921 ISR, 2951 ISR, 3925 ISR, 3925E ISR, 3945 ISR, 3945E ISR and 5900 ESR are multifunctional networking devices delivering fast, reliable, data transfers with a high standard in security. These routers offer full network security, and other capabilities to fill networking needs for a small to medium size network. The Cisco IOS 15.5M Routers provides a scalable, secure, manageable remote access server that meets FIPS 140-2 Level 1 requirements. Some of the ISRs incorporate the High-Density Packet Voice Digital signal processor (DSP) providing high-density voice connectivity, conferencing and transcoding capabilities. Two types are part of this validation, the PVDM2 and PVDM3, (Packet Voice Video Digital Signal Processor Module) which are plugged into the router to provide some variant of the conferencing video services associated with the specific type. The high-density packet voice PVDM2 DSP’s are available in five versions: PVDM2-8, PVDM2-16, PVDM2-32, PVDM2-48, and PVDM2-64. The -8, -16, -32, -48 and -64 indicate the maximum number of packet fax and voice channels. While the high- density packet voice PVDM3 DSP modules are available in six versions: PVDM3-16, PVDM3-32, PVDM3-64, PVDM3-128, PVDM3-192, and PVDM3-256 supporting switched-only video with the -128 and higher also supporting video conferencing with transcoding and translating. The -16, -32, -64, -128, -192 and -256 indicate the number of participants. The Cisco 5900 ESR all optimized for mobile and embedded networks that require IP routing and services. The flexible, compact form factor of the Cisco 5900 routers, complemented by Cisco IOS Software and Cisco Mobile Ready Net capabilities, provides highly secure data, voice, and video communications to stationary and mobile network nodes across wired and wireless links. The following configurations listed in Actual Hardware were tested: Hardware Actual Hardware PVDM ISM Protocols Model Model Tested SSH, TLS (VPN,Mgt), IPSec, 1905 ISR 1905 N/A N/A SNMPv3 and CUBE/sRTP SSH, TLS (VPN,Mgt), IPSec, 1921 ISR 1921 N/A N/A SNMPv3 and CUBE/sRTP SSH, TLS (VPN,Mgt), IPSec, 1941 ISR 1941 N/A ISM-VPN-19 SNMPv3 and CUBE/sRTP SSH, TLS (VPN,Mgt), IPSec, 2901 ISR 2901 ISM-VPN-29 (Any one of the SNMPv3 and CUBE/sRTP following:) SSH, TLS (VPN,Mgt), IPSec, 2911 ISR 2911 ISM-VPN-29 PVDM2-8 SNMPv3 and CUBE/sRTP PVDM2-16 SSH, TLS (VPN,Mgt), IPSec, 2921 ISR 2921 ISM-VPN-29 PVDM2-32 SNMPv3 and CUBE/sRTP PVDM2-48 SSH, TLS (VPN,Mgt), IPSec, 2951 ISR 2951 ISM-VPN-29 PVDM2-64 SNMPv3 and CUBE/sRTP PVDM3-16 SSH, TLS (VPN,Mgt), IPSec, PVDM3-32 3925 ISR 3925 ISM-VPN-39 SNMPv3 and CUBE/sRTP PVDM3-64 SSH, TLS (VPN,Mgt), IPSec, PVDM3-128 3945 ISR 3945 ISM-VPN-39 SNMPv3 and CUBE/sRTP PVDM3-192 N/A SSH, TLS (VPN,Mgt), IPSec, PVDM3-256 3925E ISR 3925E SNMPv3 and CUBE/sRTP N/A SSH, TLS (VPN,Mgt), IPSec, 3945E ISR 3945E SNMPv3 and CUBE/sRTP SSH, TLS (VPN,Mgt), IPSec, Cisco 5915 ESR N/A N/A SNMPv3 and CUBE/sRTP 5900 ESR SSH, TLS (VPN,Mgt), IPSec, Cisco 5940 ESR N/A N/A SNMPv3 and CUBE/sRTP Table 2 Module Hardware Configurations The following pictures are representative each of the modules hardware model: © Copyright 2016 Cisco Systems, Inc. 5 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Figure 1 - Cisco 1905 ISR Figure 2 - Cisco 1921 ISR Figure 3 - Cisco 1941 ISR Figure 4 - Cisco 2901 ISR Figure 5 - Cisco 2911 ISR © Copyright 2016 Cisco Systems, Inc. 6 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Figure 6 - Cisco 2921 ISR Figure 7 - Cisco 2951 ISR Figure 8 - Cisco 3925/3925E ISR Figure 9 - Cisco 3945/3945E ISR © Copyright 2016 Cisco Systems, Inc. 7 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Figure 20 – Cisco 5915/5940 ESR Module Interfaces 2.1 Each of ISRs is a multiple-chip standalone cryptographic module. The module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the physical interfaces provided by the module are mapped to the following FIPS 140-2 defined logical interfaces: data input, data output, control input, status output, and power. The module provided no power to external devices and takes in its power through normal power input/cord. The following table lists all possible logical interface configurations and their associated mapping for all of the various ISR systems detailed in this Security Policy. 