Brocade® DCX, DCX 8510-8, DCX-4S and DCX 8510-4 Backbones, 6510 FC Switch, 6520 FC Switch, 7800 Extension Switch FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Document Version 1.0 Brocade Communications August 1, 2014 1 Copyright Brocade Communications 2014. May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision]. Document History Version Summary of Changes Publication Date 1.0 Initial Release August 1, 2014 2 1 Module Overview The Brocade 6510, 6520, 7800, DCX, DCX 8510-8, DCX-4S and DCX 8510-4 are multiple-chip standalone cryptographic modules, as defined by FIPS 140-2. The cryptographic boundary for DCX, DCX 8510-8, DCX-4S and DCX 8510-4 backbone is the outer perimeter of the metal chassis including the removable cover, control processor blades, core switch blades, and port blades or filler panels. The cryptographic boundary of the 6510 FC Switch, 6520 FC Switch, 7800 Extension Switch is the outer perimeter of the metal chassis including the removable cover. The power supply units are not included in the cryptographic boundary. The module is a Fibre Channel and/or Gigabit Ethernet routing switch that provides secure network services and network management. For each module to operate in a FIPS approved mode of operation, the tamper evident seals supplied in FIPS Kit P/N Brocade XBR-000195 must be installed as defined in Appendix A. The Crypto-Officer is responsible for storing and controlling the inventory of any unused seals. The unused seals shall be stored in plastic bags in a cool, dry environment between 60° and 70° F (15° to 20° C) and less than 50% relative humidity. Rolls should be stored flat on a slit edge or suspended by the core. The Crypto-Officer shall maintain a serial number inventory of all used and unused tamper evident seals. The Crypto-Officer shall periodically monitor the state of all applied seals for evidence of tampering. A seal serial number mismatch, a seal placement change, a checkerboard destruct pattern that appears in peeled film and adhesive residue on the substrate are evidence of tampering. The Crypto-Officer shall periodically view each applied seal under a UV light to verify the presence of a UV wallpaper pattern. The lack of a wallpaper pattern is evidence of tampering. The Crypto-Officer is responsible for returning a module to a FIPS approved state after any intentional or unintentional reconfiguration of the physical security measures. A validated module configuration is comprised of Fabric OS v7.2.1 (P/N: 63-1001421-01) installed on, a switch or backbone and a set of installed blades. The below platforms may be used in a validated module configuration: Firmware Fabric OS v7.2.1 Table 1 - Firmware Version 3 S KU Part Number Br i e f D e s c r i p t i o n S witch 6510,24P,16GB SFP,NON-PORT2 SIDE AIR FLOW BR-6510-24-16G-F 80-1005232-031 6510,24P,16GB SFP,PORT SIDE2 AIR FLOW BR-6510-24-16G-R 80-1005267-031 6510,24P,8GB SFP,NON-PORT SIDE AIR FLOW BR-6510-24-8G-F 80-1005268-031 6510,24P,8GB SFP,PORT SIDE AIR FLOW BR-6510-24-8G-R 80-1005269-031 6510 6510,48P,16GB SFP,NON-PORT SIDE AIR FLOW, 24-PORT BR-6510-48-16G-F 80-1005271-03 POD LICENSE 6510,48P,16GB SFP, PORT SIDE AIR FLOW, 24-Port POD BR-6510-48-16G-R 80-1005272-03 LICENSE 6520, 48 port 8G, SWL SFP, non-port side exhaust. Includes BR-6520-48-8G-F 80-1007245-03 three fan FRUs and two 1100W AC power supplies 6520, 48 port 8G, SWL SFP, port side exhaust. Includes three BR-6520-48-8G-R 80-1007246-03 fan FRUs and two 1100W AC power supplies 6520, 48 port 16G, SWL SFP, non-port side exhaust. Includes 6520 BR-6520-48-16G-F 80-1007242-03 three fan FRUs and two 1100W AC power supplies 6520, 48 port 16G, SWL SFP, port side exhaust. Includes BR-6520-48-16G-R 80-1007244-03 three fan FRUs and two 1100W AC power supplies 6520, 96 port, 16G, SWL SFP, port side exhaust. Includes BR-6520-96-16G-R 80-1007257-03 three fan FRUs and two 1100W AC power supplies 80-1002607-073 BR-7800F-0001 7800,UPG LIC,22P,16 8 SWL 80-1006977-024 80-1002608-073 BR-7800F-0002 7800,UPG LIC,22P,16 8 LWL 7800 80-1006980-024 80-1002609-073 BR-7800-0001 7800,6P,8GB SWL SFP 80-1006979-024 Table 2 - Switch Platforms Table 2 Notes 1. Ports 25 – 48 are physically present but disabled. A POD license is required to enable ports 25 – 48. 2. Port side and non-port side air flow indicates whether the fan direction causes air to be drawn into the port side air vents or exhausted from the port side air vents. 3. Serviceable assembly. 4. Production assembly. 