Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification Security Policy No: 010-105847-01 Rev: 2 REVISION # ECO # REVISION # ECO # 1 15-0450 2 15-5417 Title: Christie F-IMB Security Policy Product(s): Christie F-IMB 4K Integrated Media Block (IMB) Prepared by: Kevin Draper Prep'd Date: 02/02/2015 Last Updated: 12/18/2015 F0015 ­ Revision Page 1 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification Detailed Revision History Revision Description of Changes Date 1 First Revision 08/26/2015 2 Initial Public Release 12/15/2015 This document may only be reproduced in its entirety without revision including this statement. Copyright ©2015 Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. F0015 ­ Revision Page 2 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification Table of Contents 1. SCOPE .............................................................................................................................................................................5 1.1 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS ........................................................................................................................................5 2. PRODUCT OVERVIEW ...............................................................................................................................................5 2.1 VALIDATED MODULE VERSIONS .............................................................................................................................5 3. SECURITY LEVELS .....................................................................................................................................................6 4. MODES OF OPERATION ............................................................................................................................................7 5. CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY...............................................................................................................................7 6. BLOCK DIAGRAM .....................................................................................................................................................10 7. APPROVED ALGORITHMS .....................................................................................................................................11 8. NON-APPROVED ALGORITHMS IN FIPS MODE ...............................................................................................11 9. NON-APPROVED ALGORITHMS ...........................................................................................................................12 10. PORTS AND INTERFACES ..................................................................................................................................13 11. AUTHENTICATION...............................................................................................................................................13 12. ROLES AND SERVICES ........................................................................................................................................15 12.1 CRYPTO OFFICER SERVICES .................................................................................................................................15 12.2 USER SERVICES .....................................................................................................................................................16 12.3 PROJECTOR SERVICES ...........................................................................................................................................17 12.4 UNAUTHENICATED SERVICES ...............................................................................................................................17 12.5 NON-APPROVED SERVICES ....................................................................................................................................17 13. CRITICAL SECURITY PARMETERS & PUBLIC KEYS ................................................................................19 13.1 CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS (CSPS) ...........................................................................................................19 13.2 PUBLIC KEYS ........................................................................................................................................................20 14. PHYSICAL SECURITY ..........................................................................................................................................21 15. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ......................................................................................................................21 16. SELF-TESTS ............................................................................................................................................................23 17. MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS ................................................................................................................23 18. SECURITY RULES .................................................................................................................................................24 19. ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................................................................25 20. APPENDIX A: CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS ...................................................................................26 21. APPENDIX B: PUBLIC KEYS ..............................................................................................................................33 F0015 ­ Revision Page 3 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification Table of Figures Figure 1 Front view of Christie F-IMB_________________________________________________________ 7 Figure 2 Top View of Christie F-IMB __________________________________________________________ 8 Figure 3 Bottom View of Christie F-IMB________________________________________________________ 9 Figure 4 Module Block Diagram ____________________________________________________________ 10 List of Tables Table 1 Reference Documents ________________________________________________________________ 5 Table 2 Validated module versions ____________________________________________________________ 5 Table 3 FIPS 140-2 Security Levels ___________________________________________________________ 6 Table 4 Ports and Interfaces ________________________________________________________________ 13 Table 5 Roles and Required Identification and Authentication _____________________________________ 13 Table 6 Strength of Authentication Mechanism __________________________________________________ 14 Table 7 Crypto Officer Services ______________________________________________________________ 16 Table 8 User Services______________________________________________________________________ 16 Table 9 Projector Services __________________________________________________________________ 17 Table 10 Unauthenticated Services ___________________________________________________________ 17 Table 11 Non-Approved Services _____________________________________________________________ 17 Table 12 Critical Security Parameters ________________________________________________________ 19 Table 13 Public Keys _____________________________________________________________________ 20 Table 14 Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms _____________________________________ 21 Table 15 Mitigation of Other Attacks _________________________________________________________ 23 F0015 ­ Revision Page 4 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification 1. SCOPE This document is the Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Christie F-IMB 4K Integrated Media Block (IMB) (also referred to herein as the Christie F-IMB, the cryptographic module, or simply the module). This policy is a specification of the security rules under which the Christie F-IMB operates and meets the requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 2. 1.1 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS Document No. Description FIPS PUB 140-2 Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules [FIPS PUB 140-2] (http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/fips1402.pdf ) Table 1 Reference Documents 2. PRODUCT OVERVIEW The Christie F-IMB is a multi-chip embedded cryptographic module. It is a DCI-compliant integrated media block solution to enable the playback of the video, audio and timed text essence on a Christie "Fusion" Series 3 digital cinema projector (2K or 4K projector). The F-IMB enables playback of encrypted cinema content packaged as an industry standard Digital Cinema Package (DCP). The F-IMB supports playback of digital cinema content from a network attached storage (NAS) device. 2.1 VALIDATED MODULE VERSIONS The validated module consists of the following: Hardware version Firmware version 000-105081-01 1.6.0-4217 Table 2 Validated module versions F0015 ­ Revision Page 5 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification 3. SECURITY LEVELS The IMB is tested to meet the FIPS security requirements shown in Table 3. FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements Security Level 1. Cryptographic Module Specification 2 2. Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2 3. Roles, Services and Authentication 3 4. Finite State Model 2 5. Physical Security 3 6. Operational Environment N/A 7. Cryptographic Key Management 2 8. EMI/EMC 2 9. Self-Tests 2 10. Design Assurance 3 11. Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A FIPS Overall Level 2 Table 3 FIPS 140-2 Security Levels F0015 ­ Revision Page 6 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification 4. MODES OF OPERATION The Christie F-IMB provides a FIPS Approved mode of operation and a non-Approved mode of operation. To determine that the module is running in a FIPS Approved mode of operation, the operator shall verify the FIPS LED status: o Orange ­ module is running power-up self-tests. o Green ­ module has successfully performed self-tests and is running in FIPS mode. o Red ­ module has entered an error state; all cryptographic operations are inhibited. The non-Approved mode of operation uses the TI ECDH algorithm via the "Projector Status" Service. TI ECDH is strictly disallowed in the FIPS Approved mode of operation. Use of the "Projector Status" Service Places the module in the non-Approved mode of operation. Upon completion of the "Projector Status" Service, the module automatically transitions back into the FIPS Approved mode of operation. 5. CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY The illustrations below indicate the cryptographic boundary and the physical ports defined on the boundary. The cryptographic boundary is the outer physical perimeter of the module's PCB board; the effective security boundary is the physical perimeter of the module's metal Security Enclosure. Everything outside the metal Security Enclosure is excluded from FIPS 140-2 Requirements. Unlabelled connectors are not interfaces on the cryptographic boundary. Figure 1 Front view of Christie F-IMB F0015 ­ Revision Page 7 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification Figure 2 Top View of Christie F-IMB F0015 ­ Revision Page 8 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification Figure 3 Bottom View of Christie F-IMB F0015 ­ Revision Page 9 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification 6. BLOCK DIAGRAM Audio LVDS Video Port (latent ­ reserved for future use) Ethernet Decryptor/Decoder FPGA Audio Projector I/O PCIE LPC (latent ­ reserved Reset for future use) Power Good AES Aurora Video Port LEDs Keys Data Input Security Manager FPGA Ethernet Data Output Control Input Status Output Security Boundary Power Figure 4 Module Block Diagram F0015 ­ Revision Page 10 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification 7. APPROVED ALGORITHMS The cryptographic module supports the following Approved algorithms: Symmetric Key Encryption/Decryption o Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) ­ Cert #2043 [CBC Mode] o Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) ­ Cert #2042 [CBC/ECB Mode] Asymmetric Key Signature Generation & Verification o RSA (2048 bits) ­ Cert #1062 Secure Hash Standard (SHS) o SHA-1 ­ Cert #1789 o SHA-1 ­ Cert #1788 o SHA-256 ­ Cert #1788 Random Number Generators (DRNG) o DRNG ­ ANSI X9.31 ­ Cert #1066, 1230 o DRNG - FIPS 186-2 ­ Cert #1066 Message Authentication o HMAC-SHA1 ­ Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (128-bit key) ­ Cert #1242 o HMAC-SHA1 ­ Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (160-bit key) ­ Cert #1241 Key Derivation o KDF - SP 800-135 - Cert #97 [Note: TLS v1.1 is latent functionality and not directly exposed to any service provided by the module] The following protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP: TLS v1.0 TLS v1.1 [Note: TLS v1.1 is latent functionality and not directly exposed to any service provided by the module] 8. NON-APPROVED ALGORITHMS IN FIPS MODE The cryptographic module supports the following non-Approved but allowed algorithms in the Approved mode of operation: NDRNG MD5 (as used in TLS) F0015 ­ Revision Page 11 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification RSA Key unwrapping of KDMs allowed as a commercially available key establishment technique (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 bit of encryption strength) 9. NON-APPROVED ALGORITHMS The cryptographic module supports the following non-Approved algorithm in the non-Approved mode of operation: TI ECDH ­ considered as non-security relevant data obfuscation (plaintext) and only used to interoperate with legacy equipment F0015 ­ Revision Page 12 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification 10. PORTS AND INTERFACES The following table maps the logical interfaces to the physical ports: Logical Interface Physical Ports Data Input Ethernet, Audio, LVDS Video Port (latent ­ reserved for future use) Data Output Ethernet, Audio, Aurora Video Port Control Input Ethernet, Projector I/O, PCIE, LPC (latent ­ reserved for future use), Reset, Power Good Status Output Ethernet, Projector I/O, PCIE, LPC (latent ­ reserved for future use), LEDs Power Power Table 4 Ports and Interfaces 11. AUTHENTICATION The Christie F-IMB shall support the following distinct operator roles: Crypto Officer, User and Projector. The Christie F-IMB does not support a Maintenance role. The cryptographic module shall enforce the separation of roles using identity-based operator identification. Role Type of Authentication Authentication Data Crypto Officer Identity-based operator authentication RSA Digital Signature Verification User Identity-based operator authentication ID and Password Projector Identity-based operator authentication