2901, 2911, 2921, 2951, 3925, 3945, 3925E, 1905, 1921, 1941 5915, 5940 3945E EHWIC, EHWIC Slots GigE Ports Gigabit Ethernet (GE) ports, SM Slot Console Port Data Console Port, GigE Ports Input USB Console Port, Console Port Interface Auxilary Port USB Console Port Auxiliary Port EHWIC, EHWIC Slots GigE Ports Gigabit Ethernet (GE) ports, SM Slot Console Port Data Console Port, GigE Ports Output USB Console Port, Console Port Interface Auxilary Port USB Console Port Auxiliary Port EHWIC, EHWIC Slots GigE Ports Gigabit Ethernet (GE) ports, SM Slot Console Port Control Console Port, GigE Ports Input USB Console Port, Console Port Interface Auxilary Port USB Console Port Auxiliary Port Activity LED Activity LED Activity LED System LED System LED System LED Power LED GigE Link LED (1 per GigE port) GigE Link LED Console Port, GigE Speed LED (1 per GigE port) GigE Speed LED Status Auxilary Port, Compact Flash LED (2) GigE Ports Output USB Console Port, RPS Boost LED Console Port Interface Gigabit Ethernet (GE) ports Power LED (2) GigE ports (2) Console Port Auxiliary Port USB Console Port Power 110v ~240v AC power supply, Power Plug Power Plug Power Plug interface POE power port PoE Port Table 3 Interfaces © Copyright 2016 Cisco Systems, Inc. 8 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Cryptographic Boundary 2.2 The cryptographic boundary of the module is the physical enclosure of the system on which the module is executed. All of the functionality discussed in this document is provided by components within this cryptographic boundary. Roles, Services, and Authentication 2.3 Authentication is identity-based. Each user is authenticated upon initial access to the module. The module also supports RADIUS or TACACS+ for authentication. There are two roles in the router that operators can assume: the Crypto Officer role and the User role. The administrator of the router assumes the Crypto Officer role and associated services in order to configure the router, while the Users exercise only the basic User services. A complete description of all the management and configuration capabilities of the router can be found in the Performing Basic System Management manual or Configuration Guide Manual and in the online help for the routers. The User and Crypto Officer passwords and all shared secrets must each be at least eight (8) characters long, including at least one letter and at least one number character, in length (enforced procedurally). See the Secure Operation section for more information. If six (6) integers, one (1) special character and one (1) alphabet are used without repetition for an eight (8) digit PIN, the probability of randomly guessing the correct sequence is one (1) in 4,488,223,369,069,440 (this calculation is based on the assumption that the typical standard American QWERTY computer keyboard has 10 Integer digits, 52 alphabetic characters, and 32 special characters providing 94 characters to choose from in total. Since it is claimed to be for 8 digits with no repetition, then the calculation should be 94 x 93 x 92 x 91 x 90 x 89 x 88 x 87). In order to successfully guess the sequence in one minute would require the ability to make over 74,803,722,817,824 guesses per second, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the module. Additionally, when using RSA-based authentication, RSA key pair has a modulus size of 2048-3072 bits, thus providing 112 to 128 bits of strength. Assuming the low end of that range, an attacker would have a 1 in 2 112 chance of randomly obtaining the key, which is much stronger than the one in a million chance required by FIPS 140-2. To exceed a one in 100,000 probability of a successful random key guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be capable of approximately 5.19x1028 attempts per minute, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the modules to support. 