5. Serviceable and production assemblies are functionally equivalent. The part number assigned to each production assembly was created to support the release of new agency labels with new CCC mark, humidity and altitude marks. 4 B ackbone S KU Part Number Br i e f D e s c r i p t i o n 80-1001064-101 BR-DCX-0001 DCX,2PS,0P,2CP,2 CORE,0SFP 80-1006751-012 DCX 80-1004920-041 BR-DCX-0002 DCX,2PS,0P,2CP,2 CORE,0 SFP,ENT BUN4,2 WWN 80-1006752-012 80-1002071-101 BR-DCX4S-0001 DCX-4S,2PS,0P,2CP,2 CORE,0SFP 80-1006773-012 DCX-4S 80-1002066-101 BR-DCX4S-0002 DCX-4S,2PS,0P,2CP,2 CORE,0SFP,BR,ENT BUN4 80-1006772-012 80-1004697-04 , 1 BR-DCX8514-0001 DCX8510-4,2PS,0P,2CP,2 16G CORE,0SFP 2 80-1006963-01 DCX 8510-4 1 80-1005158-04 DCX8510-4,2PS,0P,2CP,2 16G CORE,0SFP,ENT BUN 4 BR-DCX8514-0002 2 80-1006964-01 80-1004917-041 BR-DCX8518-0001 DCX8510-8,2PS,0P,2CP,2 16GB,0SFP,ENT BUN4 DCX 8510-8 80-1007025-012 Table 3 - Backbone Models Table 3 Notes 1. Serviceable assembly. 2. Production assembly. 3. Serviceable and production assemblies are functionally equivalent. The part number assigned to each production assembly was created to support the release of new agency labels with new CCC mark, humidity and altitude marks. 4. Enterprise Software License Bundle: Adaptive Networking, Extended Fabrics, Advance Performance Monitoring, Trunking, Fabric Watch, Server Application Optimized. 5 The blades listed below may be used in backbone-based validated module configurations: Ac r on y m 4 Part Number Br I e f D e s c r i p t i o n Bl a d e 80-1001070-071 CP8 FRU,CP BLADE,DCX CP8 Control Processor Blade 80-1006794-012 CR16-4 80-1004897-01 FRU, CORE BLADE, DCX8510-4 CR16-4 Core Switch Blade CR16-8 80-1004898-01 FRU, CORE BLADE, DCX8510-8 CR16-8 Core Switch Blade 80-1002000-021 CR4S-8 FRU, CORE BLADE, DCX-4S CR4S-8 Core Switch Blade 80-1006771-012 80-1001071-021 CR8 FRU, CORE BLADE, DCX CR8 Core Switch Blade 80-1006750-012 FC16-32 80-1005166-02 FRU, PORT BLADE,32P,DCX8510,16G SFP FC16-32 Port Blade FC16-48 80-1005187-02 FRU,PORT BLADE,48P,DCX8510,16G SFP FC16-48 Port Blade 80-1001066-011 FC8-16 FRU, PORT BLADE, 16P, DCX, 8G SFP FC8-16 Port Blade 80-1006936-012 80-1001067-011 FC8-32 FRU, PORT BLADE, 8P, DCX, 8G SFP FC8-32 Port Blade 80-1006779-012 80-1001453-011 FC8-48 FRU, PORT BLADE, 48P, DCX, 8G SFP FC8-48 Port Blade 80-1006823-012 80-1003887-011 FC8-64 FRU, PORT BLADE, 48P, DCX, 8G SFP FC8-64 Port Blade 80-1007000-012 80-1002839-031 FRU, EXT BLADE, 8G X 12P, 10x1GBE, FX8-24 FX8-24 Port Blade 2X10GBE 80-1007017-012 DCX/DCX 8510-8 DCX/DCX 8510-8 Filler 49-1000016-04 FILLER PANEL Filler Panel Panel DCX-4S Backbone DCX-4S Backbone Filler 49-1000064-02 FILLER PANEL Filler Panel Panel DCX-4S/DCX 8510- DCX-4S/DCX 8510-4 Filler 49-1000294-05 FILLER PANEL 4 Filler Panel Panel Table 4 - Supported Blades Table 4 Notes 1. Serviceable assembly. 2. Production assembly 3. Serviceable and production assemblies are functionally equivalent. The part number assigned to each production assembly was created to support the release of new agency labels with new CCC mark, humidity and altitude marks. 4. Acronym reference in Table 5 Backbone Blade Support Matrix. 6 Each backbone model supports a selected set of blades: Backbone Model Blades (ma x cou nt) CP8 (2), CR8 (2), FC8-16 (8), FC8-32 (8), FC8-48 (8), FC8-64 (8), FX8-24 (1), DCX (12 slots) 1 DCX/DCX 8510-8 Filler Panel (10) CP8 (2) 1, CR16-8 (2), FC8-64 (8), FC16-32 (8), FC16-48 (8), FX8-24 (1), DCX/DCX 8510-8 Filler Panel (10) DCX 8510-8 (12 slots) 1 CP8 (2) , CR4S-8 (2), FC8-16 (4), FC8-32 (4), FC8-48 (4), FC8-64 (4), FX8-24(1), DCX-4S Backbone Filler Panel (6), DCX-4S/DCX 8510-4 Filler Panel (6) DCX-4S (8 slots) 1 CP8 (2) , CR16-4 (2), FC8-64 (4), FC16-32 (4), FC16-48 (4), FX8-24 (1), DCX 8510-4 (8 slots) 1 DCX-4S/DCX 8510-4 Filler Panel (6) Table 5 - Backbone Blade Support Matrix Table 5 Notes 1. Each Backbone Model shall be fully populated with a minimum of two CP8 Control Processor Blades (Part Number: 80-1001070-06 or 80-1006794-01). The name of a backbone-based validated module configuration is formed by a concatenation of part numbers of the specific set of blades installed in the backbone. For the DCX and DCX 8510-8 platforms: …. For the DCX-4S and DCX 8510-4 platforms: …. 7 Figure 1 - DCX-4S and DCX Figure 1 illustrates representative configurations of the DCX-4S (left image) and DCX (right image) cryptographic modules. These are not the only possible configurations. Other possible configurations can be created by utilizing the blade and support matrix information in Table 4 and Table 5. 