Postal mRevenector DE 2011 - Security Policy Security Policy Postal mRevenector DE 2011 Version 1.4 Hardware P/N: 580036020300/01 Firmware Version: Bootloader: 90.0036.0201.00/2011485001 Software-Loader: 90.0036.0206.00/2011485001 FRANKIT-Application: 90.0036.0204.00/2011515001 Francotyp-Postalia GmbH Development Department Hasbi Kabacaoglu / Dirk Rosenau Triftweg 21-26 D-16547 Birkenwerder Germany Postal mRevenector DE 2011 - Security Policy Contents 1  Introduction ..............................................................................................................................3  2  Cryptographic Module Specification .............................................................................................4  3  Cryptographic Ports, Interfaces & Excluded Components ...............................................................5  4  Rules of Operation .....................................................................................................................6  5  Roles, Services, Authentication & Identification ............................................................................8  6  Physical Security ...................................................................................................................... 12  7  Cryptographic Functions ........................................................................................................... 13  8  Cryptographic Keys and Critical Security Parameters ................................................................... 14  9  Self-Tests ................................................................................................................................ 17  10  Mitigating Other Attacks ........................................................................................................ 19  Figures Figure: 1 Postal mRevenector DE 2011...............................................................................................3  Tables Table 1: FIPS 140-2 Security Levels ...................................................................................................4  Table 2: Cryptographic Ports & Types ................................................................................................5  Table 3: Services and Roles............................................................................................................. 10  Table 4: Cryptographic Functions ..................................................................................................... 13  Table 5: Critical Security Parameters ................................................................................................ 15  Table 6: FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Algorithm Tests ........................................................................... 17  - page 2 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector DE 2011 - Security Policy 1 Introduction 1.1 Overview Francotyp-Postalia (FP) is one of the leading global suppliers of mail center solutions. A major component of the business of FP is the development, manufacture and support of postal franking machines (postage meters). These postal franking machines incorporate a postal security device (PSD) that performs all postage meter cryptographic and postal security functions and which protects both Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) and Postal Relevant Data Items (PRDIs) from unauthorized access. The Postal mRevenector DE Figure: 1 Postal mRevenector DE 2011 2011 is FP’s latest generation of PSD. This document forms a Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the cryptographic module of the device under the terms of the NIST FIPS 140-2 validation. This Security Policy specifies the security rules under which this device operates. 1.2 Implementation The Postal mRevenector DE 2011 is a multiple-chip embedded cryptographic module, based around a cryptographic integrated circuit, together with a small number of support components. The components, mounted on a PCB, are covered by hard opaque potting material. The module has a proprietary electrical connector forming the interface to the module. - page 3 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector DE 2011 - Security Policy 2 Cryptographic Module Specification 2.1 FIPS Security Level Compliance The cryptographic module is designed to meet FIPS 140-2 as shown in the table below: Section Security Requirement Level 1 Cryptographic Module Specification 3 2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 3 3 Roles, Services and Authentication 3 4 Finite State Model 3 5 Physical Security 3 + EFP/EFT 6 Operational Environment N/A 7 Cryptographic Key Management 3 8 Electromagnetic Interference/ Electromagnetic 3 Compatibility (EMI/IMC) 9 Self-Tests 3 10 Design Assurance 3 11 Mitigation of Other Attacks 3 Table 1: FIPS 140-2 Security Levels - page 4 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector DE 2011 - Security Policy 3 Cryptographic Ports, Interfaces & Excluded Components 3.1 Physical Interface The cryptographic module uses a 36 pin card edge connector. The usage of these physical ports for FIPS 140-2 logical interfaces is detailed in the table below: Type Pin Data Input A4, A5, A10, A11, A12, A13, A14, A15 Data Output A4, A5, A10, A11, A12, A13, A14, A15 Control Input A4, A5, A8, A9, A10, A11, A12, A13, A14, A15 Status Output A2, A3, A4, A5, A10, A11, A12, A13, A14, A15 Power A1, A6, A7, A16, A17, A18, B1, B7, B8, B9, B10, B11, B16, B17, B18 Not Used B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B12, B13, B14, B15 Table 2: Cryptographic Ports & Types 3.2 Cryptographic boundary The cryptographic boundary is defined to be the outer edge both the epoxy covered printed circuit board and the exposed battery. The battery is excluded from the requirements of FIPS 140-2. It is connected to the circuitry of the module in such a way that it cannot be used to compromise the security of the module. - page 5 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector DE 2011 - Security Policy 4 Rules of Operation 4.1 FIPS 140-2 Related Security Rules The Postal mRevenector DE 2011 shall: 1. Support only an Approved mode of operation. 