Postal mRevenector CA 2012 - Security Policy Security Policy Postal mRevenector CA 2012 Version 1.4 Hardware P/N: 580036020300/01 Firmware Version: Bootloader: 90.0036.0201.00/2011485001 Softwareloader: 90.0036.0206.00/2011485001 CA Application: 90.0036.0211.00/2013032001 Francotyp-Postalia GmbH Development Department Hasbi Kabacaoglu / Dirk Rosenau Triftweg 21-26 D-16547 Birkenwerder Germany Postal mRevenector CA 2012 - Security Policy Contents 1  Introduction ..............................................................................................................................3  2  Cryptographic Module Specification .............................................................................................4  3  Cryptographic Ports, Interfaces & Excluded Components ...............................................................5  4  Rules of Operation .....................................................................................................................6  5  Roles, Services, Authentication & Identification ............................................................................8  6  Physical Security ...................................................................................................................... 12  7  Cryptographic Functions ........................................................................................................... 13  8  Cryptographic Keys and Critical Security Parameters ................................................................... 14  9  Self-Tests ................................................................................................................................ 17  10  Mitigating Other Attacks ........................................................................................................ 19  Figures Figure: 1 Postal mRevenector CA 2012 ...............................................................................................3  Tables Table 1: FIPS 140-2 Security Levels ...................................................................................................4  Table 2: Cryptographic Ports & Types ................................................................................................5  Table 3: Services and Roles............................................................................................................. 10  Table 4: Cryptographic Functions ..................................................................................................... 13  Table 5: Critical Security Parameters ................................................................................................ 15  Table 6: FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Algorithm Tests ........................................................................... 17  - page 2 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector CA 2012 - Security Policy 1 Introduction 1.1 Overview Francotyp-Postalia (FP) is one of the leading global suppliers of mail center solutions. A major component of the business of FP is the development, manufacture and support of postal franking machines (postage meters). These postal franking machines incorporate a postal security device (PSD) that performs all postage meter cryptographic and postal security functions and which protects both Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) and Postal Relevant Data Items (PRDIs) from unauthorized access. The Postal mRevenector CA Figure: 1 Postal mRevenector CA 2012 2012 is FP’s latest generation of PSD. This document forms a Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the cryptographic module of the device under the terms of the NIST FIPS 140-2 validation. This Security Policy specifies the security rules under which this device operates. 1.2 Implementation The Postal mRevenector CA 2012 is a multiple-chip embedded cryptographic module, based around a cryptographic integrated circuit, together with a small number of support components. The components, mounted on a PCB, are covered by hard opaque potting material. The module has a proprietary electrical connector forming the interface to the module. - page 3 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector CA 2012 - Security Policy 2 Cryptographic Module Specification 2.1 FIPS Security Level Compliance The cryptographic module is designed to meet FIPS 140-2 as shown in the table below: Section Security Requirement Level 1 Cryptographic Module Specification 3 2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 3 3 Roles, Services and Authentication 3 4 Finite State Model 3 5 Physical Security 3 + EFP/EFT 6 Operational Environment N/A 7 Cryptographic Key Management 3 8 Electromagnetic Interference/ Electromagnetic 3 Compatibility (EMI/IMC) 9 Self-Tests 3 10 Design Assurance 3 11 Mitigation of Other Attacks 3 Table 1: FIPS 140-2 Security Levels - page 4 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector CA 2012 - Security Policy 3 Cryptographic Ports, Interfaces & Excluded Components 3.1 Physical Interface The cryptographic module uses a 36 pin card edge connector. The usage of these physical ports for FIPS 140-2 logical interfaces is detailed in the table below: Type Pin Data Input A4, A5, A10, A11, A12, A13, A14, A15 Data Output A4, A5, A10, A11, A12, A13, A14, A15 Control Input A4, A5, A8, A9, A10, A11, A12, A13, A14, A15 Status Output A2, A3, A4, A5, A10, A11, A12, A13, A14, A15 Power A1, A6, A7, A16, A17, A18, B1, B7, B8, B9, B10, B11, B16, B17, B18 Not Used B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B12, B13, B14, B15 Table 2: Cryptographic Ports & Types 3.2 Cryptographic boundary The cryptographic boundary is defined to be the outer edge of both the epoxy covered printed circuit board and the exposed battery. The battery is excluded from the requirements of FIPS 140-2. It is connected to the circuitry of the module in such a way that it cannot be used to compromise the security of the module. - page 5 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector CA 2012 - Security Policy 4 Rules of Operation 4.1 FIPS 140-2 Related Security Rules The Postal mRevenector CA 2012 shall: 1. Support only an Approved mode of operation. 