Sm@rtCafé Expert 7.0    FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module   Non-Proprietary Security Policy   Version: 1.0  Date: 21 January 2015     Author Giesecke&Devrient Status Final Edition 25.07.2014  Giesecke&DevrientGmbH Prinzregentenstraße159 P.O.Box800729 D-81607Munich Copyright 2015 Giesecke & Devrient ‐ may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision)   FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy     Sm@rtCaféExpert7.0  Page2of21 FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy Version1.0  25.07.2014  FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy ©Copyright2015 Giesecke&DevrientGmbH Prinzregentenstraße159 P.O.Box800729 D-81607Munich Thisdocumentaswellastheinformationormaterialcontainediscopyrighted.Anyuse notexplicitlypermittedbycopyrightlawrequirespriorconsentofGiesecke&Devrient GmbH.Thisappliestoanyreproduction,revision,translation,storageonmicrofilmas wellasitsimportandprocessinginelectronicsystems,inparticular. . 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Sm@rtCaféExpert7.0  Page3of21 FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy Version1.0  25.07.2014  FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy TableofContents References .................................................................................................................................................... 6  Acronyms and definitions ............................................................................................................................. 7  1  Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 8  1.1  Versions,ConfigurationsandModesofoperation ......................................................... 9  2  Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary ................................................................................. 9  2.1  FirmwareandLogicalCryptographicBoundary ............................................................ 11  3  Cryptographic Functionality ................................................................................................................ 12  3.1  CriticalSecurityParametersandPublicKeys .................................................................. 14  4  Roles, Authentication and Services ..................................................................................................... 15  4.1  SecureChannelProtocolAuthenticationMethod ........................................................ 15  4.2  DemonstrationAppletAuthenticationMethod  ............................................................ 16  . 4.3  Services ..................................................................................................................................... 17  5  Self‐test ............................................................................................................................................... 19  5.1  Power-OnSelf-tests ............................................................................................................... 19  5.2  ConditionalSelf-tests ............................................................................................................ 20  6  Physical Security Policy ....................................................................................................................... 21  7  Electromagnetic Interference and Compatibility (EMI/EMC) ............................................................. 21  8  Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy ...................................................................................................... 21  9  Security Rules and Guidance ............................................................................................................... 21   Sm@rtCaféExpert7.0  Page4of21 FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy Version1.0  25.07.2014  FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy   ListofTables Table 1 – References ..................................................................................................................................... 7  Table 2 – Acronyms and Definitions ............................................................................................................. 