2.3.1 User Services Users enter the system by accessing the console port through a terminal program or via IPsec protected telnet or SSH v2 session to a LAN port. The IOS prompts the User for username and password. If the password is correct, the User is allowed entry to the IOS executive program. The services available to the User role accessing the CSPs, the type of access – read (r), write (w) and zeroized/delete (d) – and which role accesses the CSPs are listed below. Services and Access Description Keys and CSPs Status Functions View state of interfaces and protocols, version of IOS currently running. User password (r) Network Functions Connect to other network devices through outgoing telnet, PPP, etc. and User password (r) initiate diagnostic network services (i.e., ping, mtrace). Terminal Functions Adjust the terminal session (e.g., lock the terminal, adjust flow control). User password (r) Directory Services Display directory of files kept in flash memory. User password (r) Self-Tests Execute the FIPS 140 start-up tests on demand N/A SSL VPN (TLSv1.0) Negotiation and encrypted data transport via SSL VPN (TLSv1.0) Operator password (r, w, d) and [TLS pre-master secret, TLS Traffic Keys] (d) IPsec VPN Negotiation and encrypted data transport via IPSec VPN Operator password (r, w, d) and [skeyid, skeyid_d, SKEYSEED, IKE session encrypt key, IKE session authentication key, ISAKMP preshared, IKE authentication private Key, IKE authentication public key, IPsec encryption key, IPsec authentication key] (d) © Copyright 2016 Cisco Systems, Inc. 9 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Services and Access Description Keys and CSPs SSH Functions Negotiation and encrypted data transport via SSH Operator password (r. w. d), SSH Traffic Keys (d) HTTPS Functions (TLS) Negotiation and encrypted data transport via HTTPS Operator password (r, w, d) and [TLS pre-master secret, TLS Traffic Keys] (d) SNMPv3 Functions Negotiation and encrypted data transport via SNMPv3 SNMP v3 password, SNMP session key (r,w,d) CUBE/sRTP Functions Negotiation and encrypted data transport via CUBE/sRTP sRTP Traffic Keys (r,w,d) Table 4: User Services 2.3.2 Crypto Officer Services During initial configuration of the router, the Crypto Officer password (the “enable” password) is defined. A Crypto Officer can assign permission to access the Crypto Officer role to additional accounts, thereby creating additional Crypto Officers. The Crypto Officer role is responsible for the configuration of the router. The services available to the Crypto Officer role accessing the CSPs, the type of access – read (r), write (w) and zeroized/delete (d) – and which role accesses the CSPs are listed below. Services and Access Description Keys and CSPs Configure the router Define network interfaces and settings, create command [ISAKMP preshared, Operator password, aliases, set the protocols the router will support, enable Enable password] - (r, w, d), [IKE session interfaces and network services, set system date and time, encrypt key, IKE session authentication and load authentication information. key, IKE authentication private Key, IKE authentication public key, IPsec encryption key, IPsec authentication key] – (w, d) Define Rules and Filters Create packet Filters that are applied to User data streams Operator password, Enable password - (r, on each interface. Each Filter consists of a set of Rules, w, d) which define a set of packets to permit or deny based on characteristics such as protocol ID, addresses, ports, TCP connection establishment, or packet direction. View Status Functions View the router configuration, routing tables, active Operator password, Enable password - (r, sessions, use gets to view SNMP MIB statistics, health, w, d) temperature, memory status, voltage, packet statistics, review accounting logs, and view physical interface status. Manage the router Log off users, shutdown or reload the router, erase the Operator password, Enable password - (r, flash memory, manually back up router configurations, w, d) view complete configurations, manager user rights, firmware upgrade, and restore router configurations. SNMPv3 Non security-related monitoring by the CO SnmpEngineID, SNMP v3 password - (r, using SNMPv3. w, d), SNMP session key (w, d) Configure Encryption/Bypass Set up the configuration tables for IP tunneling. Set [ISAKMP preshared, Operator password, preshared keys