8 Figure 2 - DCX 8510-4 and DCX 8510-8 Figure 2 illustrates representative configurations of the DCX 8510-4 (left image) and DCX 8510-8 (right image) cryptographic modules. These are not the only possible configurations. Other possible configurations can be created by utilizing the blade and support matrix information in Table 4 and Table 5. Figure 3 - Brocade 6510 Figure 3 illustrates the Brocade 6510 cryptographic module. 9 Figure 4 - Brocade 6520 Figure 4 illustrates the Brocade 6520 cryptographic module. Figure 5 - Brocade 7800 Figure 5 illustrates the Brocade 7800 cryptographic module. 10 2 Security Level The cryptographic module meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 2 security of FIPS 140-2. S ec urit y R equir em en ts S ecti on L e v el Cryptographic Module Specification 2 Module Ports and Interfaces 2 Roles, Services and Authentication 2 Finite State Model 2 Physical Security 2 Operational Environment NA Cryptographic Key Management 2 EMI/EMC 2 Self-Tests 2 Design Assurance 2 Mitigation of Other Attacks NA Table 6 - Module Security Level Specification 11 3 Modes of Operation 3.1 Approved mode of operation The cryptographic module supports the following Approved algorithms: A ppro ve d A lgo rithm C ertificate Num ber AES 731, 1595, 1596 HMAC-SHA-256 397, 933, 934 HMAC-SHA-512 933, 934 HMAC-SHA-1 397, 933, 934 RNG 1252, 1253 RSA 1389, 1390 SHS [SHA-1] 749, 1408 SHS [SHA-256] 749, 1408 SHS [SHA-512] 1407, 1408 Triple-DES 652, 1043 CVL (SP800-135 KDF) 157, 158 Table 7 - Approved Algorithms NOTICE: Users should reference the transition tables that will be available at the CMVP Web Site (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/). The data in the tables will inform users of the risks associated with using a particular algorithm and a given key length. The following non-Approved algorithms and protocols are allowed within the Approved mode of operation: RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength) • Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption • strength) HMAC-MD5 to support RADIUS authentication • NDRNG – used for seeding the Approved DRBG • MD5 (used for password hash) • The initial state of the cryptographic module is not in a FIPS-compliant state. The cryptographic module contains four default accounts: root, factory, admin, and user. Each default account has a public, default password. The cryptographic module may be configured for FIPS mode via execution of the following procedure: 1) Perform zeroization operation. 2) Power cycle the module. 3) Change passwords for all existing user accounts. 4) Disable Telnet, HTTP 5) Enable HTTPS 6) Do not use FTP a) Config Upload b) Config Download 12 c) Support Save d) FW Download 7) Do not use MD5 and SHA1 hash and 0-3 within Authentication Protocols; Diffie-Hellman with Challenge- Handshake Authentication Protocol (DH-CHAP) and FCAP. 8) Configure to use SHA256 as the signature algorithm for FCAP authentication with group 4. 9) Do not define FCIP IKE or IPSec policies. 10) Disable Management Interface IPSec/IKE 11) Disable In-Band Management Interface 12) Disable In-Flight Encryption 13) Disable TACACS+ authspec mode 14) LDAP CA certificate should be of RSA 2048 bits signed with SHA256. 15) Do not configure SNMP Access List 16) Enable Self-Tests 17) Within Radius, only use PEAP MS-CHAP V2. [NOTE: This is a protocol that relies on the strength of TLSv1.0, which is utilizing RSA 2048 with SHA-256 and FIPS Approved cipher suites (AES, HMAC-SHA-1)]. Configure RADIUS server to only use PEAP MS-CHAP V2. 18) Enable Signed FW Download 19) Install removable front cover (as applicable) and apply tamper labels 20) Disable Boot PROM Access 21) Disable Factory role Access 22) Disable Root Access 23) Enable FIPS mode via the “fipscfg – enable fips” command 24) Power-cycle the module. 25) Externally generated RSA key pairs shall only be imported if they are RSA 2048. 26) After certificate operations (e.g. importing) view “fipscfg – verify fips” to validate FIPS. 27) For SSH sessions, execute “fipscfg – enable SHA256” for SSH sessions signed/verified with SHA 256. 28) Execute “fipscfg – verify fips” and ensure that all verifications are passed. 29) SSH clients and servers should support diffie-hellman-group-exchange-256 and the ability to sign/verify with SHA256 to connect to the switch. The operator can determine if the cryptographic module is running in FIPS (Approved) vs. non-FIPS (non- Approved) mode via execution of the CLI command, “fipscfg -- show” service. The module will return the following as an indicator for the FIPS Mode of Operation: “FIPS mode is: Enabled”. When operating in the non- Approved mode of operation the following will be displayed “FIPS mode is: Disabled.” 