8  Table 3 – Security Level of Security Requirements ....................................................................................... 9  Table 4 – Ports and Interfaces .................................................................................................................... 10  Table 5 –Approved Cryptographic Functions  ............................................................................................. 12  . Table 6 – Non‐Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions ................................................................ 13  Table 7 –Critical Security Parameters ......................................................................................................... 14  Table 8 – Public Keys ................................................................................................................................... 14  Table 9 ‐ Roles Supported by the Module .................................................................................................. 15  Table 10 ‐ Unauthenticated Services .......................................................................................................... 17  Table 11 –Authenticated Services  .............................................................................................................. 17  . Table 12 –Access to CSPs by Service ........................................................................................................... 18  Table 13 – Power‐On Self‐Test .................................................................................................................... 19  ListofFigures Figure 1 – Contact only: P‐M4.8‐8‐1 front and back (left);    S‐MFC6.8 front and back (right) .................. 10  Figure 2 – Dual interface: P‐M8.4‐8‐3 front and back (left);   S‐COM6.8 front and back (right) ................ 10  Figure 3 – Contactless‐only: P‐MCS8‐2‐1 front and back (left); P‐MCC8‐2‐6 front and back (right) .......... 10  Figure 4 ‐ Module Block Diagram ................................................................................................................ 11   Sm@rtCaféExpert7.0  Page5of21 FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy Version1.0  25.07.2014  FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy References  Acronym  Full Specification Name  [FIPS140-2] NIST,SecurityRequirementsforCryptographicModules,May25,2001 GlobalPlatform Consortium: GlobalPlatform Card Specification 2.2.1, January 2011,http://www.globalplatform.org [GlobalPlatform] GlobalPlatform Consortium: GlobalPlatform Card Specification 2.2 AmendmentA,ConfidentialCardContentManagement,Version1.0,October 2007 ISO/IEC 7816-1: 1998 Identification cards -- Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts--Part1:Physicalcharacteristics ISO/IEC 7816-2:2007 Identification cards -- Integrated circuit cards -- Part 2: Cardswithcontacts--Dimensionsandlocationofthecontacts [ISO7816] ISO/IEC 7816-3:2006 Identification cards -- Integrated circuit cards -- Part 3: Cardswithcontacts--Electricalinterfaceandtransmissionprotocols ISO/IEC 7816-4:2005 Identification cards -- Integrated circuit cards -- Part 4: Organization,securityandcommandsforinterchange ISO/IEC 14443-1:2008 Identification cards -- Contactless integrated circuit cards--Proximitycards--Part1:Physicalcharacteristics ISO/IEC 14443-2:2010 Identification cards -- Contactless integrated circuit cards--Proximitycards--Part2:Radiofrequencypowerandsignalinterface [ISO14443] ISO/IEC 14443-3:2011 Identification cards -- Contactless integrated circuit cards--Proximitycards--Part3:Initializationandanticollision ISO/IEC 14443-4:2008 Identification cards -- Contactless integrated circuit cards--Proximitycards--Part4:Transmissionprotocol Java Card 3 Platform Runtime Environment (JCRE) Specification, Classic Edition.Version3.0.4 Java Card 3 Platform Virtual Machine (JCVM) Specification, Classic Edition. Version3.0.4 [JavaCard] Java Card 3 Platform Application Programming Interface, Classic Edition. Version3.0.4 PublishedbyOracle,September2011 Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic [SP800-131A] AlgorithmsandKeyLengths,January2011 AmericanBankersAssociation,DigitalSignaturesUsingReversiblePublicKey [ANSX9.31] Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry (rDSA), ANSI X9.31-1998 - Sm@rtCaféExpert7.0  Page6of21 FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy Version1.0  25.07.2014  FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy Acronym  Full Specification Name  AppendixA.2.4. NIST Special Publication 800-67, Recommendation for the Triple Data [SP800-67] EncryptionAlgorithm(TDEA)BlockCipher,version1.2,July2011 [FIPS113] NIST,ComputerDataAuthentication,FIPSPublication113,30May1985. NIST, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), FIPS Publication 197, November [FIPS197] 26,2001. PKCS#1v2.1:RSACryptographyStandard,RSALaboratories,June14,2002 [PKCS#1] [FIPS186-4] NIST,DigitalSignatureStandard(DSS),FIPSPublication186-4,July,2013 NIST Special Publication 800-56A, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key [SP800-56A] EstablishmentSchemesUsingDiscreteLogarithmCryptography,March2007 [FIPS180-4] NIST,SecureHashStandard,FIPSPublication180-4,March2012 NIST, Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions [SP800-108] (Revised),October2009 NIST, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for [SP800-38F] KeyWrapping,December2012 NIST, Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic [IG] ModuleValidationProgram,lastupdated25July2013. Irving S. Reed, Gustave Solomon: Polynomial codes over certain finite fields. [RS] In: Journal of the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, SIAM J. 8, 1960,ISSN0036-1399,p.300–304. Table 1 – References  Acronyms and definitions   Acronym  Definition  APDU ApplicationProtocolDataUnit,see[ISO7816] API ApplicationProgrammingInterface ATR AnswerToReset CSP CriticalSecurityParameter,see[FIPS140-2] DAP DataAuthenticationPattern,see[GlobalPlatform] DPA DifferentialPowerAnalysis GP GlobalPlatform IC IntegratedCircuit ISD IssuerSecurityDomain,see[GlobalPlatform] Sm@rtCaféExpert7.0  Page7of21 FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy Version1.0  25.07.2014  FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy KAT KnownAnswerTest NVM Non-volatilememory PCT PairwiseConsistencyTest SCP SecureChannelProtocol,see[GlobalPlatform] SPA SimplePowerAnalysis Table 2 – Acronyms and Definitions  1 Introduction  ThisdocumentdefinestheSecurityPolicyfortheGiesecke&DevrientSm@rtCaféExpert 7.0cryptographicmodule,hereafterdenotedthemodule.Themodule,validatedtoFIPS 140-2 overall Level 3, is a single chip module implementing the GlobalPlatform operationalenvironment,withCardManagerandaDemonstrationApplet. TheDemonstrationAppletisavailableonlytodemonstratethecompletecryptographic capabilitiesofthemoduleforFIPS140-2validation,andisnotintendedforgeneraluse. Thetermplatformhereinisusedtodescribethechipandoperationalenvironment,not inclusiveoftheDemonstrationApplet. ThemoduleisalimitedoperationalenvironmentundertheFIPS140-2definitions.The moduleincludesafirmwareloadfunctiontosupportnecessaryupdates.Newfirmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-2 CMVP.Anyotherfirmwareloadedintothismoduleisoutofthescopeofthisvalidation andrequiresaseparateFIPS140-2validation. TheFIPS140-2securitylevelsforthemoduleareasfollows: Security  Security Requirement  Level  CryptographicModuleSpecification 3 CryptographicModulePortsandInterfaces 3 Roles,Services,andAuthentication 3 FiniteStateModel 3 PhysicalSecurity 3 OperationalEnvironment N/A Sm@rtCaféExpert7.0  Page8of21 FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy Version1.0  25.07.2014  FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy Security  Security Requirement  Level  CryptographicKeyManagement 3 EMI/EMC 3 Self-Tests 3 DesignAssurance 3 MitigationofOtherAttacks 3 Table 3 – Security Level of Security Requirements  1.1 Versions,ConfigurationsandModesofoperation Hardware: SLE78CLFX4000P(M)M7892 Firmware: Sm@rtCaféExpert7.0,DemonstrationAppletV1.0   Packaging options (configurations): Contactonly:  P-M4.8-8-1,S-MFC6.8 Dual-interface: P-M8.4-8-3,S-COM8.6 Contactlessonly: P-MCS8-2-1,P-MCC8-2-6 Thechipandfirmwareareidenticalinallconfigurations.Thechipdesignisasupersetof allpossibleinterfaceoptions;unusedoptionsaredisabledduringproduction. The card is always in the Approved mode; the explicit indicator of Approved mode is givenintheATR:thevalue0x46(‘F’)inHistoricalByte9indicatestheApprovedmode. interface bytes historical bytes 3B F9 96 00 00 80 31 FE 45 46 69 70 73 20 41 70 70 46 6E Fips AppF 2 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary  The module is designed to be embedded into plastic card bodies, with a contact plate andcontactlessantennaconnections.Thephysicalformsofthemodulearedepictedin Figures 1 through 3. The cryptographic boundary is the surface and edges of the packagesasshownintheFigures. The contactless ports of the module require connection to an antenna. The module relieson[ISO7816]and[ISO14443]cardreadersasinput/outputdevices. Sm@rtCaféExpert7.0  Page9of21 FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy Version1.0  25.07.2014  FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy     Figure 1 – Contact only: P‐M4.8‐8‐1 front and back (left);    S‐MFC6.8 front and back (right)      Figure 2 – Dual interface: P‐M8.4‐8‐3 front and back (left);   S‐COM6.8 front and back (right)      Figure 3 – Contactless‐only: P‐MCS8‐2‐1 front and back (left); P‐MCC8‐2‐6 front and back (right)   Port  Description  Logical Interface Type  VCC,GND ISO7816:Supplyvoltage Power–Contactconfigurationsonly RST ISO7816:Reset Controlin-Contactconfigurationsonly CLK ISO7816:Clock Controlin-Contactconfigurationsonly I/O ISO7816:Input/Output Controlin,Datain,Dataout,Statusout –Contactconfigurationsonly LA,LB ISO14443:Antenna Power,Controlin,Datain,Dataout,Statusout -Contactconfigurationsonly NC Notconnected Notconnected Table 4 – Ports and Interfaces  Control/datainputandstatus/dataoutputshareacommonphysicalport,withthe logicalseparationintointerfacesdeterminedbytheISO7816andISO14443protocols. Sm@rtCaféExpert7.0  Page10of21 FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy Version1.0  25.07.2014  FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy 2.1 FirmwareandLogicalCryptographicBoundary Figure4depictsthemoduleoperationalenvironment. Java Applications Layer System Applications Layer  Demonstration Card Manager  Applet  Firmware Platform  Global Platform API JavaCard API  G&D API  JCP OS Hardware   Power  RAM AES/DES CRC Vcc, GND    Mgmt  Engine      Clock  MMU Timers RSA/ECC  CLK    Mgmt  Engine  CPU  HW RNG Sensors  NVM ISO 7816  I/O (Contact)  (UART)  ROM   Reset  ISO 14443  LA/LB (RF)  RST  Mgmt  (RF)   Figure 4 ‐ Module Block Diagram  The JavaCard, GlobalPlatform and G&D APIs are internal interfaces available only to applets and security domains (i.e., Card Manager). Only applet services are available at thecardedge(theinterfacesthatcrossthecryptographicboundary).Section3describes appletfunctionalityingreaterdetail. The NVM is separated into segments with different access rules, enforced by the hardware MMU. The MMU is initialized with the correct settings by startup code, and verifiedbytheoperatingsystemeachtimethesystemstarts.TheMMUsettingscannot bechangedatruntime.AllcodeisexecutedfromROMandNVM. Sm@rtCaféExpert7.0  Page11of21 FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy Version1.0  25.07.2014  FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy 3 Cryptographic Functionality   The module implements the Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functionslistedinTables5and6below. Algorithm Description Cert# DRBG [SP800-90A]AES-256CTR_DRBG.Doesnotsupportpredictionresistance. 455 [SP800-67]TripleDataEncryptionAlgorithm.Themodulesupports3-Key Triple-DES 1637 keysonly,andCBCandECBmodes. Triple-DESMAC [FIPS113]Triple-DESMAC,vendoraffirmedbasedonCert.#1637. 1637 [FIPS197]AdvancedEncryptionStandardalgorithm.Themodulesupports AES 2721 AES-128,AES-192-andAES-256keys,andECBandCBCmodes. [SP800-38B]AES-256CMAC.ThemodulesupportsAES-128,AES-192and AESCMAC 2720 AES-256keys. SHA-1 SHA-1 2290 [FIPS180-4]SecureHashStandardcompliantone-way(hash)algorithms; SHA-2 2289 SHA-224,SHA-256,SHA-384,SHA-512 SHA-2 SHA-256 2288 [FIPS186-4]RSAkeygeneration,signaturegenerationandverification. RSA 1506 Themodulesupports2048-bitRSAkeys. [FIPS186-4]RSAkeygenerationandsignaturegeneration.Themodule RSACRT 1507 supports2048-bitRSAkeys. DSA [FIPS186-4]DSAkeygeneration,signaturegenerationandverification. 837  Themodulesupports2048bitkeys. [FIPS186-4]EllipticCurveDigitalSignatureAlgorithm.Themodule ECDSA supportstheNISTdefinedP-224,P-256,P-384,P-521curvesforkeypair 476 generation,signatureandsignatureverification. KDF [SP800-108]CMAC-basedKDFwithAES-128,AES-192,AES-256. 