and algorithms to be used for each IP range Enable password] - (r, w, d); [IKE session or allow plaintext packets to be set from specified IP encrypt key, IKE session authentication address. key, IKE authentication private Key, IKE authentication public key, IPsec encryption key, IPsec authentication key] – (w, d) TLS pre-master secret, TLS Traffic Keys – SSL VPN (TLSv1.0) Configure SSL VPN parameters, provide entry and output of CSPs. (r, w, d) SSH v2 Configure SSH v2 parameter, provide entry and output of SSHv2 Private Key, SSHv2 Public Key CSPs. and SSHv2 session key (r, w, d) IPsec VPN Configure IPsec VPN parameters, provide entry and skeyid, skeyid_d, IKE session encryption output of CSPs. ISAKMP preshared (r, w, d), [skeyid, skeyid_d, SKEYSEED, IKE session encrypt key, IKE session authentication key, IKE authentication private Key, IKE authentication public key, IPsec encryption key, IPsec authentication key] – (w, d) Self-Tests Execute the FIPS 140 start-up tests on demand N/A User services The Crypto Officer has access to all User services. Operator password (r, w, d) Zeroization Zeroize cryptographic keys All CSPs (d) sRTP/CUBE Configure sRTP parameter, provide entry and output of sRTP Traffic Keys (r,w,d) CSPs. Table 5: Crypto Officer Services (r = read w = write d = delete) © Copyright 2016 Cisco Systems, Inc. 10 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Unauthenticated Services 2.4 The services available to unauthenticated users are:  Viewing the status output from the module’s LEDs  Powering the module on and off using the power switch  Sending packets in bypass Cryptographic Key/CSP Management 2.5 The router securely administers both cryptographic keys and other critical security parameters such as passwords. All keys are protected by the Crypto Officer role login password-protection, and these keys can be zeroized by the Crypto Officer. Zeroization consists of overwriting the memory that stored the key. The router is in the approved mode of operation only when FIPS 140-2 approved algorithms are used (except DH and RSA key transport which are allowed in the approved mode for key establishment despite being non-approved). All pre-shared keys are associated with the CO role that created the keys, and the CO role is protected by a password. Therefore, the CO password is associated with all the pre-shared keys. The Crypto Officer needs to be authenticated to store keys. All Diffie-Hellman (DH) keys agreed upon for individual tunnels are directly associated with that specific tunnel via the Internet Key Exchange (IKE). RSA Public keys are entered into the modules using digital certificates which contain relevant data such as the name of the public key's owner, which associates the key with the correct entity. All other keys are associated with the user/role that entered them. The module supports the following keys and critical security parameters (CSPs). Name CSP Type Size Description Storage Zeroization DRBG entropy SP800-90A 256-bits This is the entropy for SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG. SDRAM Power cycle the input DRBG_CTR (using HW based entropy source used to construct seed. (plaintext) device AES-256) DRBG Seed SP800-90A 384-bits Input to the DRBG that determines the internal SDRAM Power cycle the DRBG_CTR state of the DRBG. Generated using DRBG (plaintext) device derivation function that includes the entropy input from hardware-based entropy source. DRBG V SP800-90A 128-bits The DRBG V is one of the critical values of the SDRAM Power cycle the DRBG_CTR internal state upon which the security of this (plaintext) device DRBG mechanism depends. Generated first during DRBG instantiation and then subsequently updated using the DRBG update function. DRBG Key SP800-90A 256-bits Internal Key value used as part of SP 800-90A SDRAM Power cycle the DRBG_CTR CTR_DRBG. Established per SP 800-90A (plaintext) device CTR_DRBG. 2048 – 4096 bits Diffie-Hellman DH The shared secret used in Diffie-Hellman (DH) SDRAM Power cycle the Shared Secret exchange. Established per the Diffie-Hellman key (plaintext) device agreement. Diffie Hellman DH 224-379 bits The private key used in Diffie-Hellman (DH) SDRAM