3.2 Non-Approved mode of operation In non-Approved mode, an operator will have no access to CSPs used within the Approved mode. When switching between FIPS and non-FIPS mode of operation, the operator is required to perform zeroization of the module’s plaintext CSPs. NOTICE: The module provides the following non-FIPS approved algorithms only in non-FIPS mode of operation. The use of any such service is an explicit violation of this Security Policy and is explicitly disallowed by this Security Policy. 13 Crypto Role Additional Details Function/Service Cipher suites for SSL N/A* aes-128-cbc, aes-128-ecb, aes-192-cbc, aes-192-ecb, aes-256-cbc, aes- and TLS 256-ecb, bf, bf-cbc, bf-cfb, bf-ecb, bf- ofb, cast, cast-cbc, cast5-cbc, cast5-cfb, cast5-ecb, cast5-ofb, des, des-cbc, des-cfb, des-ecb, des-ede, des-ede- cbc, des-ede-cfb, des-ede-ofb, des-ede3, des-ede3-cbc, des- ede3-cfb, des-ede3-ofb, des-ofb, des3, desx, rc2, rc2-40- cbc, rc2-64-cbc, rc2-cbc, rc2-cfb, rc2-ecb, rc2-ofb, rc4, rc4-40 Message Digests SSL N/A* md2, md4, md4, rmd160 and TLS Message Crypto-Officer Ciphers: aes-128-ctr, aes-192-ctr, aes-256-ctr, arcfour256, arcfour128, authentication aes-128-cbc, 3des-cbc, blowfish- cbc, cast128-cbc, aes-192-cbc, aes-256- algorithms and cbc, arcfour ciphers for configuring SSH Macs: hmac-md5, hmac-sha-1, umac-64, hmac-ripemd160, hmac-sha-1- 96, hmac-md5-96 Common Crypto-Officer FCAP and HTTPS are supported with certificates of any size (512 to 2048 Certificates for FCAP and above) signed with MD5, SHA1, SHA256 and HTTPS SNMP Crypto-Officer SNMPv1 and SNMPv3; Algorithms: SHA1 and MD5 RADIUS or LDAP Crypto-Officer PAP and CHAP authentication method for RADIUS (all considered as plaintext) RADIUS and LDAP are supported with CA certificates of any size (512 to 2048 and above) signed with MD5, SHA1, SHA256 LDAP uses TLS connections in non-FIPS mode without certificates Telnet N/A N/A HTTP N/A N/A FTP Crypto-Officer Config Upload, Config Download, Support Save, FW Download, autoftp FCIP IKE or IPSec N/A Management Interface IPSec/IKE (disabled for management interface) In-Band N/A N/A Management Interface RSA Crypto-Officer RSA key size < 2048 bits for SSH and TLS Diffie-Hellman Crypto-Officer DH key size < 2048 bits for SSH In-Flight Encryption Crypto-Officer IKE: DH 2048 keys with SHA1 for key exchange and HMAC-SHA1-512 for IKE protocol DH-CHAP: Diffie Hellman with NULL DH, 1024, 1280, 1536 and 2048 keys with MD5 and SHA1 hash algorithm FCAP: Certificates with any key size signed by MD5, SHA1 TACACS+ authspec Crypto-Officer PAP or CHAP authspec is supported mode Table 8 – Functions / Services available in non-FIPS mode *NOTE: This feature “IS NOT” available to the operator after FIPS mode has been enabled (i.e. this feature is permanently disabled). 14 4 Ports and Interfaces The cryptographic module provides the following physical ports and logical interfaces: Fiber Channel: Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output • 1 GbE & 10 GbE: Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output • Ethernet Ports: Control Input, Status Output • Serial port: Control Input, Status Output • USB: Data Input, Data Output, Status Output • Brocade USB flash device, XBR-DCX-0131 o Power Supply Connectors: Power Input, Data Output, Status Input • LEDs: Status Output (1) • 4.1 LED Indicators 1) Blades: a) Blade Power LED b) Blade Status LED c) Fibre Channel port status LED d) Fibre Channel port speed LED e) USB port Status LED f) Active CP LED g) Ethernet port (SERVICE) Link LED h) Ethernet port (SERVICE) Activity LED i) Ethernet port (MGMT) Link LED j) Ethernet port (MGMT) Activity LED k) ICL port LINK LED l) ICL port ATTN LED 2) Backbone: a) WWN Status Interface LED b) FAN power LED c) FAN status LED 3) Switches: a) Switch Power LED b) Switch Status LED c) Ethernet port Link LED d) Ethernet port Activity LED e) Gigabit Ethernet (GE) port status LED f) Gigabit Ethernet (GE) port activity LED g) Fiber Channel port status LED 15 16 Port/Interface Type Model Fibre 1 GbE Channel & 10 Serial Power Supply Ports GbE Ethernet Port USB Connectors LED DCX-4S 256 24 4 2 2 2 4 DCX 512 24 4 2 2 4 30 DCX 8510-4 192 12 4 2 2 2 4 DCX 8510-8 384 12 4 2 2 4 30 6510 48 0 1 1 1 2 54 6520 96 0 1 1 1 2 107 7800 16 8 1 1 1 2 32 Table 9 - Port/Interface Quantities Bl a d e L ED Bl a d e L ED CP8 Control Processor 8 FC8-16 Port Blade 18 