FIPS 1402 Security Policy for: Toshiba TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Hard Disk Drive (AL14SEQ model) TOSHIBA CORPORATION Rev 1.0.0 1 Oct 01, 2015 TOSHIBA TCG ENTERPRISE SSC SELF-ENCRYPTING HARD DISK DRIVE ..................................... 1 OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................................................ 3 ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................................................... 3 SECTION 1 ­ MODULE SPECIFICATION............................................................................................... 5 SECTION 1.1 ­ PRODUCT VERSION ...................................................................................................... 5 SECTION 2 ­ ROLES SERVICES AND AUTHENTICATION .................................................................. 5 SECTION 2.1 ­ SERVICES ....................................................................................................................... 6 SECTION 3 ­ PHYSICAL SECURITY ...................................................................................................... 7 SECTION 4 ­ OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ..................................................................................... 8 SECTION 5 ­ KEY MANAGEMENT ......................................................................................................... 9 SECTION 6 ­ SELF TESTS ....................................................................................................................... 9 SECTION 7 ­ DESIGN ASSURANCE ....................................................................................................... 9 SECTION 8 ­ MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS............................................................................... 10 2 Oct 01, 2015 Overview The Toshiba TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Hard Disk Drive (AL14SEQ18/12/09EQB, AL14SEQ18/12/09EPB) is used for hard disk drive data security. This Cryptographic Module (CM) provides various cryptographic services using FIPS approved algorithms. Services include hardware-based data encryption, cryptographic erase, and FW download. This CM is a multiple-chip embedded, and the physical boundary of the CM is the entire HDD. The physical interface for power-supply and communication is one SAS connector. The CM is connected with host system by SAS cable. The logical interface is the SAS, TCG SWG, and Enterprise SSC. The CM has the non-volatile storage area for not only user data but also the keys, CSPs, and FW. The latter storage area is called the "system area", which is not logically accessible / addressable by the host application. Section Level 1. Cryptographic Module Specification 2 2. Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2 3. Roles, Services, and Authentication 2 4. Finite State Model 2 5. Physical Security 2 6. Operational Environment N/A 7. Cryptographic Key Management 2 8. EMI/EMC 2 9. SelfTests 2 10. Design Assurance 2 11. Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A Overall Level 2 Table 1 Security Level Detail Interface Ports Data Input SAS connector Control Input SAS connector Data Output SAS connector Status Output SAS connector Power Input SAS connector Table 1-1 Physical/Logical Port Mapping This document is non-proprietary and may be reproduced in its original entirety. Acronyms AES Advanced Encryption Standard CM Cryptographic Module CSP Critical Security Parameter DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator EDC Error Detection Code FW Firmware 3 Oct 01, 2015 HMAC Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication code KAT Known Answer Test LBA Logical Block Address MSID Manufactured SID NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator PCB Printed Circuit Board POST Power on Self-Test PSID Printed SID SED Self-Encrypting Drive SHA Secure Hash Algorithm SID Security ID 4 Oct 01, 2015 Section 1 ­ Module Specification The CM has one FIPS 140 approved mode of operation and CM is always in approved mode of operation. The CM provides services defined in Section 2.1 and other non-security related services. Section 1.1 ­ Product Version The Toshiba Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Hard Disk Drive has been validated: HW version: A0 with AL14SEQ18EQB, AL14SEQ12EQB, AL14SEQ09EQB, AL14SEQ18EPB, AL14SEQ12EPB, AL14SEQ09EPB FW version: 0101 AL14SEQxxEQB is 512 byte emulation sector drive. AL14SEQxxEPB is 4K sector drive. Section 2 ­ Roles Services and Authentication This section describes roles, authentication method, and strength of authentication. Role Name Role Type Type of Authentication Authentication Multi Attempt strength Authentication Strength EraseMaster Crypto Officer Role PIN 1/248 < 1/1,000,000 15,000 / 248 < 1 / 100,000 SID Crypto Officer Role PIN 1/248 < 1/1,000,000 15,000 / 248 < 1 / 100,000 BandMaster0 User Role PIN 1/248 < 1/1,000,000 15,000 / 248 < 1 / 100,000 BandMaster1 User Role PIN 1/248 < 1/1,000,000 15,000 / 248 < 1 / 100,000 ... ... ... ... ... ... BandMaster8 User Role PIN 1/248 < 1/1,000,000 15,000 / 248 < 1 / 100,000 Table 2 Identification and Authentication Policy Per the security policy rules, the minimum PIN length is 6 bytes. Therefore the probability that a random attempt will succeed is 1/248 < 1,000,000 (the CM accepts any value (0x00-0xFF) as each byte of PIN). The CM waits 5msec when authentication attempt fails, so the maximum number of authentication attempts is 12,000 times in 1 min. Therefore the probability that random attempts in 1min will succeed is 12,000 / 248 < 1 / 100,000. 