2. Not allow unauthenticated operators to have any access to the module’s cryptographic services. 3. Inhibit data output during self-tests and error states. 4. Logically disconnect data output from the processes performing zeroization and key generation. 5. Enforce identity-based authentication for roles that access Approved algorithms and CSPs. 6. Not retain the authentication of an operator following power-off or reboot. 7. Support the following roles: Default User, User, and Cryptographic Officer. 8. Not permit the output of plaintext cryptographic keys or other CSPs. 9. Not support a bypass mode or maintenance mode. 10. Perform the self-test as described in section 9 of this document. 11. Support the following logically distinct interfaces:  Data input interface  Data output interface  Control input interface  Status output interface  Power interface. 12. Implement all software using a high-level language, except the limited use of low-level languages to enhance performance. 13. Protect critical security parameters from unauthorized disclosure, modification and substitution. 14. Provide means to ensure that a key entered into or stored within the device is associated with the correct entities to which the key is assigned. 15. Support a FIPS approved deterministic random bit generator (DRBG) as specified in NIST 800-90 section 10.2.1 16. Perform the self tests listed in section 9 during power-on and on-demand when the corresponding service is used. 17. Store an error indication whenever an error state is entered. As a result the error indication can be read by the Get Device Status Service. 18. Not perform any cryptographic functions while in an error state. 19. Not support multiple concurrent operators. - page 6 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector CA 2012 - Security Policy 4.2 CPC Related Security Rules Based on the specifications of the Canada Post Corporation (CPC) the Postal mRevenector CA 2012 shall: 20. Protect the postal registers against unauthorized substitution or modification. 21. Never zeroize the postal registers. 22. Comply with the specifications of the Canada Post Corporation (CPC). 23. Provide mechanisms to disable the Accounting-Service when it has no connection with its partnering infrastructure on a regular basis. 24. Provide services for protecting postal related data inside its hosting system against unauthorized substitution or modification. - page 7 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector CA 2012 - Security Policy 5 Roles, Services, Authentication & Identification 5.1 Roles The Postal mRevenector CA 2012 supports three distinct roles:  Default User  User  Cryptographic Officer Any services which do not read, update, modify or generate critical security parameters (CSPs) do not require authentication. 5.2 Default User Role By default the device enters the Default user role, which is an unauthenticated role, for services that do not require authentication. The Host System typically acts on behalf of the Default operator and can request unauthenticated services. 5.3 User Role The User is authenticated using an identity based authentication method. This method is based on a three way handshake protocol using secret pass phrases and user identifications (UIDs) known to both parties. The Host System typically acts on behalf of the User and can request authenticated services. 5.4 Cryptographic Officer Role The Cryptographic Officer is authenticated using an identity based authentication method based on an RSA signature verification process, which utilizes a 2048-bit RSA public key over the CO’s identifier. This method uses two pairs of asymmetric keys and two distinguished names. The public parts and distinguished names are each known to the other party. In this way, the PSD and the infrastructure are able to identify and authenticate themselves to the other by verifying the exchanged distinguished name and signature. In addition the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol is used to establish secret keys that may be used for further key encryption and authentication of data exchange. The Cryptographic Officer role shall provide those services necessary to initialize, authorize and validate the Postal mRevenector CA 2012. This role provides those services which enter, modify or generate critical security parameters. A Francotyp-Postalia Infrastructure server typically acts on behalf of a Cryptographic Officer. 