Cisco Systems Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence Systems (Firmware Version: TC5.0.2) (Hardware Version: v1) FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Level 2 Validation Document Version 1.0 © 2011 CISCO This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.0 March 19, 2012 Revision History Version Modification Date Modified By Description of Changes 1.0 2011-11-10 Espen Holmbakken Initial version Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems Page 2 of 28 © 2012 CISCO This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.0 March 19, 2012 Table of Contents 1  Introduction  4  1.1  Purpose  4  1.2  References  4  2  Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems  5  2.1  Module Overview  5  2.2  Module Ports and Interfaces  12  2.3  Roles and Services  12  2.3.1  Crypto Officer Role  13  2.3.2  User Role  14  2.4  Cryptographic Key Management  15  2.4.1  Key Generation  17  2.4.2  Key Input/Output  17  2.4.3  Key Storage  18  2.4.4  Key Zeroization  18  2.5  Self­Tests  18  2.6  Mitigation of Other Attacks  19  3  Secure Operation  20  3.1  Crypto Officer Guidance  20  3.2  Approved Algorithms  21  3.3  Non­Approved Algorithms  22  3.4  Physical Security  22  3.5  Acronyms  27  Table of Tables TABLE 1 - SECURITY LEVEL PER FIPS 140-2 SECTION ................................................................................................... 5  TABLE 2 - MAPPING OF FIPS 140-2 LOGICAL INTERFACES TO EX SERIES TELEPRESENCE SYSTEM INTERFACES .......... 12  TABLE 3 – CRYPTO OFFICER SERVICES ........................................................................................................................ 13  TABLE 4 - USER SERVICES............................................................................................................................................ 15  Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems Page 3 of 28 © 2012 CISCO This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.0 March 19, 2012 1 Introduction 1.1 Purpose This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems. This policy describes how the Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems meet the requirements of FIPS 140-2. This document also includes instructions for configuring the security appliances in FIPS 140-2 mode. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 2 FIPS 140-2 validation for the Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems. FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 - Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the NIST website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/. In this document, the Cisco EX series Telepresence system is referred to as the module or the module. 1.2 References This document deals only with the operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following sources: • The Cisco website (http://www.cisco.com) contains information on the full line of products from Cisco. • The CMVP website (http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/) contains contact information for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module. Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems Page 4 of 28 © 2012 CISCO This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.0 March 19, 2012 2 Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems The Cisco TelePresence portfolio creates an immersive, face-to-face experience over the network—empowering you to collaborate with others like never before. Through a powerful combination of technologies and design that allows you and remote participants to feel as if you are all in the same room, the Cisco TelePresence portfolio has the potential to provide great productivity benefits and transform your business. Many organizations are already using it to control costs, make decisions faster, improve customer intimacy, scale scarce resources, and speed products to market. The Cisco EX series Telepresence system is one of the most powerful, flexible TelePresence and collaboration engine available delivering crisp, clear 1080p end-to-end HD video, HD collaboration, and HD embedded Cisco TelePresence MultiSite (MultiSite). With more inputs and outputs than ever before, the integration possibilities are endless. Cisco TelePresence provides full standard protocol H.323 (for Ethernet) and SIP (for Ethernet). Using these protocols, secure video conferencing is offered using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption for point-to- point calls and multipoint calls on Ethernet with the speed of up to 6000 kbps on the full Cisco TelePresence product line. 2.1 Module Overview The Cisco EX series telepresence system (version TC5.0.2) is the firmware installed in the Cisco EX series telepresence product line. The firmware supports the following Cisco TelePresence systems: EX60 and EX90. The Cisco EX60 and EX90 Telepresence systems support a FIPS-Approved mode of operation and a non-FIPS- Approved mode of operation. The Cisco EX60 and EX90 Telepresence systems are validated at the following FIPS 140-2 Section levels (when operated in the FIPS-Approved mode). Table 1 - Security Level Per FIPS 140-2 Section Section Section Title Level 1 Cryptographic Module Specification 2 2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2 3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3 4 Finite State Model 2 5 Physical Security 2 6 Operational Environment N/A 7 Cryptographic Key Management 2 8 EMI/EMC 2 9 Self-tests 2 10 Design Assurance 2 11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A In Table 1, N/A indicates “Not Applicable”. EMI and EMC refer to Electromagnetic Compatibility and Electromagnetic Interference, respectively. Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems Page 5 of 28 © 2012 CISCO This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.0 March 19, 2012 Figure 1 - EX60 Front Figure 2 - EX60 Back Figure 3 - EX60 Right Side Figure 4 - EX60 Left Side Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems Page 6 of 28 © 2012 CISCO This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.0 March 19, 2012 Figure 5 - EX60 Top Figure 6 - EX60 Bottom Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems Page 7 of 28 © 2012 CISCO This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.0 March 19, 2012 Proprietary Touch Screen Device Connector Video Figure 7 - EX60 Ports close-up Ethernet RJ45 Power Console Audio Figure 8 - EX60 corner ports Audio USB Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems Page 8 of 28 © 2012 CISCO This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.0 March 19, 2012 Figure 9 - EX90 Front Figure 10 - EX90 Back Figure 11 - EX90 Right Side Figure 12 - EX90 Left Side Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems Page 9 of 28 © 2012 CISCO This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.0 March 19, 2012 Figure 13 - EX90 Top w/ camera down Console port for service and maintenance Figure 14 - EX90 Bottom Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems Page 10 of 28 © 2012 CISCO This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.0 March 19, 2012 Figure 15 - EX90 Ports close-up Optional Ethernet USB Power DVI Port Proprietary Audio Ports Input Connector for Port touch screen HDMI Ports device USB Console port for Audio service and maintenance Figure 16 - EX90 corner ports Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems Page 11 of 28 © 2012 CISCO This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.0 March 19, 2012 2.2 Module Ports and Interfaces Each module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the physical interfaces provided by the module are mapped to four FIPS 140-2 defined logical interfaces: data input, data output, control input, and status output. The logical interfaces and their mapping are described in Table 2. The following is a list of the logical interfaces implemented in the module: • Data Input Interface • Data Output Interface • Control Input interface • Status Output Interface • Power Interface Table 2 maps the telepresence system interfaces with the FIPS 140-2 logical interfaces. Table 2 - Mapping of FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces to EX series telepresence system Interfaces FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Cisco EX series telepresence system Server Port/Interface Data Input Microphone , Audio Line input, DVI input Ethernet 1 and 2, HDMI input Audio Line output, DVI output, Ethernet 1 and 2, HDMI output, Audio line Data Output output Control Input Touch Screen Control, Ethernet 1 and 2 Audio Line output, DVI output, Ethernet 1 and 2, LEDs, HDMI output, Audio Status Output line output Power Power socket 2.3 Roles and Services The modules support two authorized roles: Crypto Officer and User. The services of a Crypto Officer include module management, settings, and firmware upgrades. The User role places and answers videoconferencing calls with or without security features as specified by the security configurations of itself and other parties to the call. Both roles can access the module through one of the following interfaces: • Touch Screen Control • HTTPS • SSHv2 • RS232 The Touch Screen Control provides the operator with a menu-driven interface. The HTTP/HTTPS protocol provides a web-based interface. The SSHv2 and serial interfaces are command-line based. Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems Page 12 of 28 © 2012 CISCO This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.0 March 19, 2012 Authentication is identity-based. Each user is authenticated upon initial access to the module. As required by FIPS 140-2, there are two main roles in the security appliances that operators may assume: a Crypto Officer role and User role. The administrator of the module assumes the Crypto Officer role in order to configure and maintain the module using Crypto Officer services, while the Users exercise only the basic User services. The User and Crypto Officer passwords and PINs must each be at least eight (8) characters long, and the minimum number of character groups to three (numerical special characters, upper case and lower case characters), and maximum number of consecutive characters in password to be 2. -For access on the over RS232, HTTPS or SSH, the operator needs to type in a username and password. A password must, at the very minimum, satisfy all password criteria listed in section 3.1. That is, the password must be at least 8 characters, contain at least one alphabet letter (uppercase or lowercase), one special character, maximum two consecutive characters, and an integer. Therefore, the minimum password contains six (6) integers, one (1) special character and one (1) alphabet. The probability of randomly guessing the correct sequence is one (1) in 1,091,750,400. In FIPS mode, the module limits entering a password on the serial port and SSH by enforcing a four second delay between each password entry. Therefore, an attacker will be able to input 15 passwords in one minute with this four second delay. The probability that a random success or false acceptance is 15 out of 1,091,750,400, which is much less than 1 in 100,000. The web interface restriction is different, as an attacker is limited to 1500 attempts per minute. Therefore the probability of a random success is 1500 in 1,091,750,400 which is less than one in 100,000. Including the rest of the alphanumeric characters drastically decreases the odds of guessing the correct sequence. Likewise, when logging into the module using the Touch Screen Control, the operator needs to enter a PIN. Since the PIN consists of 8 (eight) integers with a maximum 2 consecutive digits, the probability of randomly guessing the correct sequence is one (1) in 53,144,100. Since the touch screen is connected to the module via an SSH connection, the module enforces the four second delay on the PIN entry. Therefore, in one minute, only 15 PINs can be entered, which brings the probability of a random success within one minute to 15 in 53,144,100. Increasing the number of digits in the PIN further lowers the probability. 2.3.1 Crypto Officer Role Table 3 shows the services for the Crypto Officer role in the FIPS mode of operation. The purpose of each service is shown in the first column (“Service”), and the corresponding function is described in the second column (“Description”). Table 3 – Crypto Officer Services Keys/CSPs and Service Description Input Output Type of Access User and password Create users, assign Web interface Users with Crypto Write SHA-256 management roles and change Officer (admin) or password hashes passwords of users. User role. Status, success or failure Enable FIPS mode Enter FIPS Command System reboot, None operational mode system boots up in FIPS mode Reset to factory Reset the module Command Uninstalled module, None default server system this exits FIPS mode of operation Crypto Officer logs in Physical access, Status, success or Verifies PIN Hash Login through Touch the module through username and PIN failure Screen Control Touch Screen Control Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems Page 13 of 28 © 2012 CISCO This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.0 March 19, 2012 Keys/CSPs and Service Description Input Output Type of Access Login through Crypto Officer logs in Module’s IP Status, success or RSA keys – Read HTTPS the module through address, failure DSA keys – Read HTTPS username/password AES key – Read, or certificate Write, and Delete TDES keys – Read, Write, and Delete Verifies Password Hash Login through SSH Crypto Officer logs in Module’s IP Status, success or DSA keys – Read, the module through address, failure Write, and Delete SSH username/password AES key – Read, or certificate Write, and Delete TDES keys – Read, Write, and Delete Verifies Password Hash Login through Crypto Officer logs in Physical access, Status, success or Verifies Password RS232 the module through username/password failure Hash RS232 Configure system Configure network Command, network Status, success or None settings parameters that are parameters such as failure necessary for IP addresses, placing/answering calls and system parameters Configuring module video, audio camera settings Configure security Enable/disable Command, options Status, success or None settings HTTPS/SSH/Serial failure port Install certificates Install certificates for Command, Status, success or RSA or DSA key TLS sessions for certificates, private failure pair- Write HTTPS connections keys and certificates for IEEE 802.1.x Get logfiles Access the logs Command, options Event log, None stored on the module Get Status Get status of the Command Status None module Zeroize Zeroize the keys Command, Hard Status AES keys – Read, used by the module Reset (power Write, and Delete during a call or button) TDES keys – Read, connection Write, and Delete HMAC keys – Read, Write, and