Power cycle the private key exchange. This key is generated by calling (plaintext) device SP800-90A DRBG. 2048 – 4096 bits Diffie Hellman DH The public key used in Diffie-Hellman (DH) SDRAM Power cycle the public key exchange. This key is derived per the Diffie- (plaintext) device Hellman key agreement. © Copyright 2016 Cisco Systems, Inc. 11 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name CSP Type Size Description Storage Zeroization EC Diffie-Hellman ECDH Curves: P-256/P-384 Used in establishing the session key for an IPSec SDRAM Power cycle the private key session. The private key used in Elliptic Curve (plaintext) device Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) exchange. This key is generated by calling SP800-90A DRBG. EC Diffie-Hellman ECDH Curves: P-256/P-384 Used in establishing the session key for an IPSec SDRAM Power cycle the public key session. The public key used in Elliptic Curve (plaintext) device Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) exchange. This key is established per the EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement. EC Diffie-Hellman ECDH Curves: P-256/P-384 The shared secret used in Elliptic Curve Diffie- SDRAM Power cycle the shared secret Hellman (ECDH) exchange. Established per the (plaintext) device Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) protocol. skeyid Shared Secret 160 bits A shared secret known only to IKE peers. It was SDRAM Power cycle the established via key derivation function defined in (plaintext) device SP800-135 KDF (IKEv1) and it will be used for deriving other keys in IKE protocol implementation. skeyid_d Shared Secret 160 bits A shared secret known only to IKE peers. It was SDRAM Power cycle the derived via key derivation function defined in (plaintext) device SP800-135 KDF (IKEv1) and it will be used for deriving IKE session authentication key. SKEYSEED Shared Secret 160 bits A shared secret known only to IKE peers. It was SDRAM Power cycle the derived via key derivation function defined in (plaintext) device SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2) and it will be used for deriving IKE session authentication key. IKE session Triple-DES/AES 192 bit Triple-DES or The IKE session (IKE Phase I) encrypt key. This SDRAM Power cycle the encrypt key 128/192/256 bits AES key is derived via key derivation function defined (plaintext) device in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv1/IKEv2). IKE session HMAC- 160-512 bits The IKE session (IKE Phase I) authentication SDRAM Power cycle the authentication key SHA1/256/384/512 key. This key is derived via key derivation (plaintext) device function defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv1/IKEv2). By running ‘# no ISAKMP Pre-shared key Variable 8 plus The secret used to derive IKE skeyid when using NVRAM crypto isakmp key’ preshared characters preshared secret authentication. This CSP is (plaintext) entered by the Crypto Officer. command RSA (2048 – 3072 bits) RSA/ECDSA private key used in IKE By running ‘#crypto IKE authentication RSA/ ECDSA NVRAM key zeroize’ private Key or ECDSA (Curves: P- authentication. This key is generated by calling (plaintext) 256/P-384) SP800-90A DRBG. command RSA (2048 – 3072 bits) RSA/ECDSA public key used in IKE By running ‘#crypto IKE authentication RSA/ ECDSA SDRAM key zeroize’ public key or ECDSA (Curves: P- authentication. Internally generated by the (plaintext) 256/P-384) module command IPsec encryption Triple-DES/AES 192 bits Triple-DES or The IPsec (IKE phase II) encryption key. This SDRAM Power cycle the key 128/192/256 bits AES key is derived via a key derivation function (plaintext) device defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv1/IKEv2). IPsec HMAC- 160-512 bits The IPsec (IKE Phase II) authentication key. This SDRAM Power cycle the authentication key SHA1/256/384/512 key is derived via a key derivation function (plaintext) device defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv1/IKEv2). sRTP master AES 128/192/256 bits Key used to generate sRTP session keys SDRAM upon end of call or key (plaintext) device reset. © Copyright 2016 Cisco Systems, Inc. 12 