CR16-4 Core Switch Blade 4 FC8-32 Port Blade 34 CR16-8 Core Switch Blade 4 FC8-48 Port Blade 50 CR4S-8 Core Switch Blade 6 FC8-64 Port Blade 66 FX8-24 Port Blade 26 CR8 Core Switch Blade 4 FC16-32 Port Blade 34 FC16-48 Port Blade 50 Table 10 - DCX-4S, DCX, DCX 8510-4, and DCX 8510-8 blade LED counts 5 Identification and Authentication Policy 5.1 Assumption of Roles The cryptographic module supports the operator roles. The cryptographic module enforces the separation of roles using role-based operator authentication. An operator must enter a username and its password to log in. The username is an alphanumeric string of maximum 40 characters. The password is an alphanumeric string of 8 to 40 characters randomly chosen from the 96 printable and human-readable characters. Upon correct authentication, the role is selected based on the username of the operator and the context of the module. At the end of a session, the operator must log-out. The module supports a maximum of 256 operators, five Radius servers and five LDAP servers that may be allocated the following roles: Type of A u the ntica tio n R ole FOS RBAC Role D ata A ut h e n t i c a t i o n Role-based operator Username and Admin (Crypto-Officer) Admin authentication Password Role-based operator Username and User, BasicSwitchAdmin, User (User role) authentication Password SwitchAdmin, Operator Role-based operator Username and Security Admin SecurityAdmin authentication Password Role-based operator Username and Fabric Admin FabricAdmin authentication Password 17 Maximum Permissions (for a Role -based operator Username and user-defined role) N/A authentication Password Role -based operator LDAP Root CA LDAP Server N/A authentication certificate Role -based operator RADIUS Shared Secret RADIUS Server N/A authentication Role -based operator PKI (FCAP) or Shared Host/Server/Peer Switch N/A authentication Secret (DH-CHAP) Table 11 - Roles and Required Identification and Authentication A ut h e n t i c a t i o n St r e n g t h o f M e c h a n i s m M echanism The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is 1/96^8 which is less than 1/1,000,000. The module can be configured to restrict the number of consecutive failed Password authentication attempts. If the module is not configured to restrict failed authentication attempts, then the maximum attempts possible within one minute is 20. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within one minute is 20/96^8 which is less than 1/100,000. The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is 1/2^112 which is less than 1/1,000,000. Digital Signature The module will restrict the number of consecutive failed authentication attempts to Verification (PKI) 10. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within one minute is 10/2^112 which is less than 1/100,000. The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is 1/96^8 which is less than 1/1,000,000. Knowledge of a The maximum possible authentication attempts within a minute is 16 attempts. The Shared Secret probability of successfully authenticating to the module within one minute is 16/96^8 which is less than 1/100,000. Table 12 - Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms 18 S ervi ce Nam e Description F O S I n t er f a c e Fabric element authutil secauthsecret Fabric Element authentication, including Authentication selection of authentication protocols, protocol configuration selection and setting authentication secrets. FIPSCfg Control FIPS mode operation fipscfg and related functions. Zeroize Zeroize all CSPs. fipgscfg --zeroize firmwarecommit firmwaredownload FirmwareManagement Control firmware management. firmwaredownloadstatus PKI configuration functions, PKI including FOS switch certificates seccertutil and SSL certificates. RADIUS RADIUS configuration functions. aaaconfig LDAP LDAP configuration functions. aaaconfig UserManagement User and password passwd passwdconfig userconfig management. Table 13 - Service Descriptions 19 6 Access Control Policy 6.1 Roles and Services H ost Ser ver /Peer RADIU S S erver S ec urityAdm in Fa b r i c A d m i n L D A P S e r v er P ermission s Maxim um S witch A dmin U ser Fabric Element X X X X Authentication FIPSCfg X X X Zeroize X X X FirmwareManagement X X X X X PKI X X X X X RADIUS X X X X LDAP X X X X UserManagement X X X Table 14 - Services Authorized for Roles 6.2 Unauthenticated Services The cryptographic module supports the following unauthenticated services: Self-tests: This service executes the suite of self-tests required by FIPS 140-2. Self-tests may be • initiated by power-cycling the module. Show Status: This service is met through the various status outputs provided by the services provided • above, as well as the LED interfaces. 