18 [SP800-56A]TheSection5.7.1.2ECCCDHPrimitiveonly(asusedbythe CVL PIVspecification).ThemodulesupportstheNISTdefinedP-224P-256,P- 177 384andP-521curves. Table 5 –Approved Cryptographic Functions       Sm@rtCaféExpert7.0  Page12of21 FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy Version1.0  25.07.2014  FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy   Algorithm  Description  TRNG HardwareTRNGusedtoseedtheFIPSapprovedDRBG. AES(Cert.#2721,keywrapping;keyestablishmentmethodologyprovides128 KeyWrap to256bitsofencryptionstrength) Table 6 – Non‐Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions  Sm@rtCaféExpert7.0  Page13of21 FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy Version1.0  25.07.2014  FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy 3.1 CriticalSecurityParametersandPublicKeys AllCSPsandpublickeysusedbythemodulearedescribedinthissection.Inthetables below, the OS prefix denotes operating system, the SD prefix denotes the GlobalPlatform Security Domain, the DAP prefix denotes the GlobalPlatform Data AuthenticationProtocol,andtheDEMprefixdenotesaDemonstrationAppletCSP. CSP  Description / Usage  OS-RNG-STATE 384bitvalue;thecurrentRNGstate. SD-KENC AES-128,AES-192,AES-256MasterkeyusedtogenerateSD-SENC. SD-KMAC AES-128,AES-192,AES-256MasterkeyusedtogenerateSD-SMAC. SD-KDEK AES-128,AES-192,AES-256SensitivedatadecryptionkeyusedtodecryptCSPs. AES-128,AES-192,AES-256Sessionencryptionkeyusedtoencrypt/decryptsecure SD-SENC channeldata. AES-128,AES-192,AES-256SessionMACkeyusedtoverifyinboundsecurechannel SD-SMAC dataintegrity. AES-128,AES-192,AES-256SessionMACkeyusedtoverifyresponsesecure SD-SRMAC channeldataintegrity. AES-128,AES-192,AES-256authenticationkeyusedbytheManageContent DAP-SYM service. An8bytePINvalueallowingall256valuesforeachbyte,usedbythePIN DEM-AUTH Authenticationservice.Themodulealwayschecksall8bytesofthePIN. ECP-256privatekeyusedtodemonstratetheECCCDHsharedsecretgeneration. DEM-KAP-PRI TheKeyAgreementPrimitiveserviceallowsanyofthevalidECcurvestobeused. DEM-MAC 3-KeyTriple-DESENCorMACkeyusedbytheMessageAuthenticationservice. DSA2048bit,ECDSAP-256orRSA2048bitprivatekeyusedbytheDigital DEM-SGV-PRIV Signatureservice. Table 7 –Critical Security Parameters  Key  Description / Usage  DAP-PUB RSA2048newfirmwaresignatureverificationkey. DEM-KAP-PUB ECP-256ECDSApublickeyusedbytheKeyAgreementPrimitiveservice. DSA2048bit,ECP-256ECDSAorRSA2048bitpublickeyusedbytheDigital DEM-SGV-PUB Signatureservice. Table 8 – Public Keys  Sm@rtCaféExpert7.0  Page14of21 FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy Version1.0  25.07.2014  FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy 4 Roles, Authentication and Services   Themodule: Doesnotsupportamaintenancerole.  Clearspreviousauthenticationsonpowercycle.  SupportsGlobalPlatformSCPlogicalchannels,allowingconcurrentoperatorsina  limitedfashion. Authentication of each operator and their access to roles and services is as described below,independentoflogicalchannelusage.Onlyoneoperatoratatimeispermitted onachannel.Appletde-selection(includingCardManager),cardresetorpowerdown terminates the current authentication; re-authentication is required after any of these events for access to authenticated services. Authentication data is encrypted during entry(bySD-KDEK),andisonlyaccessiblebyauthenticatedservices. Table9listsalloperatorrolessupportedbythemodule. Role ID  Role Description  CO Cryptographic Officer – role that manages module content and configuration, including issuance and management of module data via the ISD.AuthenticatedasdescribedinSecureChannelProtocolAuthenticationin Section4.1below. User User – role for use in Demonstration applet. Authenticated as described in DemonstrationAppletAuthenticationinSection4.2below. Table 9 ‐ Roles Supported by the Module  4.1 SecureChannelProtocolAuthenticationMethod TheSecureChannelProtocolauthenticationmethodisprovidedbytheSecureChannel service.TheSD-KENCandSD-KMACkeysareusedtoderivetheSD-SENCandSD-SMAC keys,respectively.TheSD-SENC keyisusedtocreate acryptogram;theexternalentity participatinginthemutualauthenticationalsocreatesthiscryptogram.Eachparticipant compares the received cryptogram to the calculated cryptogram and if this succeeds, the two participants are mutually authenticated (the external entity is authenticated to themoduleintheCOrole). Theprobabilitythatarandomattemptwillsucceedusingthisauthenticationmethodis: Sm@rtCaféExpert7.0  