Delete Diffie-Hellman keys – Read, Write, and Delete RSA keys – Read, Write, and Delete DSA keys – Read, Write, and Delete Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems Page 14 of 28 © 2012 CISCO This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.0 March 19, 2012 2.3.2 User Role Table 4 shows the services for the User role under the FIPS mode of operation. Similar to Table 3, the purpose of each service is shown in the first column (“Service”), and the corresponding function is described in the second column (“Description”). Notice that, depending on what services the operator will be requesting after login, the login procedures for the Touch Screen Control, HTTP/HTTPS, SSH, and RS232 can be grouped as either Crypto Officer or User services. Table 4 - User Services Keys/CSP and Service Description Input Output Type of Access User logs in the Physical access, Status, success or Verifies PIN Hash Login through Touch module through username and PIN failure Screen Control Touch Screen Control Login through User logs in the Module’s IP address Status, success or RSA keys – Read HTTPS module through failure DSA keys – Read HTTPS AES key – Read, Write, and Delete TDES keys – Read, Write, and Delete Verifies Password Hash Login through SSH User logs in the Module’s IP address Status, success or DSA keys – Read, module through SSH failure Write, and Delete AES key – Read, Write, and Delete TDES keys – Read, Write, and Delete Verifies Password Hash Login through User logs in the None Status, success or Verifies Password RS232 module through failure Hash RS232 Videoconferencing Place outgoing calls Command, number Status, success or AES keys – Read, Calls or answer incoming of the receiver failure Write, and Delete calls (when placing an outgoing call) Configure user Configure user command Status, success or None settings settings like volume, failure background picture, layout, video input. Get Status Get status of the Command Status None module Zeroize Zeroize the keys Command, Hard Status AES keys – Read, used by the module Reset (power Write, and Delete during a call or button) TDES keys – Read, connection Write, and Delete HMAC keys – Read, Write, and Delete Diffie-Hellman keys – Read, Write, and Delete 2.4 Cryptographic Key Management The module uses a variety of keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSP’s) Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems Page 15 of 28 © 2012 CISCO This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.0 March 19, 2012 Table 5 - List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs Key/ Type Generation Storage Zeroization Use Key Component SSH host private DSA-1024 Generated On Flash At factory SSH session handshake key based on reset random data SSH Session HMAC-SHA1 Agreed upon Stored in When Data authentication for SSH authentication key key server and volatile session is sessions client as part of memory terminated ssh session setup SSH Session Triple-DES Derived via the Stored in When Data encryption/decryption encryption key CBC key SSH protocol volatile session is for SSH sessions AES CBC memory terminated 128bit key Diffie-Hellman Diffie-Hellman Generated by Stored in When Used to derive the shared private exponent 1024 calling the volatile session is secret in the Diffie-Hellman Approved memory terminated key exchange DRBG Diffie-Hellman Diffie-Hellman Negotiated in Stored in When Used to derive the H323 shared secret 1024 the Q.931 volatile session is call setup master key phase of the memory terminated H323 call setup according to H.235 H323 call setup Derived from Stored in When Used to derive subsequent master key 1024 bit Diffie-Hellman volatile session is H323 keys shared secret key exchange memory terminated H323 Session key AES-128 Derived from Stored in When Used to AES encrypt the wrapping key the H323 call volatile session is H323 Session key setup master memory terminated key H323 Session key AES-128 Generated by Stored in When Used to encrypt the H323 calling the volatile session is session traffic. Approved memory terminated DRBG User PIN Operator PIN Provided by Stored At factory This is used for H323 RAS crypto officer or hashed reset authentication User upon using SHA- login. 1 on flash sRTP master key Shared Secret Derived from Stored in When Master key used for session TLS handshake volatile session is key derivation memory terminated sRTP session HMAC SHA-1 Derived from Stored in When Keys used to authenticate authentication key the sRTP volatile session is sRTP packets (HMAC) master key memory terminated using pseudo random function sRTP session AES128 CTR Derivedfrom the Stored in When Key used to encrypt/decrypt encryption key sRTP master volatile session is sRTP packets key using memory terminated pseudo random function Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems Page 16 of 28 © 2012 CISCO This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.0 March 19, 2012 Key/ Type Generation Storage Zeroization Use Key Component sRTP salting key Salting key Generated Stored in When Used to generate the using the volatile session is Initialization vector of the module’s memory termintated SRTP encryption stream Approved DRBG SIP TLS session HMAC-SHA1 Derived Stored in When Used for user keys AES128 according to the volatile session is authentication/encryption TLS protocol memory terminated over TLS connection on SIP SIP TLS certificate RSA/DSA Provided by Stored on On factory With SIP TLS client private key Crypto Officer flash in reset certificate plaintext HTTPS TLS HMAC-SHA1 Derived Stored in When Data session key according to the volatile session is authentication/encryption TLS protocol memory terminated for TLS sessions (HTTPS client, HTTPS server, Syslog) HTTPS TLS RSA/DSA Provided by Stored on On factory With HTTPS TLS certificate and Crypto Officer flash in reset handshake private key plaintext HTTPS TLS Triple-DES Derived Stored in When Data encryption for TLS session encryption AES CBC 128 according to the volatile session is sessions key bit TLS protocol memory terminated RNG seed key Seed key Using non- Stored on On factory Used for RNG operations Approved RNG flash reset Passwords Operator Generated each Hashed On factory Password hashes for users password time a user using SHA- reset are stored on flash. changes his/her 256 and Passwords are not stored in password stored on cleartext flash File storage AES-128 Generated from Stored on On factory Used for encrypting the file cryptographic key random data on NOR-Flash reset storage on NAN-Flash module initialization Firmware Integrity DSA public Exists within the Stored on Public key Used for checking integrity Key key firmware binary flash – not of the firmware on every required to power-up be zeroizable 2.4.1 Key Generation The module uses SP800-90 DRBG RNG to generate cryptographic keys. This RNG is FIPS-Approved as indicated by FIPS PUB 140-2. The seed for the SP800-90 DRBG RNG is provided by a non-Approved RNG, which collects entropy from the Ethernet receiver. 2.4.2 Key Input/Output RSA/DSA key pairs used for TLS are generated externally and input to the modules in plaintext. RSA, DSA, and DH private keys never exit the module, while the public keys are output in plaintext. In H.323 symmetric keys that Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems Page 17 of 28 © 2012 CISCO This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.0 March 19, 2012 are input into and output from the module are encrypted by 128-bit AES. For SIP master key is sent over TLS, which is used to generate the session keys. In HTTPS, session keys exit the module in encrypted form during TLS handshakes (protected within RSA key transport). Other CSPs and keys, such as the DSA keys for integrity tests never output from the module. 2.4.3 Key Storage The DSA and RSA public and private key pairs and the DSA public keys for integrity tests are stored in the module’s flash memory in plaintext. Session key and Diffie-Hellman public and private key pairs are held in volatile memory (SDRAM) in plaintext. 2.4.4 Key Zeroization For the SIP and H.323 protocol, all Diffie-Hellman keys, symmetric keys, HMAC keys, and key components are zeroized when they are no longer needed, usually at the end of the session, or when encryption is disabled during a call. For the SSH protocol, a session key is zeroized at the end of the session, or when a new session key is generated after a certain timeout. A DSA key pair is zeroized when the module exits FIPS mode. For the HTTPS protocol, the TLS session key is zeroized at the end of the session. The RSA and DSA key pairs are not automatically zeroized. The DSA public key for the firmware integrity test and keys for other power-up self-tests are hard-coded. This is allowed by FIPS 140-2 according to Section 7.4 of the Implementation Guidance. The keys are stored on an AES-128 encrypted file storage, and zeroization is done by overwriting the key with zeros. 2.5 Self-Tests Implementation   Tests Performed   Module Software   ‐DSA Firmware Integrity Test   -AES KAT -Triple-DES KAT -SHA-1 KAT -DSA Sign/Verify -ECDSA Sign/Verify -RSA Sign/Verify OpenSSL   -SP800-90 DRBG KAT  ‐HMAC‐SHA‐1 KAT  ‐HMAC‐SHA‐224 KAT (covers self‐test for  SHA‐224)  ‐HMAC‐SHA‐256 KAT (covers self‐test for  SHA‐256)  ‐HMAC‐SHA‐384 KAT (covers self‐test for  Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems Page 18 of 28 © 2012 CISCO This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.0 March 19, 2012 SHA‐384)  ‐HMAC‐SHA‐512 KAT (covers self‐test for  SHA‐512)  The module performs all power-on self-tests automatically at boot when FIPS mode is enabled. All power-on self- tests must be passed before a User/Crypto Officer can perform services. The power-on self-tests are performed after the cryptographic systems are initialized but prior to the initialization of the LAN’s interfaces; this prevents the module from passing any data during a power-on self-test failure. In the unlikely event that a power-on self-test fails, an error message is written to /var/log/fipslog followed by a security appliance reboot. Implementation  Tests Performed  OpenSSL  -DSA, ECDSA, and RSA Pairwise Consistency Tests  -SP800-90 DRBG and non-Approved RNG Continuous Random Number Generator Tests  If conditional self-tests fail, an error message will be written to /var/log/fipslog. Failure of a pair-wise consistency test for asymmetric keys or a continuous RNG test leads to reboot of the module. If the integrity test for the running software fails, the system will reboot and an error message will be written to /var/log/fipslog. 2.6 Mitigation of Other Attacks The module does not claim to mitigate any attacks in a FIPS approved mode of operation above and beyond the protection inherently provided by the module. Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems Page 19 of 28 © 2012 CISCO This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.0 March 19, 2012 3 Secure Operation The Cisco EX series Telepresence systems meets Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2. As stated in Session 2.4, an operator can access the module through one of the following interfaces: (1) Touch Screen Control (2) HTTPS (3) SSH (4) RS232 The Touch Screen Control provides the operator with a menu interface and the HTTPS protocol provides a web- based interface. The other three interfaces are command-line based. The client application (web browser) used for HTTPS connections must support TLS version 1 or later. For SSH connections, the client application must support SSH version 2 or later. The sections below describe how to place and keep the module in the FIPS-Approved mode of operation and how to make secure calls. 3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance In order to have the Cisco EX series TelePresence system work in the FIPS-Approved mode, a Crypto Officer should perform the following operations: 1. The tamper-evident labels shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS Approved mode of operation. Refer to Section ‘Physical Security’ of this document for directions to apply the tamper- evident labels. 2. Log in to SSH or RS232. If the unit has not been previously used, the module should be on a closed network. The username is “admin” and the password is blank. 3. Switch from non-FIPS mode to FIPS mode, by inputting the command “xCommand Security FIPSmode Activate Confirm: Yes” and hit the “enter” key on your keyboard. The connection will be terminated because the module is being rebooted. 4. Log into SSH again, and enforce password policy by entering “systemtools securitysettings ask”, and change the following settings when prompted and set them to the values displayed in the square brackets (all other prompts can be left unaltered by pressing enter): Max consecutive equal digits in PINs [2]? Minimum number of digits in PINs [8]? Minimum number of characters in passwords [8]? Max consecutive identical characters in passwords [2]? Minimum number of character groups in passwords [3]? 5. Change the password of the Crypto Officer by using the command “systemtools passwd” and typing in the old password and new password twice. 6. Require that users and crypto officers log in to the GUI interface by setting the command Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems Page 20 of 28 © 2012 CISCO This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.0 March 19, 2012 “xconfiguration Video OSD LoginRequired: on” 7. Log into the web interface as the Crypto Officer. Here you can go to “Maintenance” then “User Administration” to create users with USER role, or other Crypto Officers with ADMIN role. 8. The first time the crypto officer and all new users log onto GUI they must change their PIN (from blank if not specified when created). They might also be required to change their password the first time they log into web/ssh if this was a condition when creating the user. In FIPS mode, encryption services for video calls between two modules are always required. This means that a call will only be accepted if both endpoints (modules) support encryption. 3.2 Approved Algorithms The appliances support many different cryptographic algorithms; however, only the following FIPS approved algorithms may be used while in the FIPS mode of operation: •AES encryption/decryption •Triple DES encryption/decryption •SHA (SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512) •HMAC-SHA-1 for hashed message authentication •RSA sign and verify •DSA sign and verify •ECDSA sign and verify •DRBG The Tandberg EX60 and EX90 have earned the CAVP algorithm certifications listed below Algorithm Certificate number AES 1928 Triple-DES 1255 DSA 612 SHS 1693 RSA 994 Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems Page 21 of 28 © 2012 CISCO This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.0 March 19, 2012 HMAC 1162 ECDSA 276 DRBG 168 Caveat: The following Non-Approved algorithms are allowed for use for key establishment purposes in the FIPS-Approved mode of the module: • Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment provides 80-bits of encryption strength) • RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 80, 112, or 150 bits of encryption strength) • AES (Cert. #1928, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 128 bits of encryption strength) 3.3 Non-Approved Algorithms The modules implement the following non-FIPS-approved cryptographic algorithms: • DES • RC4 • RC2 • MD5 • MD5 HMAC • Blowfish • Camellia Note: Non-FIPS approved algorithms cannot be used in FIPS mode of operation. 3.4 Physical Security All Critical Security Parameters are stored and protected within each appliance's enclosure which is protected using tamper-evident labels (TELs). The Crypto Officer is responsible for properly placing all tamper evident labels. The tamper-evident labels required for FIPS 140-2 compliance are provided in the FIPS Kit (Part Number CISCO-FIPS- KIT=). The FIPS kit includes 4 TELs for the EX60 and 3 TELs for the EX90, as well as a document detailing the number of seals required per platform and placement information. These security labels are very fragile and cannot be removed without leaving signs of tampering. The EX60 module requires four (4) tamper-evident labels while the EX90 module requires three (3) tamper-evident labels. The Crypto-Officer must first take note of where the labels are to be placed on the module. Then, the Crypto- Officer must ensure that the surfaces of the module (where the TELs are to be placed) are cleaned with rubbing alcohol. The Crypto-Officer can use a small paper towel with a dab of rubbing alcohol or an alcoholic swab to clean the surfaces. After the rubbing alcohol dries, the Crypto-Officer must apply these TELs in the positions shown in the Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems Page 22 of 28 © 2012 CISCO This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.0 March 19, 2012 photos of the modules below before making the module available for use in the FIPS-Approved mode. The Crypto- Officer shall inspect the module enclosure and the TELs periodically for signs of tampering. Status LEDs Figure 17 - EX60 Front TEL 1 TEL 2 Figure 18 - EX60 Bottom Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems Page 23 of 28 © 2012 CISCO This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.0 March 19, 2012 TEL 4 TEL 3 Figure 19 - EX60 Back Figure 20 - EX60 Right Side Figure 21 - EX60 Left Side Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems Page 24 of 28 © 2012 CISCO This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.0 March 19, 2012 TEL 1 Figure 22 - EX90 Back Figure 17 - EX90 Top w/ camera down Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems Page 25 of 28 © 2012 CISCO This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.0 March 19, 2012 Figure 24 - EX90 Bottom TEL 2 TEL 3 Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems Page 26 of 28 © 2012 CISCO This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.0 March 19, 2012 3.5 Acronyms Table 5 - Acronyms Acronym Definition AES Advanced Encryption Standard ANSI American National Standards Institute BIOS Basic Input/Output System BRI Basic Rate Interface CA Certification Authority CBC Cipher Block Chaining CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program CSP Critical Security Parameter CVS Concurrent Versions System DCE Data Communications Equipment DSA Digital Signature Algorithm DSP Digital Signal Processor DVI Digital Visual Interface ECB Electronic Codebook EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility EMI Electromagnetic Interference FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard GPIO General Purpose Input/Output HD High-Definition HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Transport Layer Security IP Internet Protocol KAT Known Answer Test LAN Local Area Network LED Light-Emitting Diode MCU Multiple Control Unit MPS Media Processing System N/A Not Applicable NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology OFB Output Feedback OS Operating System PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standards PRI Primary Rate Interface Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems Page 27 of 28 © 2012 CISCO This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.0 March 19, 2012 Acronym Definition RCA Radio Corporation of America RNG Random Number Generator RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman RTOS Real-Time Operating System SHA Secure Hash Algorithm SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol SSH Secure Shell TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard TEL Tamper-Evident Label TLS Transport Layer Security USB Universal Serial Bus XOR Exclusive-or Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems Page 28 of 28 © 2012 CISCO This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.