5 Oct 01, 2015 Section 2.1 ­ Services This section describes services which the CM provides. Service Description Role(s) Keys & RWX(Read, Algorithm(CAVP Method CSPs Write,eXecute Certification ) Number) Band Block or allow read (decrypt) / BandMaster0 N/A N/A N/A SECURITY Lock/Unlock write (encrypt) of user data in ... PROTOCOL IN(TCG a band. Locking also requires BandMaster8 Set Method Result) read/write locking to be enabled Cryptographic Erase user data (in EraseMaster MEK(s) W Hash_DRBG(#895) SECURITY Erase cryptographic means) by RKey X AES256-CBC(#3537) PROTOCOL IN(TCG changing the data encryption Erase Method Result) key Data Encryption / decryption of None MEKs X AES256-XTS(#3538) SCSI READ/WRITE read/write(decr unlocked user data to/from Commands band ypt/encrypt) Firmware Enable / Disable firmware SID PubKey X RSASSA-PKCS#-v1_ SECURITY Download download and load a complete 5(#1818) PROTOCOL IN(TCG firmware image, and save it. Set Method Result), If the code passes "Firmware SCSI WRITE load test", the device is reset BUFFER and will run with the new code. RandomNumbe Provide a random number None Seed R Hash_DRBG(#895) SECURITY r generation generated by the CM PROTOCOL IN(TCG Random Method Result) Reset(run Runs POSTs and delete None N/A N/A N/A Power on reset POSTs) CSPs in RAM Set band Set the location and size of BandMaster0 N/A N/A N/A SECURITY position and the LBA range ... PROTOCOL IN(TCG size BandMaster8 Set Method Result) Set PIN Setting PIN (authentication All for their RKey X AES256-CBC(#3537) SECURITY data) PIN SHA256(#2916) PROTOCOL IN(TCG Set Method Result) Show Status Report status of the CM None N/A N/A N/A SCSI REQUEST SENSE Zeroization Erase user data in all bands None1 RKey X,W AES256-CBC(#3537) SECURITY by changing the data MEKs W Hash_DRBG(#895) PROTOCOL IN(TCG encryption key, initialize RevertSP Method range settings, and reset PIN W Result) PINs for TCG Table 3 ­ FIPS Approved services Algorithm CAVP Certification Number AES256-CBC #3537 AES256-XTS #3538 SHA256 #2916 RSASSA-PKCS#1-v1_5 #1818 Hash_DRBG #895 Table 4 FIPS Approved Algorithms Algorithm Description NDRNG Software RNG used to seed the approved Hash_DRBG. Minimum entropy of 8 bits is 7.28. Table 4-1 Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms 1 Need to input PSID, which is public drive-unique value used for the TCG RevertSP method. 6 Oct 01, 2015 Section 3 ­ Physical Security The CM has the following physical security: Production-grade components with standard passivation Three tamper-evident security seals are applied to the CM in factory One opaque and tamper-evident security seal (PCB SEAL) is applied to PCB of the CM. This seal prevents an attacker to remove the PCB and survey electronic design Two tamper-evident security seals (TOP SEAL 1 and TOP SEAL 2) are applied to top cover of the CM. These seals prevent top cover removal Exterior of the drive is opaque The tamper-evident security seals cannot be penetrated or removed and reapplied without tamper-evidence The operator is required to inspect the CM periodically for one or more of the following tamper evidence. If the operator discovers tamper evidence, the CM should be removed. 7 Oct 01, 2015 Message "VOID" on security seal or top plate Text on security seals does not match original Cutting line on security seal Security seal cutouts do not match original Section 4 ­ Operational Environment Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the CM operates in a "non-modifiable", that is the CM cannot be modified and no code can be added or deleted. 8 Oct 01, 2015 Section 5 ­ Key Management The CM uses keys and CSPs in the following table. Key/CSP Length Type Zeroize Method Establishment Output Persistence/Storage BandMaster/Erase 256 PIN Zeroization service Electronic input No SHA digest/System Area Master/SID PINs Encrypted by RKey / MEKs 512 Symmetric Zeroization service DRBG No System Area Output: Host can MSID 256 Public N/A(Public) Manufacturing Plain / System Area retrieve PubKey 2048 Public N/A(Public) Manufacturing No Plain / System Area Obfuscated(Plain in FIPS RKey 256 Symmetric Zeroization service DRBG No means) / System Area Entropy collected Seed 440 DRBG seed Power-Off from NDRNG at No Plain/RAM Power-On Note that there is no security-relevant audit feature and audit data. Section 6 ­ Self Tests The CM runs self-tests in the following table. Function Self-Test Type Abstract Firmware Integrity Check Power-On EDC 32-bit FW SHA256 Power-On Digest KAT AES(AES CBC) Power-On Encrypt and Decrypt KAT AES(AES XTS) Power-On Encrypt and Decrypt KAT FW Hash_DRBG Power-On DRBG KAT FW RSASSA-PKCS#-v1_5 Power-On Signature verification KAT FW Hash_DRBG Conditional Verify newly generated random number not equal to previous one NDRNG Conditional Verify newly generated random number not equal to previous one Firmware load test Conditional Verify signature of downloaded firmware image by RSASSA-PKCS#-v1_5 When the CM continuously enters in error state in spite of several trials of reboot, the CM may be sent back to factory to recover from error state. Section 7 ­ Design Assurance Refer to the guidance document provided with the CM. 9 Oct 01, 2015 Section 8 ­ Mitigation of Other Attacks The CM does not mitigate other attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-2 requirements. 10 Oct 01, 2015