Page15of21 FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy Version1.0  25.07.2014  FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy 1/2^128=2.9E-39(foranyofAES-128/192/256SD-KENC/SD-SENC,assuminga  128-bitblock) The module enforces a maximum of fifteen (15) consecutive failed SCP authentication attempts.Theprobabilitythatarandomattemptwillsucceedoveraoneminuteinterval is: 15/2^128=4.4E-38(foranyofAES-128/192/256SD-KENC/SD-SENC,assuming  a128-bitblock) 4.2 DemonstrationAppletAuthenticationMethod The Demonstration Applet Authentication method is provided by the Secure Channel servicecombinedwiththeAuthenticateservice.Themoduleacceptsan8bytePINvalue and compares all 8 bytes to a stored reference, with no restriction on character space (eachcharactercanbeanyvaluefrom0-255).Theprobabilitythatarandomattemptwill succeedusingthisauthenticationmethodis: 1/256^8=5.4E-20  Themoduleenforcesamaximumofthree(3)consecutivefailedauthenticationattempts. Theprobabilitythatarandomattemptwillsucceedoveraoneminuteintervalis: 3/256^8=1.6E-19.  Sm@rtCaféExpert7.0  Page16of21 FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy Version1.0  25.07.2014  FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy 4.3 Services Allservicesimplementedbythemodulearelistedinthetablesbelow. Service  Description  Context Selectsanappletormanagelogicalchannels. ModuleInfo Reads unprivileged data objects, e.g., module configuration or status (Unauthenticated) information. ModuleReset Powercyclesorresetsthemodule.IncludesPower-OnSelf-Test. Table 10 ‐ Unauthenticated Services  Service  CO  User  Description  Lifecycle Modifiesthecardorappletlifecyclestatus. X  Loads and installs application packages and associated  ManageContent X keysanddata. ModuleInfo Readsmoduleconfigurationorstatusinformation  X (Authenticated) (privilegeddataobjects). SecureChannel Establishesandusesasecurecommunicationschannel. X X  PINAuthentication DemonstratesPINauthenticationwithOwnerPIN. X Createsuninitializedkeyobjectsforusebythedemo  ManageApplet applet'scryptographicservices.Deleteson-cardkey X Content objects,arrays,signatureobjects. Generateskeysandinitializessymmetricandasymmetric  Keys X keyobjectsforthecryptographicservices. Demonstrates DSA, RSA, and ECDSA digital signature  DigitalSignature X generationandverification. KeyAgreement DemonstratesApprovedECCCDHprimitive(SP800-56A  X Primitive Section5.7.1.2). Message Demonstrates Triple-DES encryption, decryption and  X Authentication MAC. Demonstrates secure message digest (hash) generation  MessageDigest X (SHA-224,SHA-256,SHA-384,andSHA-512). Table 11 –Authenticated Services   Sm@rtCaféExpert7.0  Page17of21 FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy Version1.0  25.07.2014  FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy CSPs  OS-RNG-STATE  DEM-SGV-PRIV  DEM-KAP-PRI  DEM-AUTH  SD-SRMAC  DEM-MAC  SD-KMAC  DAP-SYM  SD-SMAC  SD-KENC  SD-KDEK  SD-SENC  Service  Context -- -- -- -- Z Z Z -- -- -- -- -- ModuleInfo -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- (Unauthenticated) ModuleReset GEW -- -- -- Z Z Z -- -- -- -- -- Lifecycle1 Z Z Z Z E E E Z Z Z Z Z ManageContent2 -- W W W E E E EW Z Z Z Z ModuleInfo -- -- -- -- E E E -- -- -- -- -- (Authenticated) SecureChannel EW E E -- GE GE GE -- -- -- -- -- PINAuthentication -- -- -- -- E E -- -- E -- -- -- ManageAppletContent -- -- -- -- E E -- -- -- C C C Keys EW -- -- -- E E -- -- -- GZ GZ GZ DigitalSignature EW -- -- -- E E -- -- -- -- -- GE KeyAgreementPrimitive EW -- -- -- E E -- -- -- GE -- -- MessageAuthentication -- -- -- -- E E -- -- -- -- E -- MessageDigest -- -- -- -- E E -- -- -- -- -- -- Table 12 –Access to CSPs by Service   G=Generate:ThemodulegeneratestheCSP.  C=Create:Themoduleuninitializeskeyobjectsforsignatureandcipheralgorithms.  R=Read:ThemodulereadstheCSP(readaccesstotheCSPbyanoutsideentity).  E=Execute:ThemoduleexecutesusingtheCSP.  W = Write: The module writes the CSP. The write access is typically performed after a CSP is importedintothemoduleorwhenthemoduleoverwritesanexistingCSP.  Z=Zeroize:ThemodulezeroizestheCSP.FortheContextservice,SDsessionkeysaredestroyed onappletdeselect(channelclosure)  --=Notaccessedbytheservice.                                                               1  Zeroize in this row corresponds to card termination.  2  Zeroize in this row corresponds to the Demonstration Applet deletion.  Sm@rtCaféExpert7.0  Page18of21 FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy Version1.0  25.07.2014  FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy 5 Self‐test  5.1 Power-OnSelf-tests Onpower-onorreset,themoduleperformsself-testsasdescribedinTable13below.All KATs must be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the module.IfoneoftheKATsfails,thesystememitsanerrorcode(0x6666)andentersthe SELF-TESTERRORstate. Test Target  Description  Firmware 16bitReed-SolomonEDCperformedoverallcodeinthe Integrity cryptographicboundary. DRBG PerformsafixedinputKAT. PerformsseparateencryptanddecryptKATsusing3-KeyTriple-DESin Triple-DES ECBmode. AES PerformsadecryptKATusinganAES-128keyinECBmode. PerformsaKATofSP800-108KDF.Thisself-testisinclusiveofAES SP800-108KDF CMACandAESencryptfunctionself-test. PerformsseparateRSAsignatureandverifyKATsusinganRSA2048- RSA bitkey. RSACRT PerformsRSACRTsignatureKATsusinganRSA2048-bitkey. ECDSA PerformspairwiseconsistencytestusingtheP-521curve. SHA-1 PerformsafixedinputKAT. SHA-256 PerformsafixedinputKAT. SHA-256(2) PerformsafixedinputKATforthe2ndSHA-256implementation. SHA-512 PerformsafixedinputKAT. DSA PerformsapairwiseconsistencytestusingaDSA2048-bitkey. Primitive“Z”ComputationKATfor[SP800-56A]Section5.7.1.2ECC ECCCDH CDHPrimitiveusingtheP-521curve. Table 13 – Power‐On Self‐Test  Sm@rtCaféExpert7.0  Page19of21 FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy Version1.0  25.07.2014  FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy 5.2 ConditionalSelf-tests On every call to the DRBG, the module performs the AS09.42 continuous RNG test to assurethattheoutputisdifferentthanthepreviousvalue.IfthecontinuousRNGtest fails, the module enters the SELF-TEST ERROR state. The TRNG hardware includes a continuous comparison test, such that each word formed is compared to the previous value;aduplicatevalueisdiscarded,andtheTRNGstatusindicatesnotready. When an RSA, DSA or ECDSA key pair is generated the module performs a pairwise consistency test. If the pairwise consistency test fails, the module enters the SELF-TEST ERRORstate. When new firmware is loaded into the module using the Manage Content service, the module verifies the integrity of the new firmware (applet) using MAC verification with the SD-SMAC key. Optionally, the module may also verify a signature of the new firmware(applet)usingtheDAP-SV-PUBpublickeyortheDAP-SYMkey;thesignature block in this scenario is generated by an external entity using the private key corresponding to DAP-SV-PUB or the symmetric DAP-SYM. Failure to verify the new firmwareresultsintheBADAPDUerrorstate;themodulereturnsanerrorspecifictothe situation(MACfailureorDAPfailure).   Sm@rtCaféExpert7.0  Page20of21 FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy Version1.0  25.07.2014  FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy 6 Physical Security Policy   Themoduleisasingle-chipimplementationthatmeetscommercial-gradespecifications for power, temperature, reliability, and shock/vibrations. The module was tested at ambienttemperatureonly. The module is intended to be mounted in additional packaging; physical inspection of thedieistypicallynotpracticalafterpackaging. 7 Electromagnetic Interference and Compatibility (EMI/EMC)  The module conforms to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by part 47 Code of FederalRegulations,Part15,SubpartB,UnintentionalRadiators,DigitalDevices,ClassB. 8 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy  Themoduleimplementsdefensesagainst: Physicalattacks  Side-channelattacks(SPA/DPAandtiminganalysis)  Differentialfaultanalysis(DFA)  9 Security Rules and Guidance  Themoduleimplementationalsoenforcesthefollowingsecurityrules: Noadditionalinterfaceorserviceisimplementedbythemodulewhichwould  provideaccesstoCSPs. Dataoutputisinhibitedduringkeygeneration,self-tests,zeroization,anderror  states. TherearenorestrictionsonwhichkeysorCSPsarezeroizedbythezeroization  service. Themoduledoesnotsupportmanualkeyentry,outputplaintextCSPs,oroutput  intermediatekeyvalues. StatusinformationdoesnotcontainCSPsorsensitivedatathatifmisusedcouldlead  toacompromiseofthemodule.   Sm@rtCaféExpert7.0  Page21of21 FIPS140-2Non-ProprietarySecurityPolicy Version1.0  25.07.2014