20 6.3 Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)  DH Private Keys for use with 2048 bit modulus  Fibre-Channel Security Protocol (FCSP) CHAP Secret  Fibre-Channel Authentication Protocol (FCAP) Private Key (RSA 2048)  SSH/SCP/SFTP Session Keys – 128, 192, and 256 bit AES CBC or TDES 3 key CBC  SSH/SCP/SFTP Authentication Key HMAC-SHA-1  SSH KDF Internal State  SSH DH Shared Secret Key 2048 – 8192 bits  SSH 2048 RSA Private Key  TLS Private Key (RSA 2048)  TLS Pre-Master Secret  TLS Master Secret  TLS PRF Internal State  TLS Session Keys – 128, 256 bit AES CBC, TDES 3 key CBC  TLS Authentication Key for HMAC-SHA-1  RNG Seed Material  ANSI X9.31 DRNG Internal State  Passwords  RADIUS Secret 6.4 Definition of Public Keys DH Public Key (2048 bit modulus) • DH Peer Public Key (2048 bit modulus) • FCAP Public Key (RSA 2048) • FCAP Peer Public Key (RSA 2048) • TLS Public Key (RSA 2048) • TLS Peer Public Key (RSA 2048) • FW Download Public Key (RSA 2048) • SSH RSA 2048 bit Public Key • LDAP Root CA certificate (RSA 2048) • 6.5 Definition of CSPs Modes of Access Table 14 CSP Access Rights within Roles & Services defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the different module services. The modes of access shown in the table are defined as follows: R: Read • W: Write • N: No Access • • Z: Zeroize (Session Termination, “secauthsecret –remove” command and “fipscfg –zeroize” command) 21 S S H / SC P / S F T P C S P s FCSP CHA P Secret F C A P P r i v a t e K ey M at erial/In ter n a RADIU S S ecret DH Private Keys DRNG S ee d P asswords TLS CSPs l S tate Fabric Element Authentication N N N RW N N RW RW FIPSCfg N N N N N N N N Zeroize Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z FirmwareManagement R R N N N N N N PKI RW RW N RW N N N N RADIUS N N N N RW RW N N UserManagement N N RW RW RW N N N Table 15 - CSP Access Rights within Roles & Services 22 D ow nload Public F C A P P u b l i c K ey SSH RSA 2048 T L S P u b l i c K ey D H Publi c K ey L D A P R o ot C A C erti ficat e P u bl i c K e y Fi r m w a r e K ey Fabric Element Authentication RW RW N N N N FIPSCfg N N N N N N Zeroize N N N N N N FirmwareManagement N N N RW N N PKI N N RW N RW N LDAP N N N N N RW UserManagement N N N N N N Table 16 - Public Key Access Rights within Roles & Services 7 Operational Environment The FIPS 140-2 Area 6 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the device supports a limited operational environment; only trusted, validated code RSA signed may be executed. 8 Security Rules The cryptographic modules’ design corresponds to the cryptographic module’s security rules. This section documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of this FIPS140-2 Level 2 module. 1) The cryptographic module shall provide role-based authentication. 2) When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator shall not have access to any cryptographic services. 3) The cryptographic module shall perform the following tests: a) Power up Self-Tests: i) Cryptographic algorithm tests: (1) Three Key TDES CBC KAT (encrypt/decrypt) (2) AES (128, 192, 256) CBC KAT (encrypt/decrypt) (3) HMAC SHA-1 KAT (4) HMAC SHA-256 KAT (5) HMAC SHA-512 KAT (6) ANSI X9.31 DRNG KAT (7) SHA-1 KAT (8) SHA-256 KAT (9) SHA-512 KAT (10) RSA 2048 SHA-256 Sign/Verify KAT 23 (11) SP800-135 KDF KAT ii) Firmware Integrity Test (128-bit EDC) iii) Critical Functions Tests: (1) RSA 2048 Encrypt/Decrypt KAT b) Conditional Self-Tests: i) Continuous Random Number Generator (RNG) test – performed on non-approved RNG. ii) Continuous Random Number Generator test – performed on ANSI X9.31 DRNG. iii) RSA 2048 SHA-256 Pairwise Consistency Test (Sign/Verify) iv) RSA 2048 Pairwise Consistency Test (Encrypt/Decrypt) v) Firmware Load Test (RSA 2048 with SHA-256 Signature Verification) vi) Bypass Test: N/A vii) Manual Key Entry Test: N/A 4) At any time the cryptographic module is in an idle state, the operator shall be capable of commanding the module to perform the power-up self-test. 5) Data output shall be inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states. 6) Status information shall not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the module. 7) The module does not support a maintenance role or maintenance interface. 8) The serial port may only be accessed by the Crypto-Officer when the Crypto-Officer is physically present at the cryptographic boundary, via a direct connection without any network access or other intervening systems. 9) In the vent of a KAT or Conditional Test failure, the operator will be notified via a message that states “…FAILED!” 9 Physical Security Policy 9.1 Physical Security Mechanisms The multi-chip standalone cryptographic module includes the following physical security mechanisms: • Production-grade components and production-grade opaque enclosure with tamper evident seals. • Tamper evident seals. 24 9.2 Operator Required Actions The operator is required to inspect the tamper evident seals, periodically, per the guidance provided in the user documentation. Ph y s i c a l S e c u r i t y Recommended Frequency of In s p e c t i o n / T e s t G ui d a n c e M ech anism s In s p e c t i o n / T e s t D etails Reference Appendix A for a description of tamper label Tamper Evident Seals 12 months application for all evaluated platforms. Table 17 - Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms 10 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy The module has not been designed to mitigate any specific attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140- 2 requirements. 25 11 Definitions and Acronyms 10 GbE 10 Gigabit Ethernet AES Advanced Encryption Standard Blade Any functional assembly that can be installed in a chassis, excluding power and fan FRUs CBC Cipher Block Chaining CLI Command Line interface CSP Critical Security Parameter DH Diffie-Hellman FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard FOS Fabric Operating System FRU Field Replaceable Unit GbE Gigabit Ethernet HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol KDF Key Derivation Function KAT Known Answer Test LED Light Emitting Diode LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol MAC Message Authentication Code NTP Network Time Protocol NOS Network Operating System PKI Public Key Infrastructure PROM Programmable read-only memory RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In User Service RNG Random Number Generator RSA Rivest Shamir and Adleman method for asymmetric encryption SCP Secure Copy Protocol SHA Secure Hash Algorithm SSH Secure Shell Protocol TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard TLS Transport Layer Security Protocol 26 12 Brocade Abbreviations 24P 24 ports 48P 48 ports 16GB 16 Gigabit 8GB 8 Gigabit SFP Small form-factor pluggable LWL long wave length SWL Short wave length LIC License UPG Upgrade 2PS Two power supply modules 0P No port blades 0SFP Zero SFP devices provided 2CP Two Control processor blades (see Table 4) 2 CORE Two core switch blades (see Table 4) ENT BUN Enterprise Software License Bundle: Adaptive Networking, Extended Fabrics, Advance Performance Monitoring, Trunking, Fabric Watch, Server Application Optimized (see table note for Table 3) BR Brocade WWN World Wide Name card POD Ports on Demand, Defines the size of an upgrade license. For example, a 24-Port POD License allows the user to enable twenty-four additional ports FC Fibre Channel FCIP Fiber Channel over Internet Protocol GE Gigabit Ethernet GBE Gigabit Ethernet CP8 8G Control Processor blade CR8 8G Core Switch Blade for DCX backbone CR4S-8 8G Core Switch Blade for DCX -4S backbone CR16-8 16G core switch blade for DCX 8510-8 backbone CR16-4 16G core switch blade for DCX 8510-4 backbone FC8-16 8G, 16-port, Fibre Channel port blade FX8-24 8G, 24 port, Extension blade ICL Inter-Chassis Link MGMT Management 27 Appendix A: Tamper Label Application Use ethyl alcohol to clean the surface area at each tamper evident seal placement location. Prior to applying a new seal to an area that shows seal residue, use consumer strength adhesive remove to remove the seal residue. Then use ethyl alcohol to clean off any residual adhesive remover before applying a new seal. Brocade DCX and DCX 8510-8 Backbone Twenty-two (22) tamper evident seals are required to complete the physical security requirements total.  Apply three (3) seals to the right side of the chassis. Figure 6 Brocade DCX and DCX 8510-8 Backbone chassis right side seal location 28  Apply twelve (12) seals to the front side of the chassis. Figure 7 Brocade DCX and DCX 8510-8 Backbone front side seal locations 29  Apply seven (7) seals to the back side of the chassis Figure 8 Brocade DCX and DCX 8510-8 Backbone back side seal locations Figure 9 Brocade DCX and DCX 8510-8 Backbone flat ejector handle seal application on the port side 30 Figure 10 Brocade DCX and DCX 8510-8 Backbone stainless steel handle seal application on the port side Figure 11 Brocade DCX and DCX 8510-8 Backbone filler panel seal application on the port side 31 Brocade DCX-4S and DCX 8510-4 Backbone Nineteen (19) tamper evident seals are required to complete the physical security requirements total.  Apply fourteen (14) seals to the backbone front side of the chassis. Figure 12 Brocade DCX-4S and DCX 8510-4 Backbone front side seal locations 32  Apply five (5) seals to the back side of the chassis Figure 13 Brocade DCX-4S and DCX 8510-4 Backbone back side seal locations Figure 14 Brocade DCX-4S and DCX 8510-4 Backbone flat ejector handle seal application Figure 15 Brocade DCX-4S and DCX 8510-4 Backbone stainless steel ejector handle seal application 33 Figure 16 Brocade DCX-4S and DCX 8510-4 Backbone filler panel (PN 49-1000294-05) seal application Figure 17 Brocade DCX-4S Backbone filler panel (PN 49-1000064-02) seal application 34 Brocade 6510 Two tamper evident seals are required to complete the physical security requirements.  Apply one (1) seal to the left side. See Figure 19. Figure 18 Brocade 6510 left side seal application Figure 19 Brocade 6510 right side seal application 35 Figure 20 Brocade 6510 bottom seal locations 36 Brocade 6520 Twenty-six (26) tamper evident seals are required to complete the physical security requirements. 1. Relative to the left side of the Brocade 6520, apply four (4) seals along the left bottom side of the chassis. Make a 90 degree bend from the left side to the bottom side of the chassis. See Figure 21 for details on how to position each seal. 2. Relative to the left side of the Brocade 6520, apply one (1) seal vertically, on the left side of the switch, over the seam between the top cover and the front panel of the switch. Do not allow the seal to cover either of the rack mount screw holes on the left side of the switch. See Figure 21 for details on how to position each seal. Figure 21 Brocade 6520 left side seal locations 3. Relative to the right side of the Brocade 6520, apply four (4) seals along the right bottom side of the chassis. Make a 90 degree bend from the right side to the bottom side of the chassis. See Figure 22 for details on how to position each seal. 4. Relative to the right side of the Brocade 6520, apply one (1) seal vertically, on the right side of the switch, over the seam between the top cover and the front panel of the switch. Do not allow the seal to cover either of the rack mount screw holes on the left side of the switch. See Figure 22 for details on how to position each seal. 37 Figure 22 Brocade 6520 right side seal locations 5. Relative to the non-port side of the Brocade 6520, apply one (1) seal over the seam between the top cover and the grill of the each of the three (3) FAN FRUs. Each seal makes a 90 bend from the top of the switch and the grill of each FAN FRU. See Figure 23 for details on how to position each seal. Apply two (2) seals over the flathead screws on the top cover near the FAN FRUs. See Figure 23 for details on how to position each seal. Five (5) seals are required to complete this step. 6. Relative to the non-port side of the Brocade 6520, apply two (2) seals over the seam between the chassis and the AC power module on the left non-port side of the chassis. See Figure 23 for details on how to position each seal. 38 7. Relative to the non-port side of the Brocade 6520, apply two (2) seals over the seam between the chassis and the AC power module on the right non-port side of the chassis. See Figure 23 for details on how to position each seal. 8. Relative to the non-port side of the Brocade 6520, apply one (1) seal to the flange of each of the three (3) FAN FRUs and the bottom of the switch. Each seal makes a 90 bend from the bottom of the switch to the flange of each FAN FRU. See Figure 23 for details on how to position each seal. Three (3) seals are required to complete this step. Figure 23 Brocade 6520 top and non-port side seal locations 39 9. Relative to the bottom side of the Brocade 6520, apply four (4) seals diagonally, on the bottom side of the switch, over the seam between the front panel and the bottom panel of the switch. See Figure 24 for details on how to position each seal. Figure 24 Brocade 6520 bottom side seal locations 40 Brocade 7800 Two (2) tamper evident seals are required to complete the physical security requirements. Figure 25 Brocade 7800 left side seal locations Figure 26 Brocade 7800 right side seal locations 41 Figure 27 Brocade 7800 bottom seal locations 42