5.5 Services and Roles The following services are offered by the cryptographic module: Approved Associated CSPs Roles Note Service Security Functions Used Get Device Status None None Default User Echo None None Default User Echoes back data payload. - page 8 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector CA 2012 - Security Policy Approved Associated CSPs Roles Note Service Security Functions Used Enters postal configuration Postal Module data and registers the module AES-CBC, HMAC-256 None User Registration in the country and initializes the module for postal usage. Service to cause the device to Reboot Device None None Default User reboot. Default User Scrap None None Zeroizes all plaintext CSPs. Default User Enters postal configuration Setup Parameter None None data. Default User Self-test All listed in chapter 6 None Logoff None None CO, User Leaves the CO or User role. AES-CBC, Required to enter Required to enter the User Local Login HMAC-SHA256, Passphrase the User role role. DRBG PSD Transport Key Pair, KAS, PSD Keys Pair, DSA Key Generation PKM Public Key Required to enter Required to enter the CO Remote Login RSA 2048 Sign & Remote Session the CO role role. Verify with SHA-256, Encryption Key DRBG Remote Session Authentication Key Verify Mac None FP Mac Secret User Authenticates a data payload. RSA 2048 Sign/Verify PSD Key Pair using SHA-256, Remote Session Initialize the device according Postal Initialization 3TDES CBC, Encryption Key CO to the CPC requirements. HMAC-SHA1, Remote Session DRBG Authentication Key Authorize the device HMAC-SHA1, Remote Session Postal Authorization CO according to the CPC DRBG Authentication Key requirements. Indicia Key Pair, SecurityCode Key, ECDSA-P192, Finance service, managing Postage Value Remote Session 3TDES CBC, CO postal funds, re-keying indicia Download Encryption Key HMAC-SHA1 keys Remote Session Authentication Key ECDSA-P192, Indicia Signing Key, Debits the postal funds and Accounting User HMAC-SHA1 SecurityCode Key returns indicia content. Remote Session 3TDES CBC, Encryption Key & Finance service, managing Postage Value Refund CO HMAC-SHA1 Remote Session postal funds. Authentication Key Remote Session Updates customer Re-Authorization HMAC-SHA1 CO Authentication Key configuration data Remote Session Updates postal configuration Re-Initialization HMAC-SHA1 CO Authentication Key data Remote Session Encryption Key & 3TDES CBC, Enters FP Mac Secret used to Reenter FP Mac Secret Remote Session CO HMAC-SHA1 authenticate proprietary data Authentication Key FP Mac Secret - page 9 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector CA 2012 - Security Policy Approved Associated CSPs Roles Note Service Security Functions Used PSD Key Pair, 3TDES CBC, RSA 2048 Remote Session Sign/Verify using Rekey PSD key Encryption Key CO SHA-256, Remote Session HMAC-SHA1, DRBG Authentication Key RSA 2048 Verify using Renew PKM key None CO Loads signed PKM certificate SHA-256 Remote Session 3TDES CBC, Encryption Key Echoes back data payload Secure Echo CO HMAC-SHA1 Remote Session within a secure session. Authentication Key Remote Session Secure Update 3TDES CBC, Encryption Key Updates security relevant CO Parameters HMAC-SHA1 Remote Session postal configuration data. Authentication Key Remote Session Provides status within a Secure Get Status HMAC-SHA1 CO Authentication Key secure session. Remote Session Synchronizes the RTC within Secure Set Time HMAC-SHA1 CO Authentication Key a secure session. AES-CBC, HMAC- SHA256 Sign postal related items and Sign PMD Data Private PMD Key User RSA 2048 Sign using communication data. SHA-256 Receives firmware from an RSA- PKCS#1 V1.5 Working Encryption Program FLASH external source and programs verification using Working Authentication User with Firmware it into the cryptographic 2048 and SHA-256 keys module’s FLASH memory. Select Programmed None None Default User Configures the bootloader. Firmware Table 3: Services and Roles 5.6 Authentication Strength 5.6.1 Cryptographic Officer Role The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur shall be less than one in 1,000,000. This is achieved through use of a 2048 bit RSA key to authenticate the role, which has been determined to have an effective strength of 112-bits. The probability that a random attempt will succeed is therefore 1/(2112), which is less than 1/1,000,000. Should multiple attempts be made to authenticate during a one-minute period, the probability shall be less than one in 100,000 that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur. This is achieved by inserting a delay of 1 second after any failed attempt resulting in a maximum of 60 attempts per minute. The probability is therefore 60/(2112), which is less than 1/100,000. 5.6.2 User Role The passphrase contains at least 6 randomly chosen characters for the User resulting in a total of more than 626 combinations (alphanumeric input). The probability that a random attempt will succeed is therefore 1/(626), which is less than 1/1,000,000. Should multiple attempts be made to authenticate during a one-minute period, the probability shall be less than one in 100,000 that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur. This is - page 10 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector CA 2012 - Security Policy achieved by inserting a delay of 1 second after any failed attempt resulting in a maximum of 60 attempts per minute. The probability is therefore 60/(626), which is less than 1/100,000. - page 11 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector CA 2012 - Security Policy 6 Physical Security All the components of the device, except the battery and the card