RSA Digital Signature Verification Table 5 Roles and Required Identification and Authentication F0015 ­ Revision Page 13 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification Authentication Mechanism Strength of Mechanism RSA Digital Signature Verification The authentication is based on RSA 2048 which provides an equivalent encryption strength of 112 bits. The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is 1/2112 which is less than 1/1,000,000. There is a 1 second retry delay after each attempt which limits the number of attempts that can be launched per minute. The probability that a random attempt will successfully authenticate to the module within one minute is 60/2112 which is less than 1/100,000. ID and Password Verification The module accepts 63 possible characters and a minimum 6 characters for an authentication secret. The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is 1/(63^6) which is less than 1/100,000,000. There is a 1 second retry delay after each attempt which limits the number of attempts that can be launched per minute. The probability that a random attempt will successfully authenticate to the module within one minute is 60/(63^6) which is less than 1/100,000. Table 6 Strength of Authentication Mechanism F0015 ­ Revision Page 14 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification 12. ROLES AND SERVICES 12.1 CRYPTO OFFICER SERVICES Table 7 summarizes the services that are only available to the Crypto Officer role. Services Description CSP(s) and Key(s) Type(s) of Access Upgrade Update the firmware via Christie Root CA Key, Read RSA signature Certificate Chain, verification Christie Firmware Update Key Zeroization Zeroizes all sensitive AES Master Key, Write data including plaintext Device Public Key (SM CSPs Key), Device Public Key (Log Key), Content Description Keys, Content Integrity Keys (MIC key), TLS Pre- master secret, TLS Master Secret, TLS PRF Internal State, TLS AES Session Key, TLS HMAC Session Key, DRNG Seed (dt, v) and Seed Key (k), DRNG Internal State (X9.31), DRNG Seed Key (xKey), DRNG Internal State (FIPS 186-2), Marriage Password System Management System Management TLS Pre-master secret, Write functions for the module TLS Master Secret, TLS PRF Internal State, TLS AES Session Key, TLS HMAC Session Key, Marriage Password Crypto Officer Authenticate Crypto TLS Pre-master secret, Read Authentication Officer SMS Public Key TLS Master Secret, TLS Read, Write PRF Internal State, TLS F0015 ­ Revision Page 15 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification AES Session Key, TLS HMAC Session Key, DRNG Seed (dt,v) and Seed Key (k), DRNG Internal State (X9.31), Device Public Key (SM Key) KDM Management Service for managing AES Master Key, Device Read KDM information Private Key (SM Key) Content Decryption Read, Write Keys, DRNG Seed Key (xKey) CPL Management Service for managing Device Private Key (SM Read CPL information Key) Encrypted Playback Service for decrypting AES Master Key, Read encrypted content Content Integrity Keys (MIC key), Content Decryption Keys, DRNG Seed Key (xKey), DRNG Internal State (FIPS 186- 2) Log Management Service for retrieving log Device Private Key (Log Read data (secure get status) Key), Device Public Key (Log Key) Table 7 Crypto Officer Services 12.2 USER SERVICES Table 8 summarizes the services that are only available to the User role. Services Description CSP(s) and Key(s) Type(s) of Access Suite Management Initiate, monitor and Marriage Password Read, Write manage projector suite Table 8 User Services F0015 ­ Revision Page 16 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification 12.3 PROJECTOR SERVICES Table 9 summarizes the services that are only available to the projector role. Services Description CSP(s) and Key(s) Type(s) of Access Marriage Verification Verify projector marriage Projector Public Key Read Table 9 Projector Services 12.4 UNAUTHENICATED SERVICES Table 10 summarizes the unauthenticated services that are available. Services Description CSP(s) and Key(s) Type(s) of Access Power On Self-Tests Self-tests performed at N/A N/A Power On Status Status Output N/A N/A Table 10 Unauthenticated Services 12.5 NON-APPROVED SERVICES The following services are supported in the non-Approved mode of operation and can be invoked by any operator (unauthenticated): Services Description CSP(s) and Key(s) Type(s) of Access * Projector Status Monitor Projector status N/A N/A Table 11 Non-Approved Services * Note that the unauthenticated service "Projector Status" is accessible by connecting to the cryptographic module through TI ECDH in the non-Approved mode of operation, the use of which is considered non- security relevant data obfuscation from FIPS 140-2 perspective as related to this cryptographic module; this does not provide any security relevant functions and is not used to protect sensitive unclassified data. The I/O therein is obfuscated to support interoperability with existing legacy equipment and is only used to set and retrieve non-security relevant items. Note that the Projector Status service is considered to be plaintext with respect to FIPS 140-2, and does not use the Approved security functions, disclose, modify, or substitute CSPs or otherwise affect the security of the module. F0015 ­ Revision Page 17 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification F0015 ­ Revision Page 18 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification 13. CRITICAL SECURITY PARMETERS & PUBLIC KEYS 13.1 CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS (CSPS) # Name Description 1. AES Master Key AES 128 bits - used for key management. 