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name CSP Type Size Description Storage Zeroization sRTP encryption AES 128/192/256 bits Generated via the sRTP protocol. Key used to SDRAM upon end of call or key encrypt/decrypt sRTP packets (plaintext) device reset. sRTP HMAC-SHA-1 160-bits Generated via the sRTP protocol. Key used to SDRAM upon end of call or authentication authenticate sRTP packets (plaintext) device reset. key Operator password Password 8 - 25 characters The password of the User role. This CSP is NVRAM Overwrite with new entered by the Crypto Officer. (plaintext) password Enable password Password 8 - 25 characters The password of the CO role. This CSP is entered NVRAM Overwrite with new by the Crypto Officer. (plaintext) password By running ‘# no RADIUS secret Shared Secret 8 - 25 characters The RADIUS shared secret. Used for RADIUS NVRAM radius-server key’ Client/Server authentication. This CSP is entered (plaintext), by the Crypto Officer. command By running ‘# no TACACS+ secret Shared Secret 8 - 25 characters The TACACS+ shared secret. Used for NVRAM tacacs-server key’ TACACS+ Client/Server authentication. This (plaintext), CSP is entered by the Crypto Officer. command 2048 – 3072 bits By running ‘# SSHv2 Private RSA The SSHv2 private key used in SSHv2 NVRAM Key modulus connection. This key is generated by calling (plaintext) crypto key zeroize rsa’ command SP800-90A DRBG. 2048 – 3072 bits By running ‘# SSHv2 Public Key RSA The SSHv2 public key used in SSHv2 NVRAM modulus connection. This key is internally generated by (plaintext) crypto key zeroize rsa’ command the module. SSHv2 Session Triple-DES/AES 192 bits Triple-DES or This is the SSHv2 session key. It is used to SDRAM Power cycle the Key 128/192/256 bits AES encrypt all SSHv2 data traffics traversing (plaintext) device between the SSHv2 Client and SSHv2 Server. This key is derived via key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (SSH). snmpEngineID Shared Secret 32 bits A unique string used to identify the SNMP NVRAM Overwrite with new engine. This key is entered by Crypto Officer. (plaintext) engine ID SNMPv3 Shared Secret 256 bits The password use to setup SNMP v3 connection. NVRAM Overwrite with new password This key is entered by Crypto Officer. (plaintext) password SNMPv3 session AES 128 bits Encryption key used to protect SNMP traffic. SDRAM Power cycle the key This key is derived via key derivation function (plaintext) device defined in SP800-135 KDF (SNMPv3). “# crypto key TLS server private RSA 2048-3072 modulus Private key used for SSLv3.1/TLS. NVRAM key (plaintext) zeroize rsa" “# crypto key TLS server public RSA 2048-3072 modulus Private key used for SSLv3.1/TLS. NVRAM key (plaintext) zeroize rsa" TLS pre-master Shared Secret Shared Secret created using asymmetric SDRAM Automatically when At least eight secret cryptography from which new TLS session keys (plaintext) TLS session is characters can be created terminated TLS session Triple-DES/AES 192-bits Triple-DES or/ Key used to encrypt TLS session data SDRAM Automatically when encryption key 128/192/256 128/192/256-bits AES (plaintext) TLS session is terminated © Copyright 2016 Cisco Systems, Inc. 13 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Name CSP Type Size Description Storage Zeroization TLS session HMAC- 160-512 bits Used for TLS data integrity protection SDRAM Automatically when integrity key SHA1/256/384/512 (plaintext) TLS session is terminated Table 6: Keys/CSPs Table Cryptographic Algorithms 2.6 The router is in the approved mode of operation only when FIPS 140-2 approved/allowed algorithms are used. The module implements a variety of approved and non-approved algorithms. 