edge connector, are covered with a hard, tamper-evident potting material, which is opaque within the visible spectrum. Because of the potting material it is not possible to physically access any internal components without seriously damaging the module or causing zeroization. Hardness testing was performed at ambient temperature; no assurance is provided for Level 3 hardness conformance at any other temperature. - page 12 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector CA 2012 - Security Policy 7 Cryptographic Functions The module has one mode of operation, the FIPS mode of operation. It implements the following FIPS approved algorithms: Security Function Usage Certificate SHA-1, SHA-256 Hashing NIST Certificate #1346 DRBG On key generation NIST Certificate #61 AES 128 (EBC & CBC) On data encryption and authentication NIST Certificate #1493 HMAC-SHA-1, On message authentication, on indicia NIST Certificate #878 HMAC-SHA-256 authentication Key Agreement Scheme On key establishment (provides 112 bits of NIST Certificate #16 SP800-56A security strength) RSA PKCS#1 V1.5 Signature On signature verification NIST Certificate #732 Verification using RSA 2048 and SHA-256 RSA PKCS#1 V1.5 Signature On signature verification or generation NIST Certificate #785 Generation or Verification using RSA 2048 and SHA-256 ECDSA (P-192 Curve) On indicia signature generation NIST Certificate #185 TDES (ECB & CBC) On data encryption and decryption NIST Certificate #1122 DSA On key generation for KAS NIST Certificate #522 Table 4: Cryptographic Functions The module has the following non-approved security functions:  Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator (NDRNG), used for seeding the DRBG.  Automated key output via a secure session based on TDES CBC (Cert. #1122) and HMAC-SHA-1 (Cert. #878) (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength) - page 13 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector CA 2012 - Security Policy 8 Cryptographic Keys and Critical Security Parameters The following section lists the critical and public security parameters that are retained by the device. Critical Security Parameters The table below lists the critical security parameters: Name Algorithm Storage Generation Establishment Destruction Purpose DRBG State CTR_DRBG Encrypted Seeded by N/A N/A Internal state of the using AES internal Deterministic 128 NDRNG Random Bit Generator. Data Encryption AES CBC 128 Plaintext Internal N/A Scrap service Serve to encrypt and Master Key bits DRBG or tamper decrypt critical event security parameters. Data HMAC- Plaintext Internal N/A Scrap service Serve to Authentication SHA256 DRBG or tamper authenticate critical Master Key event security parameters. (128 bit key) Working Plaintext Internal N/A Scrap service, Serve to encrypt and AES CBC 128 Encryption Key DRBG tamper event decrypt other bits or power cycle internally used data. Working Plaintext Internal N/A Scrap service, Serve to HMAC- Authentication Key DRBG tamper event authenticate other SHA256 or power cycle internally used data. Data Encryption Encrypted Internal N/A N/A Serve to encrypt and AES CBC 128 Key DRBG decrypt other bits internally stored critical security parameters. Data HMAC- Encrypted Internal N/A N/A Serve to Authentication-Key SHA256 DRBG authenticate other internally stored (128 bit key) critical security parameters. Transport Signing RSA PKCS#1 Encrypted Internal N/A N/A Serves to properly (private) Key V1.5 - 2048 DRBG identify device after shipping and to establish initial secure session. PMD Signing RSA PKCS#1 Encrypted Internal N/A N/A Used to support (private) Key V1.5 - 2048 DRBG hosting device during its authentication services. PSD Signing RSA PKCS#1 Encrypted Internal N/A N/A Serves to setup (private) Key V1.5 - 2048 DRBG regular secure sessions. Indicia Signing ECDSA Encrypted Internal N/A N/A Serves to sign indicia (private) Key P-192 DRBG (barcode part). Security Code Key HMAC-SHA1 Encrypted Internal Encrypted Output N/A Serves to (128 bit key) DRBG authenticate indicia (human readable part). - page 14 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector CA 2012 - Security Policy Name Algorithm Storage Generation Establishment Destruction Purpose Ephemeral Diffie- KAS SP800- Not Internal N/A Zeroized after Serves to derive Hellman (private) 56A - 2048 persistently DRBG use session keys for the Key stored Cryptographic Officer. Remote Session HMAC -SHA1 Not N/A Key Agreement/ Zeroized after Serves to Authentication Key persistently Derivation use authenticate data stored during a remote (160 bit key, 112 secure session (CO bits of strength) role) Remote Session 3TDES-CBC Not N/A Key Agreement/ Zeroized after Serves to encrypt Encryption Key persistently Derivation use and decrypt data stored during a remote (192 bit key, 112 secure session (CO bits of strength) role). FP Mac Secret N/A Encrypted N/A Encrypted Entry N/A Used to authenticate proprietary data Passphrase N/A Encrypted N/A N/A N/A Used for User Identity based authentication Table 5: Critical Security Parameters - page 15 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector CA 2012 - Security Policy Public Security Parameters. The following public keys are stored in the device: Name of certificate Algorithm Storage Generation Purpose or public key FPRootCACert & public 2048 bit RSA Plaintext N/A Serves to authenticate FDC and PKM keys key key FDCCert & public