2. Not allow unauthenticated operators to have any access to the module’s cryptographic services. 3. Inhibit data output during self-tests and error states. 4. Logically disconnect data output from the processes performing zeroization and key generation. 5. Enforce identity-based authentication for roles that access Approved algorithms and CSPs. 6. Not retain the authentication of an operator following power-off or reboot. 7. Support the following roles: Default User, User, Cryptographic Officer. 8. Not permit the output of plaintext cryptographic keys or other CSPs. 9. Not support a bypass mode or maintenance mode. 10. Perform the self-test as described in section 9 of this document. 11. Support the following logically distinct interfaces:  Data input interface  Data output interface  Control input interface  Status output interface  Power interface. 12. Implement all software using a high-level language, except the limited use of low-level languages to enhance performance. 13. Protect critical security parameters from unauthorized disclosure, modification and substitution. 14. Provide means to ensure that a key entered into or stored within the device is associated with the correct entities to which the key is assigned. 15. Support a FIPS approved deterministic random bit generator (DRBG) as specified in NIST 800-90 section 10.2.1 16. Perform the self tests listed in section 9 during power-on and on-demand when the corresponding service is used. 17. Store an error indication whenever an error state is entered. As a result the error indication can be read by the Get Device Status Service. 18. Not perform any cryptographic functions while in an error state. 19. Not support multiple concurrent operators. - page 6 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector DE 2011 - Security Policy 4.2 Postal Related Security Rules The Postal mRevenector DE 2011 shall: 20. Protect the postal registers against unauthorized substitution or modification. 21. Never zeroize the postal registers. 22. Comply with the specifications given in the “FRANKIT-New Generation Digital Franking” specification from the Deutsche Post AG (DPAG). 23. Provide mechanisms to disable the Accounting Service when it has no connection with its partnering infrastructure on a regular basis. 24. Provide services for protecting postal related data inside its hosting system against unauthorized substitution or modification. - page 7 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector DE 2011 - Security Policy 5 Roles, Services, Authentication & Identification 5.1 Roles The Postal mRevenector DE 2011 supports three distinct roles:  Default User  User  Cryptographic Officer Any services which do not read, update, modify or generate critical security parameters (CSPs) do not require authentication. 5.2 Default User Role By default the device enters the Default user role, which is an unauthenticated role, for services that do not require authentication. The Host System typically acts on behalf of the Default operator and can request unauthenticated services. 5.3 User Role The User is authenticated using an identity based authentication method. This method is based on a three way handshake protocol using secret pass phrases and user identifications (UIDs) known to both parties. The Host System typically acts on behalf of the User to request authenticated services. 5.4 Cryptographic Officer Role The Cryptographic Officer is authenticated using an identity based authentication method based on an RSA signature verification process, which utilizes a 2048-bit RSA public key over the CO’s identifier. This method uses two pairs of asymmetric keys and two distinguished names. The public parts and distinguished names are each known to the other party. In this way, the PSD and the infrastructure are able to identify and authenticate themselves to the other by verifying the exchanged distinguished name and signature. In addition the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol is used to establish secret keys that may be used for further key encryption and authentication of data exchange. The Cryptographic Officer role shall provide those services necessary to initialize, authorize and validate the Postal mRevenector DE 2011. This role provides any services which enter, modify or generate critical security parameters. A Francotyp-Postalia Infrastructure server typically acts on behalf of a Cryptographic Officer. 5.5 Services and Roles The following services are offered by the cryptographic module: Approved Associated CSPs Roles Note Service Security Functions Used Echoes back data payload. Echo None None Default User - page 8 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector DE 2011 - Security Policy Approved Associated CSPs Roles Note Service Security Functions Used Get Device Status None None Default User Service to cause the device to Reboot Device None None Default User reboot. Scrap None None Default User Zeroizes all plaintext CSPs. Select Programmed Configures the bootloader. None None Default User Firmware Selftest All listed in chapter 6 None Default User Setup Parameter None None Default User Enters postal configuration data. Logoff None None CO, User Leaves the CO or User role. Required to enter the User role. AES-CBC, Required to enter Local Login Passphrase HMAC-SHA256, the User role DRBG PSD Transport Key Pair, KAS, DSA Key PSD Keys Pair, Generation PKM Public Key RSA 2048 Sign & Required to enter Remote Login Remote Session Required to enter the CO role. Verify with SHA- the CO role Encryption Key 256, Remote Session DRBG Authentication Key RSA 2048 Sign/Verify PSD Key Pair Initialize the device according to using SHA-256, Remote Session the DPAG FRANKIT Postal Initialization 3TDES CBC, CO Encryption Key requirements. HMAC-SHA1, Remote Session DRBG Authentication Key Remote Session Authorize the device according HMAC-SHA1, Postal Authorization Authentication Key CO to the DPAG FRANKIT requirements. DPAG Private Key Finance service, managing CO RSA 1024 Decryption, Remote Session postal funds. Postage Value Encryption Key 3TDES CBC, Download Remote Session HMAC-SHA1 Authentication Key Indicia Key (mSecret) DPAG Private Key Finance service, managing RSA 1024 Decryption, Remote Session Postage Value postal funds. 