2.6.1 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms The routers support the following FIPS 140-2 approved algorithm implementations: IOS Router HW Accelerator #2817 (128,192,256) (ECB, CBC, CFB,CTR,CMAC, #2343 (128,192,256)(ECB, CBC, AES GCM) GCM) #1688 (192) (CBC) #1466 (192) (ECB, CBC) Triple-DES #2361 (SHA1,256,384,512) #2020 (SHA1,256,384,512) SHS #1764 (HMAC SHA1,256,384,512) #1452 (HMAC SHA1,256,384,512) HMAC #1471 (Gen, PKCS1_V1_5, Sig-GEN, SIG-VER) N/A RSA (2048, 3072) Note 1: The module supports 1024-bit RSA Signature Generation. This may not be used in FIPS mode Note 2: The module supports RSA Signature Generation with SHA-1. This may only be used in protocols as defined in SP 800-52 and SP 800-57. #493 (P-256, P-384) N/A ECDSA #252 and 253 (IKE, TLS, IPsec, SSH, SNMP, SRTP, N/A CVL ECDH, DH) #481 (CTR-AES-256) N/A DRBG Table 7: Algorithm Certificates Note:  The module's AES-GCM implementation conforms to IG A.5 scenario #1 following RFC 6071 for IPsec. The module uses a 96-bit IV, which is comprised of a 4 byte salt unique to the crypto session and 8 byte monotonically increasing counter. The module generates new AES-GCM keys if the module loses power.  The TLS, IKEv1/IKEv2, SSH, and SNMP protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP. 2.6.2 Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode  Diffie-Hellman (key establishment methodology provides 112 or 128 bits of encryption strength; non- compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)  EC Diffie-Hellman (key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 192 bits of encryption strength)  RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 or 128 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)  NDRNG © Copyright 2016 Cisco Systems, Inc. 14 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. 2.6.3 Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Integrated Services Routers (ISRs) cryptographic module implements the following non-Approved algorithms: Service Non-Approved Algorithm SSH* Hashing: MD5, MACing: HMAC MD5, Symmetric: DES, Asymmetric: 1024-bit RSA, 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman TLS* Hashing: MD5, MACing: HMAC MD5 Symmetric: DES, RC4 Asymmetric: 1024-bit RSA, 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman IPsec* Hashing: MD5, MACing: HMAC MD5 Symmetric: DES, RC4 Asymmetric: 1024-bit RSA, 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman SNMP* Hashing: MD5, MACing: HMAC MD5 Symmetric: DES, RC4 Asymmetric: 1024-bit RSA, 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman Table 8 Non-Approved Services Note: Services marked with a single asterisk (*) have the listed non-approved cryptographic algorithms available to be used. Use of these algorithms are prohibited in a FIPS-approved mode of operation. The services may be used with FIPS-approved algorithms. Self-Tests 2.7 In order to prevent any secure data from being released, it is important to test the cryptographic components of a security module to insure all components are functioning correctly. The router includes an array of self-tests that are run during startup and periodically during operations. In the error state, all secure data transmission is halted and the router outputs status information indicating the failure. 2.7.1 Power-On Self-Tests (POSTs)  IOS Algorithm Self-Tests o AES (encrypt/decrypt) Known Answer Tests o AES GCM Known Answer Test o DRBG Known Answer Test o ECDSA Sign/Verify o HMAC-SHA-1 Known Answer Test o HMAC-SHA-256 Known Answer Test o HMAC-SHA-384 Known Answer Test o HMAC-SHA-512 Known Answer Test o RSA Known Answer Test o SHA-1 Known Answer Test o SHA-256 Known Answer Test o SHA–384 Known Answer Test o SHA-512 Known Answer Test o Triple-DES (encrypt/decrypt) Known Answer Test o ECC Primitive “Z” KAT o FFC Primitive “Z” KAT  Hardware Accelerator Self-Tests © Copyright 2016 Cisco Systems, Inc. 15 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. o AES (encrypt/decrypt) Known Answer Tests o Triple-DES (encrypt/decrypt) Known Answer Tests o HMAC (SHA-1) Known Answer Test o SHA-1 Known Answer Test o SHA-256 Known Answer Test o SHA–384 Known Answer Test o SHA-512 Known Answer Test  Firmware Integrity Test o RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (2048 bits) signature verification with SHA-512 2.7.2 Conditional tests o Conditional Bypass test o Continuous random number generation test for SP800-90A DRBG o Continuous Random Number Generator test for NDRNG o Pairwise consistency test for ECDSA o Pairwise consistency test for RSA o Firmware load test © Copyright 2016 Cisco Systems, Inc. 16 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. 3 Secure Operation The Cisco 1905 ISR, 1921 ISR, 1941 ISR, 2901 ISR, 2911 ISR, 2921 ISR, 2951 ISR, 3925 ISR, 3925E ISR, 3945 ISR, 3945E ISR and 5900 ESR routers meet all the Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-2. Follow the setting instructions provided below to place the module in FIPS-approved mode. Operating this router without maintaining the following settings will remove the module from the FIPS approved mode of operation. Initial Setup 3.1 The Crypto Officer must disable IOS Password Recovery by executing the following commands: configure terminal no service password-recovery end show version NOTE: Once Password Recovery is disabled, administrative access to the module without the password will not be possible. System Initialization and Configuration 3.2 1 The Crypto Officer must perform the initial configuration. IOS version 15.5M (cXXXX-universalk9- mz.SPA.155-3.Mbin or cXXXX-adventerprisek9-mz.SPA.155-3.M.bin), Advanced Security build (advsecurity) is the only allowable image; no other image should be loaded. Once this image has been installed, no updates to software or firmware are permitted in FIPS mode of operations. 2 The value of the boot field must be 0x0102. This setting disables break from the console to the ROM monitor and automatically boots the IOS image. From the “configure terminal” command line, the Crypto Officer enters the following syntax: config-register 0x0102 The Crypto Officer must create the “enable” password for the Crypto Officer role. The password must be at 3 least 8 characters (all digits; all lower and upper case letters; and all special characters except ‘?’ are accepted) and is entered when the Crypto Officer first engages the “enable” command. The Crypto Officer enters the following syntax at the “#” prompt: enable secret [PASSWORD] 4 The Crypto Officer must always assign passwords (of at least 8 characters) to users. Identification and authentication on the console port is required for Users. From the “configure terminal” command line, the Crypto Officer enters the following syntax: line con 0 password [PASSWORD] login local 5 If using a Radius/TACACS+ server for authentication, it is recommended that an IPsec tunnel or some other secure tunnel between the Router and the RADIUS/TACACS+ be set up. The pre-shared key must be at least 8 characters long. IPSec Requirements and Cryptographic Algorithms 3.3 1 Although the IOS implementation of IKE allows a number of algorithms, only the following algorithms are allowed in a FIPS 140-2 configuration:  ah-sha-hmac © Copyright 2016 Cisco Systems, Inc. 17 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.  esp-sha-hmac  esp-Triple-DES  esp-aes 2 The following algorithms are not FIPS approved and should not be used during FIPS-approved mode:  DES  MD-5 for signing  MD-5 HMAC SSLv3.1/TLS Requirements and Cryptographic Algorithms 3.4 When negotiating TLS cipher suites, only FIPS approved algorithms must be specified. All other versions of SSL except version 3.1 must not be used in FIPS mode of operation. The following algorithms are not FIPS approved and should not be used in the FIPS-approved mode:  MD5  RC4  DES Access 3.5 1 Telnet access to the module is only allowed via a secure IPSec tunnel between the remote system and the module. The Crypto officer must configure the module so that any remote connections via telnet are secured through IPSec, using FIPS-approved algorithms. Note that all users must still authenticate after remote access is granted. 2 SSH v2 access to the module is only allowed if SSH v2 is configured to use a FIPS-approved algorithm. The Crypto officer must configure the module so that SSH v2 uses only FIPS-approved algorithms. Note that all users must still authenticate after remote access is granted. 3 SNMP access is only allowed via when SNMP v3 is configured with AES encryption. Cisco Unified Border Element (CUBE) TLS Configuration 3.6 When configuring CUBE TLS connections, the following configuration command option must be executed to limit the TLS session options to FIPS-approved algorithms. sip-ua crypto signaling [strict-cipher] © Copyright 2016 Cisco Systems, Inc. 18 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.