key 2048 bit RSA Plaintext N/A Serves to authenticate TransportKey key PKMCert & public key 2048 bit RSA Plaintext N/A Serves to authenticate Cryptographic Officer key TransportCert & public 2048 bit RSA Plaintext Internal Serves to initially authenticate Postal key key DRBG mRevenector CA 2012 PSDKey (certificate & 2048 bit RSA Plaintext Internal Serves to authenticate Postal mRevenector CA public key) key DRBG 2012 IndiciaKey ECDSA Plaintext Internal Serves to verify indicia (public key) P-192 DRBG RootCABCCert & 2048 bit RSA Plaintext N/A Serves to authenticate FDCBC and PMD keys public key key FDCBCCert & 2048 bit RSA Plaintext N/A Serves to authenticate PMDKey public key key PMDKeyCert & 2048 bit RSA Plaintext Internal Used to support hosting device during its public key key DRBG authentication services. Firmware Verification 2048 bit RSA Plaintext N/A Used to verify firmware from Francotyp- Key key Postalia. - page 16 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector CA 2012 - Security Policy 9 Self-Tests 9.1 Power on self tests The following self tests are performed when the Postal mRevenector CA 2012 starts: Firmware Integrity Test The mRevenector checks the SHA 256 hash of the Postal mRevenector CA 2012 firmware of the cryptographic module and verifies this against a known signature generated with PKCS#1 V1.5 (Signature Scheme). Cryptographic Algorithm Tests The following table lists the cryptographic algorithm tests for approved security functions that are performed as part of the power-on self tests. For corresponding NIST certificates see Table 4. Security Function Type of self-test ECDSA (P-192 Curve) Sign and Verify Test DBRG Known answer test (KAT) AES 128 (ECB & CBC) KAT HMAC-SHA-1 & HMAC-SHA-256 KAT (includes SHA tests) Key Agreement Scheme KAT RSA 2048 bit Sign/Verify using SHA-256 KAT RSA 2048 bit Verify using SHA-256 KAT TDES (ECB & CBC) KAT Table 6: FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Algorithm Tests Register Consistency Test This test checks the consistency of the redundantly stored postal registers. 9.2 Conditional Tests The following conditional tests are performed: Security Function Performed CTR-DBRG and NDRNG On usage: see FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 “Continuous RNG test 1”. Diffie-Hellmann Key Agreement On key establishment: see FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 “Pair-wise consistency test 2”. RSA 2048 bit using SHA-256 On key generation: see FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 “Pair-wise consistency test 2”. - page 17 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector CA 2012 - Security Policy Security Function Performed ECDSA (P-192 Curve) On key generation: see FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 “Pair-wise consistency test 2”. Firmware Loading Test On loading of programmed firmware: Performs RSA 2048 SHA 256 signature verification Continuous DRBG Test The cryptographic module uses a Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) based on a block cipher algorithm as specified in the recommendation NIST SP 800-90. The implemented CTR DRBG uses AES- 128 as its cryptographic function. The entropy input is at least 128 Bits. The DRBG uses a hardware- based random number generator as the entropy source. Consecutive outputs of the DRBG are compared to ensure that they differ. The module has a single, non-approved algorithm, its hardware implemented NDRNG. Consecutive outputs of the NDRNG are compared to ensure that they differ. 9.3 Error States In the event of an error being detected, the Postal mRevenector CA 2012 enters an error state and stores the reason (error identifier) persistently. The error state information can be retrieved via the Get Device Status service. - page 18 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector CA 2012 - Security Policy 10 Mitigating Other Attacks The device includes environmental failure protection means for the battery voltage. If an attack is detected then the contents of the cryptographic IC’s battery powered key storage are automatically zeroized, leaving the module inoperable. The device is designed in such a way that temperature changes outside the normal operating ranges will not compromise the security of the device. The device includes failure protection means for the frequency of the internal Real Time Clock (RTC). If an attack is detected then the contents of the cryptographic IC’s battery powered key storage are automatically zeroized, leaving the module inoperable. The device includes failure protection means for the main input voltage, the internal core voltage, and the main clock frequency. If one of these conditions is outside a defined range the device is held in the reset condition. The cryptographic module’s processor incorporates a layer of metal shielding as one of its layers, used to detect attempts at intrusion at a die level. In the event of an intrusion attempt being detected, the contents of its battery powered key storage are automatically zeroized leaving the module inoperable. The failure protection for the battery voltage and the RTC frequency and the tamper detection for the physical breach of the module’s physical boundary are present using power from the battery even when the device is switched off. The module’s processor responds by destroying the stored plaintext CSPs. - page 19 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL