McAfee, Inc. Firewall Enterprise Control Center HW Version: FWE-C1015, FWE-C2050, FWE-C3000; FW Version: 5.2.0 FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy FIPS Security Level: 2 Document Version: 1.2 Prepared for: Prepared by: McAfee, Inc. Corsec Security, Inc. 2821 Mission College Blvd. 13135 Lee Jackson Memorial Hwy., Suite 220 Santa Clara, CA 95054 Fairfax, VA 22033 United States of America United States of America Phone: (408) 988-3832 Phone: (703) 267-6050 Email: info@mcafee.com Email: info@corsec.com http://www.mcafee.com http://www.corsec.com Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 Table of Contents 1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 4 1.1 PURPOSE ................................................................................................................................................................ 4 1.2 REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................................................... 4 1.3 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION ............................................................................................................................ 4 2 FIREWALL ENTERPRISE CONTROL CENTER .................................................................. 5 2.1 OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................................................................. 5 2.1.1 Firewall Enterprise Control Center Appliances..............................................................................................5 2.1.2 Architecture Overview ...........................................................................................................................................5 2.2 MODULE SPECIFICATION ..................................................................................................................................... 7 2.3 MODULE INTERFACES .......................................................................................................................................... 8 2.4 ROLES AND SERVICES ........................................................................................................................................... 9 2.4.1 Crypto Officer Role ............................................................................................................................................. 10 2.4.2 User Role ................................................................................................................................................................ 11 2.4.3 Authentication ....................................................................................................................................................... 12 2.5 PHYSICAL SECURITY ...........................................................................................................................................12 2.6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.........................................................................................................................16 2.7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................................16 2.8 SELF-TESTS ..........................................................................................................................................................24 2.8.1 Power-Up Self-Tests ............................................................................................................................................ 24 2.8.2 Conditional Self-Tests ......................................................................................................................................... 25 2.8.3 Critical Functions Self-Tests .............................................................................................................................. 25 2.9 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS ..................................................................................................................25 3 SECURE OPERATION ......................................................................................................... 26 3.1 CO AND USER GUIDANCE ...............................................................................................................................26 3.1.1 Initial Setup ........................................................................................................................................................... 26 3.1.2 Initialization ........................................................................................................................................................... 26 3.1.3 Configure FIPS settings ...................................................................................................................................... 27 3.1.4 Zeroization ............................................................................................................................................................ 28 3.1.5 Installation of Secure Front Bezel .................................................................................................................. 28 3.1.6 Placement of Tamper-Evident Seals.............................................................................................................. 28 3.1.7 Module’s Mode of Operation .......................................................................................................................... 29 4 ACRONYMS .......................................................................................................................... 30 Table of Figures FIGURE 1 – FIREWALL ENTERPRISE CONTROL CENTER ARCHITECTURE ...........................................................................6 FIGURE 2 – C1015 CONTROL CENTER .................................................................................................................................7 FIGURE 3 – C2050/C3000 CONTROL CENTER ...................................................................................................................7 FIGURE 4 – C1015 FRONT PANEL ..........................................................................................................................................8 FIGURE 5 – C1015 REAR PANEL PHYSICAL INTERFACES......................................................................................................8 FIGURE 6 – C2050/C3000 FRONT PANEL ............................................................................................................................9 FIGURE 7 – C2050/C3000 REAL PANEL PHYSICAL INTERFACES ........................................................................................9 FIGURE 8 – CONTROL CENTER TAMPER-EVIDENT SEALS ................................................................................................. 13 FIGURE 9 – C1015 TAMPER-EVIDENT SEAL PLACEMENT (TOP) ...................................................................................... 13 FIGURE 10 – C1015 TAMPER-EVIDENT SEAL PLACEMENT (BOTTOM) ........................................................................... 14 FIGURE 11 – C2050/C3000 TAMPER-EVIDENT SEAL PLACEMENT (TOP) ...................................................................... 14 FIGURE 12 – C2050/C3000 TAMPER-EVIDENT SEAL PLACEMENT (BOTTOM) .............................................................. 14 FIGURE 13 – C2050/C3000 POWER SUPPLY TAMPER-EVIDENT SEAL PLACEMENT (BOTTOM).................................. 15 FIGURE 14 – C1015 SECURITY BAFFLE PLACEMENT.......................................................................................................... 15 FIGURE 15 – C2050 SECURITY BAFFLE PLACEMENT.......................................................................................................... 15 McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 2 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 FIGURE 16 – C3000 SECURITY BAFFLE PLACEMENT.......................................................................................................... 16 List of Tables TABLE 1 – SECURITY LEVEL PER FIPS 140-2 SECTION .........................................................................................................7 TABLE 2 – C1015 FIPS 140-2 LOGICAL INTERFACE MAPPINGS .........................................................................................8 TABLE 3 – C2050/C3000 FIPS 140-2 LOGICAL INTERFACE MAPPINGS ...........................................................................9 TABLE 4 – CO SERVICES ....................................................................................................................................................... 10 TABLE 5 – USER SERVICES ..................................................................................................................................................... 11 TABLE 6 – AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM STRENGTH .................................................................................................... 12 TABLE 7 – CRYPTO-J FIPS-APPROVED ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATIONS ........................................................................ 16 TABLE 8 – OPENSSL FIPS-APPROVED ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATIONS ........................................................................ 17 TABLE 9 – LIST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS ................................. 19 TABLE 10 – ACRONYMS ........................................................................................................................................................ 30 McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 3 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 1 Introduction 1.1 Purpose This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Firewall Enterprise Control Center from McAfee, Inc.. This Security Policy describes how the Firewall Enterprise Control Center meets the security requirements of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-2, which details the U.S. and Canadian Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp. This document also describes how to run the module in a secure FIPS-Approved mode of operation. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 2 FIPS 140-2 validation of the module. The Firewall Enterprise Control Center is referred to in this document as Control Center crypto-module, or the module. 1.2 References This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following sources: • The McAfee website (http://www.mcafee.com) contains information on the full line of products from McAfee. • The CMVP website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140val-all.htm) contains contact information for individuals to answer technical or sales-related questions for the module. 1.3 Document Organization The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this document, the Submission Package contains: • Vendor Evidence document • Finite State Model document • Other supporting documentation as additional references This Security Policy and the other validation submission documentation were produced by Corsec Security, Inc. under contract to McAfee. With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140- 2 Submission Package is proprietary to McAfee and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact McAfee. McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 4 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 2 Firewall Enterprise Control Center 2.1 Overview Firewall Enterprise Control Center provides a central interface for simplifying the management of multiple McAfee Firewall Enterprise appliances. Control Center enables scalable centralized management and monitoring of the McAfee Firewall Enterprise solutions, allowing network administrators to centrally define firewall policy, deploy updates, inventory their firewall products, generate reports, and demonstrate regulatory compliance. The Control Center solution allows network administrators to fully mange their firewall solutions from the network edge to the core. Control Center can also be used to centrally monitor Firewall Enterprise audit stream data, providing a high level overview of network activity and behavior, which can be further filtered to individual appliances, devices, groups, and users. For geographically diverse or multi-tenant deployments, Control Center allows network administrators to define Configuration Domains, and segment firewall policies between them. Network administrators access Control Center server functionality in several ways. Primary management of the solution is done via the Control Center Client Application (also referred as GUI1), which is designed to run on an administrator’s workstation. Additionally, subsets of management functionality including reporting and status monitoring are exported to McAfee’s ePolicy Orchestrator via a common Application Programming Interface (API). 2.1.1 Firewall Enterprise Control Center Appliances McAfee offers three variations of Firewall Enterprise Control Center hardware appliances. The lower end C1015 Control Center is a 1U chassis and is capable of managing up to fifteen Firewall Enterprise appliances. The C2050 Control Center appliance is a 1U chassis with a RAID21 hard drive set up and is capable of managing up to fifty Firewall Enterprise appliances. Lastly, the C3000 Control Center appliance is a 1U chassis with a RAID5 hard drive set up and is capable of managing 100 Firewall Enterprise appliances. The C3000 is also upgradable to manage an unlimited amount of Firewall Enterprise appliances. Firewall Enterprise Control Center is also available as a virtual appliance, capable doing everything the physical hardware appliances can do. A separate Security Policy is available for the Control Center Virtual Appliance detailing how it meets the security requirements laid out by FIPS PUB 140-2. 2.1.2 Architecture Overview The Control Center Server firmware is hosted on CGLinux secured by McAfee using RSBAC3, an open- source access control framework. The firmware is divided into five components which represent distinct functionality of the Control Center Server: • Auditing – Control Center can store audit data both locally in the file system and remotely on a secure Syslog server. Configuration of auditing behavior is conducted by an administrator using the Control Center Client Application. 1 GUI – Graphical User Interface 2 RAID – Redundant Array of Independent Disks 3 RSBAC – Rule Set Based Access Control McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 5 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 • Tomcat – Tomcat is used to facilitate communication between the Control Center server and its Client Application or firewalls within its domain. • Database – A PostgreSQL database used to store policy and configuration data. • DCS – The Data Collection Server (DCS) is used to gather alerts from the Control Center and the firewalls. The UTT4 client of the firewall sends alerts over an SSL connection to the UTT server of the server listening on port 9006. • Control Center Features – The management functionality provided to the Control Center Client includes Control Center Server and firewall backup and restore operations, provisioning of configuration domains and HA5 topologies, firmware updates, the ePolicy Orchestrator extension, and the security event manager. Figure 1 shows the basic architecture of a Control Center deployment. The red dotted line indicates the cryptographic module boundary. Figure 1 – Firewall Enterprise Control Center Architecture 4 UTT – User Datagram Protocol (UDP) over Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Tunnel 5 HA - High Availability McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 6 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 The Firewall Enterprise Control Center is validated at the following FIPS 140-2 Section levels, shown in 2 levels Table 1: Table 1 – Security Level Per FIPS 140-2 Section Section Section Title Level 1 Cryptographic Module Specification 2 2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2 3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2 4 Finite State Model 2 5 Physical Security 2 6 Operational Environment N/A 7 Cryptographic Key Management 2 6 8 EMI/EMC 2 9 Self-tests 2 10 Design Assurance 2 11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A 2.2 Module Specification The Firewall Enterprise Control Center (HW Version: FWE-C1015, FWE-C2050, FWE-C3000; FW C2050, FWE Version: 5.2.0) is a hardware module with a multiple-chip standalone embodiment. The overall security . level of the module is level 2. The physical cryptographic boundary of the Firewall Enterprise Control . Center is defined by the hard metal casing making up the physical embodiment of each individual server chassis. The dotted line in Figure 1 indicates the cryptographic boundary of the module. module Figure 2 and Figure 3 show picture of the C1015, C2050, and C3000 Control Centers respectively. pictures Center Figure 2 – C1015 Control Center Figure 3 – C2050/C3000 Control Center 6 EMI/EMC – Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 7 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 2.3 Module Interfaces The C1015, C2050, and C3000 cryptographic modules’ physical ports can be categorized into the following logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2: 140 • Data Input Interface • Data Output Interface • Control Input Interface • Status Output Interface Physical interfaces for the C1015 Control Center are described in Table 2 and shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5. The procedure for attaching the required security bezel to the front panel of the module is outlined in the ttaching Crypto Officer Guidance in Section 3 of this document. The USB7 ports will only support Control Input while the module is running in FIPS-Approved mode of operation. FIPS Figure 4 – C1015 Front Panel Figure 5 – C1015 Rear Panel Physical Interfaces Table 2 – C1015 FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mappings s Physical Quantity FIPS 140-2 Interface 2 Port/Interface • NIC8 (10/100/1000) 2 Data Input • Ports Data Output • Control Input • Status Output • PS/2 Port 2 Control Input • Serial Port (DB-9) 1 Data Input • Control Input • USB 2 Control Input • Video Connector 1 Status Output • LED 9 Status Output • Power Interface 1 Power Input 7 USB – Universal Serial Bus 8 NIC – Network Interface Controller McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 8 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 Physical interfaces for the C2050 and C3000 Control Centers are described in Table 3 and shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7. Attaching the required security bezel to the front panel of the modules is outlined in the Crypto Officer Guidance in Section 3 of this document. The USB ports will only support Control Input n while the module is running in FIPS-Approved mode of operation. FIPS Figure 6 – C2050/C3000 Front Panel Figure 7 – C2050/C3000 Real Panel Physical Interfaces Table 3 – C2050 C2050/C3000 FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mappings Mapping Physical Quantity FIPS 140-2 Interface 2 Port/Interface • NIC (10/100/1000) 2 Data Input • Ports Data Output • Control Input • Status Output • RJ-45 Management port 45 1 Control Input • Status Output • RJ-45 Serial B 1 Data Input • Connector Data Output • Control Input • Status Output • USB 4 Control Input • Video Connector 1 Status Output • LED 21 Status Output • Power Interface 2 Power Input 2.4 Roles and Services The module supports role-based authentication. There are two roles in the module (as required by FIPS based 140-2) that operators may assume: a Crypto Officer role and a User role. Each role and their corresponding 2) McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 9 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 services are detailed in the sections below. Please note that the keys and CSPs listed in the tables indicate the type of access required using the following notation: • R – Read: The CSP is read. • W – Write: The CSP is established, generated, modified, or zeroized. • X – Execute: The CSP is used within an Approved or Allowed security function or authentication mechanism. 2.4.1 Crypto Officer Role The Crypto Officer (CO) role has the ability to initialize the module for first use, run on-demand self-tests, manage operator passwords, and zeroize keys. Descriptions of the services available to the CO role are provided in Table 4 below. Table 4 – CO Services Input Output CSP and Type of Service Description Access Run self-tests Performs power-up Command and Command None on demand self-tests parameters response CA9 Public/Private Key – Module Initial configuration of Command and Command Initialization the module. parameters response and W status output Web Server Public/Private Key – W PostgreSQL Public/Private Key – W DCS Public/Private Key – W SSH Public/Private Keys – W CO Password – W User Password – W Change Change the password Command and Command CO Password – R, W Passwords for the CO and parameters response and internal database status output users Zeroize Keys Zeroize all public and Command and Command All keys – W private keys and CSPs parameters response and status output Access CLI10 Access the CLI over Command and Command CO Password – X Services Ethernet port or serial parameters response and SSH Public/Private Key – port to configure or status output R, X monitor status of the SSH Authentication Key – module R, X SSH Session Key – W, X 9 CA – Certificate Authority 10 CLI – Command Line Interface McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 10 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 2.4.2 User Role The User role has the ability to manage the Control Center through the Control Center Client Application. Services available through the application include modifying the RADIUS11 and LDAP12 configuration and connecting to a specified firewall. Descriptions of the services available to the User role are provided in the Table 5 below. Table 5 – User Services Service Description Input Output CSP and Type of Access Create System Create a restoration Command and Command None Backup File backup file parameters response and status output Restore System Restore the system Command and Command None with a system backup parameters response and file status output RADIUS Services Configure and Command and Command RADIUS credential – W, R, X manage RADIUS parameters response server authentication mechanisms LDAP Services Configure and Command and Command LDAP Credential – W, R, X manage LDAP server parameters response authentication mechanisms Firewall Services Establish connection Command and Command CA Private Key – X to the Firewall and parameters response CA Public Key – X Firewall management. DCS Private Key – X DCS Public Key – X SSH Public Key – X SSH Private Key – X SSH Session Key – W, X Change User Change the password Command and Command User Password – R, W Password of the User parameters response and status output Show Status Show status of the Command and Command None module parameters response and status output Access GUI13 Access the GUI over Command and Command User Password – X services Ethernet port to parameters response and CA Private Key – X configure or monitor status output CA Public Key – X status of the module Web Server Public/ Private Key –X Web Server Session Key – W, X PostgreSQL Public/Private Key – X PostgreSQL Session Key – W, X 11 RADIUS – Remote Authentication Dial In User Service 12 LDAP – Lightweight Directory Access Protocol 13 GUI – Graphical User Interface McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 11 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 2.4.3 Authentication The Control Center devices support role-based authentication to control access to services that require access to sensitive keys and CSPs. To perform these services, an operator must log in to the module by authenticating with the respective role’s username and secure password. The CO and User passwords are initialized by the CO as part of module initialization, as described in Section 3 (Secure Operation) of this document. Once the operator is authenticated, they will assume their respective role and carry out the available services listed in Table 4 and Table 5. Users may authenticate to the module using User-ID and passwords. Authentication Data Protection14 2.4.3.1 The module does not allow the disclosure, modification, or substitution of authentication data to unauthorized operators. Authentication data can only be modified by the operator who has assumed the CO role or User role with administrator privileges. The module hashes the operator’s password with an MD5 hash function and stores the hashed password in a password database. 2.4.3.2 Authentication Mechanism Strength Please refer to Table 6 for information on authentication mechanism strength: Table 6 – Authentication Mechanism Strength Role Authentication Type Authentication Strength Crypto Officer The minimum length of the password is eight characters, Password or User with 91 different case-sensitive alphanumeric characters and symbols possible for usage. The chance of a random attempt falsely succeeding is 1: (918), or 1: 4,702,525,276,151,521. The fastest network connection supported by the module is 100 Mbps. Hence at most (100 ×106 × 60 = 6 × 109 =) 6,000,000,000 bits of data can be transmitted in one minute. Therefore, the probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur in one minute is less than 1: [(918) / (6×109)], or 1: 783,754, which is less than 1in 100,000 as required by FIPS 140-2. 2.5 Physical Security The Firewall Enterprise Control Center is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. The module consists of production-grade components that include standard passivation techniques. The chassis of the Control Center modules is made of a hard metal, opaque within the visible spectrum. During initial setup, the CO is required to install the security baffles that are available as part of the FIPS kit. Once the baffles are installed, all ventilation holes present on the module do not present or disclose any security-relevant components when inspected. The modules contain removable covers which are protected by tamper-evident seals, as shown in Figure 8. Tamper-evident seals must be inspected periodically by the CO for tamper evidence. If the CO finds evidence of tampering, then the module is no longer FIPS compliant. The modules contain a removable, 14 “Protection” does not imply cryptographic protection McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 12 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 lockable front bezel as depicted in Figure 9 below. Lastly, the C2050 and C3000 models contain two removable power supplies that are protected by tamper-evident seals, as shown in Figure 13. Figure 8 – Control Center Tamper-Evident Seals Figure 9 and Figure 10 show proper tamper-evident seal placement on the C1015 Control Center. Figure 9 – C1015 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (Top) McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 13 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 Figure 10 – C1015 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (Bottom) Figure 11, Figure 12 and Figure 13 show proper tamper-evident seal placement on the C2050 and C3000 Control Center. Figure 11 – C2050/C3000 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (Top) Figure 12 – C2050/C3000 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (Bottom) McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 14 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 Figure 13 – C2050/C3000 Power Supply Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (Bottom) Please refer to the CO guidance in Section 3 (Secure Operation) of this document for guidance on the correct placement of the tamper-evident seals. Figure 14 shows the C1015 cryptographic module with the security baffles installed in the rear of the module. Figure 14 – C1015 Security Baffle Placement Figure 15 shows the C2050 cryptographic module with the security baffles installed in the rear of the module. Figure 15 – C2050 Security Baffle Placement McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 15 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 Figure 16 shows the C3000 cryptographic module with the security baffles installed in the rear of the module. Figure 16 – C3000 Security Baffle Placement 2.6 Operational Environment The modules employ a non-modifiable operating environment, thus the operational environment requirements do not apply to the Firewall Enterprise Control Center. 2.7 Cryptographic Key Management The module implements the FIPS-Approved algorithms listed in Table 7 and Table 8 below. Table 7 – Crypto-J FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations Certificate Algorithm Number AES15 – ECB16, CBC17, CFB18(128), OFB19(128): 128, 192 and 1897 256 bit key sizes Triple-DES20 – ECB, CBC, CFB(64), OFB(64): KO21 1, 2 1233 RSA ANSI22 X9.31, PKCS23#1(v1.5, 2.1) Signature 972 Generation/Verification – 1024, 1536 , 2048 , 3072 , 4096 RSA24 ANSI X9.31 Key Generation – 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 972 4096 DSA25 Key Generation – 1024 599 DSA PQG Generation/Verification – 1024 599 DSA Signature Generation/Verification – 1024 599 26 SHA -1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 1666 15 AES – Advanced Encryption Standard 16 ECB – Electronic Code Book 17 CBC – Cipher Block Chaining 18 CFB – Cipher Feedback 19 OFB – Output Feedback 20 DES – Data Encryption Standard 21 KO – Keying Option 22 ANSI – American National Standards Institute 23 PKCS – Public-Key Cryptography Standards 24 RSA – Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman 25 DSA – Digital Signature Algorithm 26 SHA – Secure Hash Algorithm McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 16 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. 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Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 Certificate Algorithm Number HMAC27-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC- 1137 SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512 SP28 800-38C based CCM29 1897 SP 800-38D based GCM30 1897 FIPS 186-2 PRNG 1009 31 SP800-90 HMAC DRBG 163 SP800-90 Dual EC32 DRBG 163 Table 8 – OpenSSL FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations Certificate Algorithm Number AES – ECB, CBC, CFB(8), CFB(128), OFB, : 128, 192, and 256 1831 bit key sizes Triple-DES – ECB, CBC, CFB(8), CFB(64), OFB: KO1,2 1184 DSA Key Generation: 1024-bit 575 DSA Signature Generation/Verification – Mod (1024) 575 RSA ANSI X9.31 Key Generation – 1024 to 4096-bit 920 RSA ANSI X9.31, PKCS #1.5, PSS sign/verify – 1024 to 4096-bit 920 SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 1611 HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC- 1085 SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512 ANSI X9.31 Appendix A.2.4 PRNG using AES 963 Additionally, the module utilizes the following non-FIPS-approved algorithm implementation allowed for use in a FIPS-approved mode of operation: • Diffie-Hellman 1024 bits key (PKCS#3, key agreement/key establishment methodology provides 80 bits of encryption strength) • RSA 1024-bit to 4096-bit key encrypt/decrypt (PKCS#1, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 80-150 bits of encryption strength) • MD533 for hashing passwords Additional information concerning SHA-1, Diffie-Hellman key agreement/key establishment, RSA key signatures, RSA key transport, two-key Triple-DES, ANSI X9.31 PRNG and specific guidance on 27 HMAC – (keyed) Hash-based Message Authentication Code 28 SP – Special Publication 29 CCM – Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code 30 GCM – Galois/Counter Mode 31 DRBG – Deterministic Random Bit Generator 32 EC – Elliptical Curve 33 MD – Message Digest McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 17 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 transitions to the use of stronger cryptographic keys and more robust algorithms is contained in NIST Special Publication 800-131A. McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 18 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 The module supports the critical security parameters (CSPs) listed below in Table 9 Table 9 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use CA Public Key RSA-2048 Public key Generated internally Exits the module Stored on disk in Zeroized when the The CA public key is used for during module in plaintext plaintext, inside the module firmware is TLS client certificate installation process module reinstalled authentication CA Private RSA-2048 Private key Generated internally Never exits the Stored on disk in Zeroized when the It is used to sign certificates that Key during module module plaintext, inside the module firmware is are used by various components installation process module reinstalled (such as the web server and DCS) of the module. It is also used to sign firewall certificates during firewall registration (SCEP) process. The CA private key is used to decrypt the secret key contained in digital envelope sent by a firewall to the module during SCEP. The private key is used to sign digital envelope sent by the module to the firewall during SCEP Web Server RSA-2048 Public key The module’s public Exits the module Stored on disk in Zeroized when the It is used for TLS server Public Key key is generated in plaintext plaintext, inside the module firmware is authentication internally during module reinstalled module installation process; a peer’s public key enters the module in plaintext within a certificate Web Server RSA-2048 Private key Generated internally Never exits the Stored on disk in Zeroized when the It is used for TLS server Private Key during module module plaintext, inside the module firmware is authentication installation process module reinstalled McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 19 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. 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Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use Web Server TLS session key Generated internally Never exits the Stored inside the Zeroized on session It is used for Session Key (AES-256, AES-128, during the TLS module volatile memory in termination as well encrypting/decrypting the Triple-DES) handshake plaintext, inside the as when the module inbound and outbound traffic module firmware is during the TLS session reinstalled PostgreSQL RSA-2048 Public key The module’s public Exits the module Stored on disk in Zeroized when the It is used by the PostgreSQL Public Key key is generated in plaintext plaintext, inside the module firmware is server for TLS Server internally; a peer’s module reinstalled authentication public key enters the module in plaintext within a certificate PostgreSQL RSA-2048 Private key Generated internally Never exits the Stored on disk in Zeroized when the It is used by the PostgreSQL Private Key during module module plaintext, inside the module firmware is server for TLS Server installation process module reinstalled authentication PostgreSQL TLS session key Generated internally Never exits the Stored inside the Zeroized on session It is used for Session Key (AES-256, AES-128, during the TLS module volatile memory in termination as well encrypting/decrypting the Triple-DES) handshake plaintext, inside the as when the module inbound and outbound traffic module is reinstalled during the TLS session DCS Public RSA-2048 Public key The module’s public Exits the module Stored on disk in Zeroized when the It is used by the UTT server for Key key is generated in plaintext plaintext, inside the module firmware is authentication with firewalls internally; a peer’s module reinstalled public key enters the module in plaintext within a certificate DCS Private RSA-2048 Private key Generated internally Never exits the Stored on disk in Zeroized when the It is used by the UTT server for Key during module module plaintext, inside the module firmware is TLS authentication with installation process module reinstalled firewalls McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 20 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use SSH Public RSA-2048 or DSA- The module’s public Exits the module Stored on disk in Zeroized when the It is used by the SSH server to Key 1024 bit Public key key is generated in plaintext plaintext, inside the module firmware is authenticate itself for incoming internally; a peer’s module reinstalled connections public key enters the module in plaintext during the initial connection SSH Private RSA-2048 or DSA- Generated internally Never exits the Stored on disk in Zeroized when the It is used by the SSH server for Key 1024 bit Private key during module module plaintext, inside the module firmware is server authentication installation process module reinstalled SSH HMAC SHA-1 Generated internally Never exits the Stored inside the Zeroized on session It is used for data authentication Authentication module volatile memory in termination as well during SSH sessions Key plaintext, inside the as when the module module firmware is reinstalled SSH Session AES-256, AES-192, Generated internally Never exits the Stored inside the Zeroized on session It is used for Key AES-128, Triple-DES module volatile memory in termination as well encrypting/decrypting the data plaintext, inside the as when the module traffic during the SSH session module firmware is reinstalled CO or User Passphrase Entered by a CO or Never exits the Stored on disk in Zeroized when the Used for authenticating all COs Password User locally or over module plaintext, inside the password is updated (over CLI) and Users (over secure TLS channel module with a new one or GUI) when the module firmware is reinstalled McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 21 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use RADIUS Alpha-numeric string Entered by a User over Never exits the Stored on database Zeroized when the This password is used by the credential GUI module in plaintext, inside module firmware is module to authenticate itself to the module reinstalled the RADIUS server. This password is required for the module to validate the credential supplied by the user with the RADIUS server LDAP Alpha-numeric string Entered by a User over Never exits the Stored on database Zeroized when the This password is used by the credential GUI module in plaintext, inside module firmware is module to authenticate itself to the module reinstalled the LDAP server. This password is required for the module to validate the credential supplied by the user with the LDAP server ANSI X9.31 16 bytes of seed Generated internally by Never leaves the Volatile memory in By power cycle or Used to generate FIPS approved PRNG seed value entropy gathering module plain text session termination random number ANSI X9.31 AES 128 Key Generated internally by Never leaves the Volatile memory in By process Used to generate FIPS approved PRNG key entropy gathering module plain text termination random number HMAC DRBG Random Value Generated internally by Never exits the Volatile memory in By power cycle Used to seed the DRBG seed FIPS 186-2 PRNG module plain text HMAC DRBG Random value Generated internally by Never exits the Volatile memory in By process Used in the process of key value FIPS 186-2 PRNG module plain text termination generating a random number HMAC DRBG Random value Generated internally by Never exits the Volatile memory in By process Used in the process of V value FIPS 186-2 PRNG module plain text termination generating a random number EC DRBG Random Value Generated internally by Never exits the Volatile memory in By power cycle Used to seed the DRBG seed FIPS 186-2 PRNG module plain text EC DRBG S Random value Generated internally by Never exits the Volatile memory in By process Used in the process of value FIPS 186-2 PRNG module plain text termination generating a random number McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 22 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use FIPS 186-2 Random value Generated internally by Never exits the Volatile Memory, in By power cycle or Used for generating random PRNG Seed entropy gathering module plain text session termination number for seeding approved DRBG FIPS 186-2 Random value Generated Internally by Never exits the Volatile Memory, in By process Used for generating random PRNG Seed entropy gathering module plain text termination number for seeding approved Key DRBG Integrity test HMAC SHA-1 key Hardcoded Never exits the Volatile memory in Zeroized when the Used to perform the firmware key (Shared secret) module plain text integrity test module firmware is reinstalled McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 23 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 2.8 Self-Tests The Control Center appliances implement two cryptographic libraries in their firmware. The libraries, acting independently from one another, perform various Self-Tests (Power-Up Self-Tests and Conditional Self-Tests) to verify their functionality and correctness. 2.8.1 Power-Up Self-Tests Power-Up Self-Tests are carried out every time the module is booted. Upon successful completion of the Power-Up Self-Tests, the success is printed in the log files as “Completed FIPS 140 self checks successfully” and then the module will transition to normal operation. Should either of the independent library’s Power-Up Self-Test fail, the module will enter an error state and the library will cause the module to cease operation. To recover, the module must be reinstalled. The Firewall Enterprise Control Center performs the following self-tests at power-up: • Firmware integrity check (HMAC SHA-1) • Approved Algorithm Tests o Crypto-J AES KAT34 o OpenSSL AES KAT o Crypto-J Triple-DES KAT o OpenSSL Triple-DES KAT o Crypto-J RSA KAT o OpenSSL RSA KAT o Crypto-J DSA pair-wise consistency test o OpenSSL DSA pair-wise consistency test o Crypto-J SHA-1 KAT o OpenSSL SHA-1 KAT o Crypto-J SHA-224 KAT o OpenSSL SHA-224 KAT o Crypto-J SHA-256 KAT o OpenSSL SHA-256 KAT o Crypto-J SHA-384 KAT o OpenSSL SHA-384 KAT o Crypto-J SHA-512 KAT o OpenSSL SHA-512 KAT o Crypto-J HMAC SHA-1 KAT o OpenSSL HMAC SHA-1 KAT o Crypto-J HMAC SHA-224 KAT o OpenSSL HMAC SHA-224 KAT o Crypto-J HMAC SHA-256 KAT o OpenSSL HMAC SHA-256 KAT o Crypto-J HMAC SHA-384 KAT o OpenSSL HMAC SHA-384 KAT o Crypto-J HMAC SHA-512 KAT o OpenSSL HMAC SHA-512 KAT o SP800-90 Dual EC DRBG KAT o SP800-90 HMAC DRBG KAT o ANSI X9.31 RNG KAT o FIPS 186-2 PRNG KAT 34 KAT – Known Answer Test McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 24 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 2.8.2 Conditional Self-Tests Conditional Self-Tests are run on as needed by the module. When a Conditional Self-Test passes, the module will continue with normal operation. If the OpenSSL or Crypto-J library incurs a failure during a Conditional Self-Test, the module will enter a soft error state. The module is capable of recovering from the soft error without a user’s intervention. The Firewall Enterprise Control Center performs the following conditional self-tests: • ANSI X9.31 Continuous RNG • FIPS 186-2 Continuous RNG • Dual EC DRBG Continuous RNG • HMAC DRBG Continuous RNG • Crypto-J RSA pair-wise consistency test • OpenSSL RSA pair-wise consistency test • Crypto-J DSA pair-wise consistency test • OpenSSL DSA pair-wise consistency test • Firmware upgrade test 2.8.3 Critical Functions Self-Tests • SP800-90 Dual EC DRBG Instantiate Test • SP800-90 Dual EC DRBG Reseed Test • SP800-90 HMAC DRBG Instantiate Test • SP800-90 HMAC DRBG Reseed Test 2.9 Mitigation of Other Attacks This section is not applicable. The modules do not claim to mitigate any attacks beyond the FIPS 140-2 Level 2 requirements for this validation. McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 25 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 3 Secure Operation The Firewall Enterprise Control Center meets Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The sections below describe how to place and keep the module in FIPS-Approved mode of operation. 3.1 CO and User Guidance The CO should be in charge of receiving, installing, initializing, and maintaining the Control Center. The CO shall take assistance (when required) from an authorized User during the initial setup of the module. A CO or User must be diligent to follow complex password restrictions and must not reveal their password to anyone. The CO shall reinstall the module if the module has encountered a critical error and the module is non-operational. A User is recommended to reboot the module if the module ever encounters any soft errors. The following sections provide important instructions and guidance to the CO for secure installation and configuration of the Control Center. 3.1.1 Initial Setup Upon receiving the Control Center, the CO should check that the appliance is not damaged and that all required parts and instructions are included. The Control Center will be shipped with the following items: • Front Bezel • Mountain Rails • Mounting ears (2) and associated screws (4) • Cable Management Arm (C2050, C3000) • (1) Power cord (C1015) • (2) Power cords (C2050, C3000) • RJ-45 to DB-9 Female Serial Cable • Firewall Enterprise Control Center 5.x USB35 • McAfee Diagnostic USB • Firewall Enterprise Control Center 5.x Client CD • Firewall Enterprise Control Center 5.x Server CD • FIPS Kit for C1015 (Part #: FWE-CC-FIPS-KIT1) • FIPS Kit for C2050 or C3000 (Part #: FWE-CC-FIPS-KIT2) • Multilingual installation/setup guides, warranty information, and other helpful materials After unpacking the module and ensuring all materials are supplied, the CO should follow the included instructions for secure installation of the module into a rack system. Security baffles installation instructions are available as part of the FIPS Kit. 3.1.2 Initialization There are two documents that should be used to initialize the Control Center for use on the network; McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center: Quick Startup Guide and McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center: Product Guide. After the module has booted up and run through its initial setup, there will be a message on the screen stating that the module cannot find a configuration file. The CO has the option of manually configuring the module directly on the appliance, or they can create a configuration file prior to powering up the appliance following the instructions in the guides listed above. The created configuration file can then be loaded at this time. 35 USB – Universal Serial Bus McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 26 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 Once the Control Center has been fully configured, it will reboot and then give the option for the CO (mgradmin account) to login. When this prompt appears, the appliance has been properly configured and is ready to run in a non-FIPS-Approved mode of operation. 3.1.3 Configure FIPS settings The Control Center is shipped and initially configured in a non-FIPS-Approved mode of operation. The following instructions must be followed to ensure the module operates in a FIPS-approved mode of operation. NOTE: This is a one-way operation. Once the module has been configured for FIPS mode, the module must be completely reset and reinitialized to run in non-FIPS mode. Configure the BIOS36 3.1.3.1 Once the module is securely installed and initialized, the CO must follow the instructions outlined in the McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center 5.2.0 FIPS 140-2 Configuration Guide and to McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Installation Guide FIPS 140-2 Level 2 Kit to configure and password protect the BIOS. If the module is powered off, then power-up the system. Press the button when the McAfee logo appears. If the module is powered on, have the CO login in and type in the “reboot” command to reboot the appliance. The BIOS must be modified to ensure that the Control Center is only booted from the FIPS-enable hard drive, unauthorized users are unable to access the BIOS, and that the appliance will reset on AC Power Loss. Once the BIOS has been configured, save all changes and exit. The appliance will reboot and the CO may continue to configure the module for FIPS-Approved mode. 3.1.3.2 Turning On FIPS Cryptography The User must first enable FIPS cryptography through the Firewall Control Center Client Application. Turning on FIPS cryptography means that the system will use FIPS-Approved cryptographic libraries and keys and FIPS self-tests will be run. More detailed instructions can be found in the McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center 5.2.0 FIPS 140-2 Configuration Guide. The User will login to manage the Control Center via the Firewall Control Center Client Application with the appropriate username and password. Once logged in, the User will navigate to the “Control Center” tab at the top of the application. By double clicking the “FIPS” tree node and selecting “OK”, both the Control Center and the Firewall Control Center Client Application will restart. Once the Control Center has restarted and prompts for mgradmin login, the CO must configure the Control Center for FIPS Validated Mode. When in this mode, the Control Center is running in a FIPS-Approved mode of operation. 3.1.3.3 Enabling FIPS-Approved Mode In FIPS Validated Mode, FIPS-Approved cryptographic libraries are used, keys comply with FIPS- Approved lengths, and FIPS self-tests are running. Root access and other OS-level account cannot login. The system’s munix37 mode of operation is disabled and only the CO has OS-level access (console and remote SSH). Instructions for enabling FIPS Validated Mode on the Control Center can be found in the McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center 5.2.0 FIPS 140-2 Configuration Guide. The first thing the CO will do is replace all CSPs, certificates and SSH server keys. The CO will login using the mgradmin credentials that were set up during module initialization. Once logged in, the CO will login as root, and reboot the appliance. As soon as the module reboots and the splash screen appears, the 36 BIOS – Basic Input Output System 37 munix – system “maintenance kernel” McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 27 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 CO will force munix mode by pressing the “TAB” key repeatedly before the module can boot into normal operating conditions. Once in munix mode, the CO will run two preconfigured scripts. The fips_rmcerts script will perform a set of commands that will remove server certificates and CSPs for FIPS-Approved use. The next script, fips_block_munix, will block access to the CLI when the system is in the munix mode of operation. Once this script is has completed, the system will restart back into server mode and prompt for mgradmin to login. The last step to ensure the Control Center is running in a FIPS-Approved mode of operation is to block access to all OS-level accounts except for mgradmin (CO). At the login prompt, the CO will login then login once more as the sso user using the su sso command. As sso, the CO will run the script fips_lock_accounts, which will run a set of commands to block OS-level access to root and all other users. Once the script has finished, the CO will log out of sso, then reboot the module. The module is now running in a FIPS-Approved mode of operation. To verify this, the CO may try to login as another user and may try to force the CLI in munix mode. The certificates must also be reestablished by the Firewall Control Center Client Application for remote firewall management. 