2. Device Private Key (SM Key) RSA 2048 ­ RSA private key that device uses to prove its identity and facilitate secure Transport Layer Security (TLS) communications, and for key transport. 3. Device Private Key (Log Key) RSA 2048 - RSA private key used to sign log data. 4. Content Decryption Keys AES 128 CBC mode - AES keys that protect encrypted content. 5. Content Integrity Keys (MIC key) HMAC-SHA-1 (128-bit key) ­ content integrity key 6. TLS Pre-Master Secret Session specific TLS secret 7. TLS Master Secret Session specific TLS secret 8. TLS PRF Internal State Session specific TLS secret 9. TLS AES Session Key AES 128 CBC mode - AES encryption/decryption of TLS session data 10. TLS HMAC Session Key HMAC-SHA-1 (160-bit key) - HMAC integrity of TLS session data 11. DRNG Seed (dt, v) and Seed Key (k) X9.31 DRNG - seeding inputs in the Approved DRNG 12. DRNG Internal State (ANSI X9.31) X9.31 DRNG - intermediate state of the DRNG 13. DRNG Seed Key (xKey) FIPS 186-2 DRNG - seeding inputs in the Approved DRNG 14. DRNG Internal State (FIPS 186-2) FIPS 186-2 DRNG - intermediate state of the DRNG 15. Marriage Password User role authentication data; 6-32 characters password Table 12 Critical Security Parameters F0015 ­ Revision Page 19 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification 13.2 PUBLIC KEYS # Name Description 1. Christie Root CA Key RSA 2048 ­ Christie Root CA key 2. Certificate Chain RSA 2048 ­ Christie Certificate Chain 3. Christie Firmware Update Key RSA 2048 ­ Christie firmware verification key 4. Device Public Key (SM Key) RSA 2048 - RSA public key that device uses to prove its identity and facilitate secure Transport Layer Security (TLS) communications, and for key transport. 5. Device Public Key (Log Key) RSA 2048 - RSA public key used to verify log signatures. 6. SMS Public Key RSA 2048 ­ TLS Client Public Key 7. Projector Public Key RSA 2048 ­ Identity of the projector Table 13 Public Keys F0015 ­ Revision Page 20 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification 14. PHYSICAL SECURITY The Christie F-IMB is a multi-chip embedded cryptographic module which is composed of production-grade components. The physical security mechanisms of the module includes a hard, opaque and tamper-evident metal enclosure that is monitored 24/7 by battery backed-up tamper detection and response mechanisms. Any attempt to remove the metal enclosure results in instantaneous active zeroization of all plaintext CSPs. Zeroization also occurs if the battery becomes discharged. The module includes tamper-evident labels covering the screws that secure the metal enclosure to the module; said tamper-evident labels are installed as part of the manufacturing process and shall not be removed (i.e. maintenance role is not supported, maintenance interface is not supported). The tamper-evident metal enclosure and the tamper-evident labels shall be periodically inspected to ensure the physical security of the module is maintained. All components which lie outside the metal enclosure are not security relevant and are excluded from the FIPS 140-2 requirements. The excluded components are the non-security relevant data input and data output, passive components (capacitors, resistors, inductors), voltage regulators, traces and signals routed to these components, the PCB lying outside the metal enclosure, connectors and the faceplate. Physical Security Recommended Inspection/Test Guidance Details Mechanism Frequency of Inspection/Test Metal enclosure Upon receipt of module Visually inspect metal enclosure for scratches, and as often as feasible. gouges, deformation and other signs of visible signs of tamper. Tamper Responsive N/A N/A Switches Tamper Evident Seals Upon receipt of module Visually inspect the tamper evident seals for and as often as feasible. scratches, gouges, deformation or other physical signs of tampering. Table 14 Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms If any tampering of the module is observed or suspected, remove the module from service and return it to Christie Digital. 15. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT The Christie F-IMB operates in a limited operational environment that only allows the loading of trusted and validated firmware binary images through an authenticated service. Firmware binary images are signed by an RSA key which is part of the Christie certificate chain. The RSA signature verification algorithm has been validated (RSA Cert. #1062). F0015 ­ Revision Page 21 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification F0015 ­ Revision Page 22 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification 16. SELF-TESTS The module performs the following self-tests: Power Up Self-Tests o Cryptographic algorithm tests: ANSI X9.31 DRNG KAT FIPS 186-2 DRNG KAT AES 128 CBC Encrypt/Decrypt KAT SHA-1 KAT SHA-256 KAT HMAC-SHA-1 KAT (using 160 bit HMAC key) RSA 2048 Signature Generation / RSA 2048 Signature Verification KAT SHA-1 KAT (executed for SHA (Cert. #1789)) AES128 CBC Decrypt KAT (executed for AES (Cert. #2043)) HMAC-SHA-1 KAT (using 160 bit HMAC key) (executed for HMAC (Cert. #1242)) SP 800-135 KDF KAT o Firmware Integrity Test - EDC that meets requirements of AS09.24 o Critical Functions Tests: RSA 2048 Encrypt/Decrypt KAT Conditional Self-Tests o Continuous Random Number Generator (RNG) tests: ANSI X9.31 RNG FIPS 186-2 RNG NDRNG o Firmware Load Test (RSA signature verification ­ RSA 2048 with SHA-256) 17. MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS The cryptographic module does not mitigate any specific attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-2. Other Attacks Mitigation Mechanism Specific Limitations N/A N/A N/A Table 15 Mitigation of Other Attacks F0015 ­ Revision Page 23 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification 18. SECURITY RULES The following specifies the security rules under which the cryptographic module shall operate: The module does not support a bypass capability or a maintenance interface. The module supports concurrent operators. However, the module does not support more than one operator per role. The operators may not switch roles without re-authenticating. The operator must re-authenticate on each power-up event. The module inhibits data output during an error state, zeroization, key generation and during the power- up self-tests. The module shall enforce identity-based authentication. The module does not provide feedback of authentication data. An error state may be cleared by power-cycling the module. The module provides logical separation between all the data input, control input, data output and status output interfaces. The module protects all CSPs from unauthenticated disclosure and unauthorized modification. The module protects all public keys from unauthorized modification and unauthorized substitution. The module does not support manual key entry. A manual key entry test is not implemented. The module does not support split-knowledge processes. The operator may perform on-demand power-on self-test by recycling power to the module. The status output does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the module. F0015 ­ Revision Page 24 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification 19. ACRONYMS Acronym Definition AES Advanced Encryption Standard CSP Critical Security Parameter DAS Direct Attached Storage DCI Digital Cinema Initiatives, LLC DCP Digital Cinema Package DRNG Deterministic Random Number Generator EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility EMI Electromagnetic Interference FCC Federal Communications Commission FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code IMB Image Media Block KAT Known Answer Test KDM Key Delivery Message ­ as per SMPTE 430-1 MAC Media Access Control NAS Network Attached Storage RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman SHA Secure Hash Algorithm TI Texas Instruments Incorporated TI ECDH Considered as non-security relevant data obfuscation (plaintext) and only used to interoperate with legacy equipment TLS Transport Layer Security F0015 ­ Revision Page 25 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification 20. APPENDIX A: CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS The Module supports the following critical security parameters: 1. AES Master Key Description: used for re-encrypting KDM AES keys to be persisted in Flash. Type: AES 128 Generation: Via Approved ANSI X9.31 DRNG; as per SP800-133 Section 7.1, key generation is performed as per the "Direct Generation" of Symmetric Keys which is an Approved key generation method. Storage: Security manager hardware; controlled zeroizeable RAM Establishment: N/A Entry: N/A Output: N/A Key-to-entity association: Bound to the process of internal key management, stored at a specific memory location, and via CRC-16. Zeroization: Built in function on security manager hardware zeroizes all internal memory on power- down and power-on tamper events. Controlled RAM will be zeroized on power-down and powered-on tamper events. 2. Device Private Key (SM Key) Description: RSA private key that device uses to prove its identity and facilitate secure Transport Layer Security (TLS) communications, and to decrypt the KDMs. Type: RSA 2048 Generation: N/A - generated outside of the crypto boundary by Christie Storage: Stored in Flash, encrypted with AES Master Key. Establishment: N/A Entry: N/A Output: N/A Key-to-entity association: via memory location and CRC-16 Zeroization: Built in function on security manager hardware zeroizes all internal memory on power- down and power-on tamper events. 3. Device Private Key (Log Key) F0015 ­ Revision Page 26 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification Description: RSA private key used to sign log data. Type: RSA 2048 Generation: N/A - generated outside of the crypto boundary by Christie Storage: Stored in Flash, encrypted with AES Master Key Establishment: N/A Entry: N/A Output: N/A Key-to-entity association: via memory location and CRC-16 Zeroization: Built in function on security manager hardware zeroizes all internal memory on power- down and power-on tamper events. Controlled RAM will be zeroized on power-down and powered-on tamper events. 4. Content Decryption Keys Description: Key Delivery Message (KDM) AES keys that protect content. Type: AES 128 CBC mode (using an IV as specified by SMPTE 429-6) Generation: N/A Storage: Stored in Flash, encrypted with AES Master Key. Establishment: RSA wrapped outside of crypto boundary with Device Public Key and entered into the crypto boundary. Entry: Entered in RSA wrapped format Output: N/A Key-to-entity association: via memory location Zeroization: Controlled RAM, and Key Buffer in media decryptor on power-down and power-on tamper events. 5. Content Integrity Keys (MIC key) Description: HMAC-SHA-1 keys that protect the integrity of compressed content (integrity pack check parameters) Type: HMAC-SHA-1 (128-bit key) Generation: Via Approved FIPS 186-2 DRNG; as per SP800-133 Section 7.1, key generation is performed as per the "Direct Generation" of Symmetric Keys which is an Approved key generation method. Storage: N/A F0015 ­ Revision Page 27 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification Establishment: N/A Entry: N/A Output: N/A Key-to-entity: via memory location Zeroization: RAM and key buffer in media decyptor zeroized on power-down and power-on tamper events. 6. TLS Pre-Master Secret Description: input to TLS PRF Type: Session specific TLS secret Generation: N/A Storage: Plaintext in RAM Establishment: generated outside the cryptoboudary by the TLS client; entered into the crypto boundary RSA wrapped with Device Public Key. Entry: see Establishment Output: N/A Key-to-entity: via TLS session identifiers and port number Zeroization: Zeroized when TLS session is closed and via tamper. 7. TLS Master Secret Description: input to TLS PRF Type: Session specific TLS secret Generation: N/A Storage: RAM Establishment: TLS KDF as per SP800-135 Section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2; allowed method as per FIPS 140-2 IG D.8 Scenario 4 Entry: N/A Output: N/A Key-to-entity: via TLS session identifiers and port number Zeroization: Zeroized when TLS session is closed and via tamper. F0015 ­ Revision Page 28 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification 8. TLS PRF Internal State Description: intermediate state variables of PRF Type: Session specific TLS secret Generation: N/A Storage: RAM Establishment: TLS KDF as per SP800-135 Section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2; allowed method as per FIPS 140-2 IG D.8 Scenario 4 Entry: N/A Output: N/A Key-to-entity: via TLS session identifiers and port number Zeroization: Zeroized when TLS session is closed and via tamper. 9. TLS AES Session Key Description: AES encryption of TLS session data Type: AES 128 Generation: N/A Storage: RAM Establishment: TLS KDF as per SP800-135 Section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2; allowed method as per FIPS 140-2 IG D.8 Scenario 4 Entry: N/A Output: N/A Key-to-entity: via TLS session identifiers and port number Zeroization: Zeroized when TLS session is closed and via tamper. 10. TLS HMAC Session Key Description: HMAC integrity verification of TLS session data Type: HMAC-SHA-1 (160-bit key) Generation: N/A Storage: RAM Establishment: TLS KDF as per SP800-135 Section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2; allowed method as per FIPS 140-2 IG D.8 Scenario 4 F0015 ­ Revision Page 29 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification Entry: N/A Output: N/A Key-to-entity: via TLS session identifiers and port number Zeroization: Zeroized when TLS session is closed and via tamper. 11. DRNG Seed (dt, v) and Seed Key (k) Description: seeding inputs in the Approved DRNG (X9.31) Type: FIPS 186-2 DRNG Generation: via NDRNG from security manager hardware Storage: RAM Establishment: N/A Entry: N/A Output: N/A Key-to-entity: via data structure and pointer in memory Zeroization: Memory location in RAM and security manager hardware zeroized via zeroize command and via tamper. 12. DRNG Internal State Description: intermediate state of the DRNG (X9.31) Type: X9.31 DRNG Generation: inside crypto boundary via X9.31 DRNG Storage: RAM Establishment: N/A Entry: N/A Output: N/A Key-to-entity: via data structure and pointer in memory Zeroization: Memory location in RAM zeroized via zeroize command and via tamper. 13. DRNG Seed Key (xKey) Description: seeding input in the Approved DRNG (FIPS 186-2) Type: FIPS 186-2 DRNG F0015 ­ Revision Page 30 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification Generation: When used for MIC key generation, the xKey is created by padding the AES Content Decryption Keys. Storage: RAM Establishment: N/A Entry: Seed Key is wrapped with Content Decryption Key (RSA 2048) Output: N/A Key-to-entity: via data structure and pointer in memory Zeroization: Memory location in RAM zeroized via zeroize command and via tamper. 14. DRNG Internal State Description: intermediate state of the DRNG (FIPS 186-2) Type: FIPS 186-2 DRNG Generation: inside crypto boundary via FIPS 186-2 DRNG Storage: RAM Establishment: N/A Entry: N/A Output: N/A Key-to-entity: via data structure and pointer in memory Zeroization: Memory location in RAM zeroized via zeroize command and via tamper. 15. Marriage Password Description: User role authentication password. Type: Authentication data; minimum 6 characters password, maximum 32 character password. Generation: N/A Storage: Stored in Flash, hashed with SHA-256; RAM Establishment: N/A Entry: Encrypted via TLS Output: N/A Key-to-entity: via memory location Zeroization: RAM memory is zeroized via tamper. Also zeroized via Zeroization service. F0015 ­ Revision Page 31 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification F0015 ­ Revision Page 32 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification 21. APPENDIX B: PUBLIC KEYS The Module supports the following public keys: 1. Christie Root CA Key Description: digitally signed and thus authorizes other public keys to be used by the module for a defined purpose Type: RSA 2048 Generation: N/A - Installed into the module within the secure factory during manufacturing Storage: Stored in Flash in self-signed certificate; RAM Entry: N/A - Installed into the module within the secure factory during manufacturing Output: In X.509 certificate upon request Establishment: N/A Key-to-entity: via memory location and CRC-16 2. Certificate Chain Description: digitally verify public keys Type: RSA 2048 Generation: N/A - Installed into the module within the secure factory during manufacturing Storage: Stored in Flash in certificate signed by Christie Root CA Key; RAM Establishment: N/A Entry: N/A - Installed into the module within the secure factory during manufacturing Output: In X.509 certificate upon request Key-to-entity: via memory location and CRC-16 3. Christie Firmware Update Key Description: Used to securely update the firmware via RSA signature verification via the Update service. Type: RSA 2048 Generation: N/A - generated outside of the crypto boundary by Christie Storage: RAM F0015 ­ Revision Page 33 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification Establishment: N/A Entry: Entered into the module via a certificate signed by the Certificate Chain Output: In X.509 certificate upon request Key-to-entity: via memory location and CRC 4. Device Public Key (SM Key) Description: RSA public key that device uses to prove its identity Type: RSA 2048 Generation: N/A - generated outside of the crypto boundary by Christie Storage: Stored in Flash signed with Christie Certificate Chain; RAM Establishment: N/A Entry: N/A - Installed in the secure factory during manufacturing Output: In X.509 certificate Key-to-entity: via memory location and CRC-16 5. Device Public Key (Log Key) Description: RSA public key that device uses to prove its identity Type: RSA 2048 Generation: N/A - generated outside of the crypto boundary by Christie Storage: Stored in Flash signed with Christie Certificate Chain; RAM Establishment: N/A Entry: N/A - Installed in the factory Output: In X.509 certificate upon request Key-to-entity: via memory location and CRC-16 6. SMS Public Key Description: RSA 2048 - TLS Client Public Key Type: RSA 2048 Generation: N/A - generated outside of the crypto boundary F0015 ­ Revision Page 34 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification Security 010-105847-01 - Rev 2 12/18/2015 Policy Specification Storage: Stored in RAM Establishment: N/A Entry: Entered into the module during TLS session establishment within a certificate signed by the Certificate Chain Output: In X.509 certificate Key-to-entity: via signature verification during projector handshake 7. Projector Public Key Description: Identity of the projector Type: RSA 2048 Generation: N/A - generated outside of the crypto boundary Storage: Stored in Flash; RAM Establishment: N/A Entry: Entered into the module in X.509 certificate during marriage handshake with projector Output: In X.509 certificate Key-to-entity: via signature verification during marriage handshake F0015 ­ Revision Page 35 of 35 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. Christie Digital Systems Canada Inc. Specification