3.1.4 Zeroization After the Firewall Enterprise Control Center has been put into FIPS Validated Mode, the CO may zeroize all Keys, CSPs, and certificates by reinstalling the Control Center image onto the module. The Crypto- Officer must wait until the module has successfully rebooted in order to verify that zeroization has been completed. The CO will then follow the steps outlined above to place the newly installed Control Center back into FIPS-Approved mode. 3.1.5 Installation of Secure Front Bezel Access to the front panel of the Control Center modules may be required during initial set up; therefore, the front bezel should be installed last. The front bezel will prevent operators of the Control Center module from accessing the front USB port and power button of all devices as well as the DVD38 drive and ID39 button on the C2050 and C3000. To install the front bezel, you may refer to the guide included in the Control Center shipment materials. Access to the front panel of any of the modules should be limited to the CO. 3.1.6 Placement of Tamper-Evident Seals McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center uses tamper-evident seals to protect against unauthorized access to within the modules through the removable covers. These seals are shipped as part of the FIPS Kit. If one of the seals shows evidence of tampering, it is possible the module has been compromised. It is up to the CO to ensure proper placement of the tamper-evident seals using the following steps: • Apply at room temperature – the adhesive will not form a solid bond if applied at temperatures below 50° F. • The surface must be dry and free of dirt, oil, and grease, including finger oils. Alcohol pads can be used. • Place the seal and rub thumb over it to ensure complete adhesion • Wait 72 hours to ensure a complete adhesive bond. This will ensure that all tamper-evident features of the seals can be activated 38 DVD - Digital Video Disc 39 ID - Identification McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 28 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 3.1.6.1 C1015 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement Placement of the tamper-evident seals for the C1015 is shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10. Two tamper- evident seals will be used in total for this appliance. Figure 9 shows the seal placement on top of the appliance. The seal is to be placed on both the metal chassis and on the security bezel. It is important to note the placement of the sticker on the chassis is covering one of the screw heads holding the top plate in place. This will ensure that evidence of trying to access the top plate is clearly visible. Figure 10 shows seal placement on the bottom of the appliance. This seal is to be placed on both the metal chassis and the security bezel. By placing the tamper-evident seals on both the top and bottom of the security bezel, this ensures that the bezel cannot be removed from either side of the chassis. 3.1.6.2 C2050/C3000 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement Placement of the tamper-evident seals for the C2050 and C3000 is shown in Figure 11, Figure 12 and Figure 13. The C2050 and C3000 will each require five tamper-evident seals. Figure 11 shows the seal placement on top of the appliance. There are two seals visible in Figure 11. The one farthest from the camera is placed between the removable top cover of the chassis and the main chassis. This ensures that any attempt to remove the top panel of the appliance will show evidence of tampering. The seal closest to the camera shows placement on both the chassis base and the front security bezel. Figure 13 shows the seal placement for removable power supplies. Figure 12 shows seal placement on the bottom of the appliance. This seal is to be placed on both the metal chassis and the security bezel. By placing the tamper-evident seals on both the top and bottom of the security bezel, this ensures that the bezel cannot be popped off from either side of the chassis. 3.1.7 Module’s Mode of Operation After initial setup into FIPS mode, the module can only be operated in the FIPS-Approved mode of operation. An authorized User can access the module via the Control Center Client Application and determine whether the module is operating in FIPS-Approved mode or not. Detailed steps and procedure required to determine whether the module is operating in FIPS-Approved mode or not can be found in the McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center 5.2.0 FIPS 140-2 Configuration Guide, which is available as a part of FIPS kit. McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 29 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 4 Acronyms The Table 10 in this section defines the acronyms used in this document. Table 10 – Acronyms Acronym Definition AES Advanced Encryption Standard ANSI American National Standards Institute API Application Programming Interface BIOS Basic Input Output System CA Certificate Authority CBC Cipher Block Chaining CCM Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code CFB Cipher Feedback CLI Command Line Interface CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program CSEC Communications Security Establishment Canada CSP Critical Security Parameter DCS Data Collection Server DSA Digital Signature Algorithm DES Data Encryption Standard DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator DVD Digital Video Disc EC Elliptical Curve ECB Electronic Code Book EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility EMI Electromagnetic Interference FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard GCM Galois/Counter Mode GUI Graphical User Interface HA High Availability HMAC (Keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code ID Identification KAT Known Answer Test KO Keying Option LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 30 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Security Policy, Version 1.2 July 25, 2012 Acronym Definition MD Message Digest Munix System “maintenance kernel” NIC Network Interface Controller NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program OFB Output Feedback PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standards PRNG Pseudo-Random Number Generator PSU Power Supply Unit RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service RAID Redundant Array of Independent Disks RNG Random Number Generator RSA Rivest Shamir and Adleman RSBAC Rule Set Based Access Control SCEP Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol SHA Secure Hash Algorithm SP Special Publication SSH Secure Shell TCP Transmission Control Protocol TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard TLS Transport Layer Security USB Universal Serial Bus UTT User Datagram Protocol (UDP) over Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Tunnel McAfee Firewall Enterprise Control Center Page 31 of 32 © 2012 McAfee, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Prepared by: Corsec Security, Inc. 13135 Lee Jackson Memorial Highway Suite 220 Fairfax, VA 22033 United States of America Phone: +1 (703) 267-6050 Email: info@corsec.com http://www.corsec.com