3TDES CBC, CO Encryption Key Refund HMAC-SHA1 Remote Session Authentication Key Remote Session Updates postal configuration Re-Initialization HMAC-SHA1 CO Authentication Key data Remote Session Enters FP Mac Secret used to CO Encryption Key Reenter FP Mac 3TDES CBC, authenticate proprietary data Remote Session Secret HMAC-SHA1 Authentication Key FP Mac Secret RSA 1024 Encryption/ DPAG Key Pair CO Decryption, Remote Session Rekey DPAG Keys 3TDES CBC, Encryption Key HMAC-SHA1 Remote Session DRBG Authentication Key - page 9 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector DE 2011 - Security Policy Approved Associated CSPs Roles Note Service Security Functions Used TDES CBC, RSA 2048 PSD Key Pair, CO Sign/Verify using Remote Session Rekey PSD keys SHA-256, Encryption Key HMAC-SHA1, Remote Session DRBG Authentication Key Remote Session Echoes back data payload within Secure Echo HMAC-SHA1 CO Authentication Key a secure session. Remote Session Provides status within a secure Secure Get Status HMAC-SHA1 CO Authentication Key session. Remote Session Synchronizes the RTC within a Secure Set Time HMAC-SHA1 CO Authentication Key secure session. SHA1 with secret Debits the postal funds and Accounting User mSecret suffix method returns indicia content. Enters postal configuration data Postal Module AES-CBC, and registers the module in the User None Registration HMAC-SHA256 country and initializes the module for postal usage. Receives firmware from an RSA- PKCS#1 V1.5 Working Encryption keys Program FLASH external source and programs it User verification using Working Authentication with Firmware into the cryptographic module’s 2048 and SHA-256 keys FLASH memory. Local Session Encryption Sign postal related items and AES-CBC, Key, communication data. HMAC-SHA256, Sign PMD Data Local Session User RSA 2048 Sign using Authentication Key, SHA-256 Private PMD Key Authenticates a data payload. Verify Mac None FP Mac Secret User Table 3: Services and Roles 5.6 Authentication Strength 5.6.1 Cryptographic Officer Role The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur shall be less than one in 1,000,000. This is achieved through use of a 2048 bit RSA key to authenticate the role, which has been determined to have an effective strength of 112-bits. The probability that a random attempt will succeed is therefore 1/(2112), which is less than 1/1,000,000. Should multiple attempts be made to authenticate during a one-minute period, the probability shall be less than one in 100,000 that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur. This is achieved by inserting a delay of 1 second after any failed attempt resulting in a maximum of 60 attempts per minute. The probability is therefore 60/(2112), which is less than 1/100,000. 5.6.2 User role The passphrase contains at least 6 randomly chosen characters for the User resulting in a total of more than 626 combinations (alphanumeric input). The probability that a random attempt will succeed is therefore 1/(626), which is less than 1/1,000,000. - page 10 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector DE 2011 - Security Policy Should multiple attempts be made to authenticate during a one-minute period, the probability shall be less than one in 100,000 that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur. This is achieved by inserting a delay of 1 second after any failed attempt resulting in a maximum of 60 attempts per minute. The probability is therefore 60/(626), which is less than 1/100,000. - page 11 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector DE 2011 - Security Policy 6 Physical Security All the components of the device, except the battery and the card edge connector, are covered with a hard, tamper-evident potting material, which is opaque within the visible spectrum. Because of the potting material it is not possible to physically access any internal components without seriously damaging the module or causing zeroization. - page 12 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector DE 2011 - Security Policy 7 Cryptographic Functions The module has one mode of operation, the FIPS mode of operation. It implements the following FIPS approved and allowed algorithms: Security Function Usage Certificate SHA-1, SHA-256 Hashing NIST Certificate #1346 DRBG On key generation NIST Certificate #61 AES 128 (EBC & CBC) On data encryption and authentication NIST Certificate #1493 HMAC-SHA1, On message authentication NIST Certificate #878 HMAC-SHA-256 Key Agreement Scheme(KAS) SP800-56A On key establishment, key establishment method NIST Certificate #16 provides 112 bits of security strength. RSA PKCS#1 V1.5 Verification On signature verification NIST Certificate #732 using 2048 and SHA-256 RSA PKCS#1 V1.5 Signing On signature generation NIST Certificate #785 using 2048 and SHA-256 RSA PKCS#1 V1.5 Encryption/Decryption* On key decryption, key establishment method N/A using 1024 and SHA-1 provides 80 bits of security strength. 3TDES (ECB & CBC) On data encryption and decryption NIST Certificate #1122 DSA On key generation for KAS NIST Certificate #522 Non-Approved RNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator N/A (NDRNG), used for seeding the DRBG. * The Approved Signature Generation and Verification functions of this RSA implementation were issued NIST Certificate #731. Table 4: Cryptographic Functions - page 13 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector DE 2011 - Security Policy 8 Cryptographic Keys and Critical Security Parameters The following section lists the critical and public security parameters that are retained by the device. Critical Security Parameters The table below lists the critical security parameters: Name Algorithm Storage Generation Establishment Destruction Purpose DRBG State CTR_DRBG Encrypted Seeded by N/A N/A Internal state of the using AES internal Deterministic Random 128 NDRNG Bit Generator. Data AES CBC Plaintext Internal DRBG N/A Scrap service Serve to encrypt and Encryption 128 bits or tamper decrypt critical Master Keys event security parameters. Internal DRBG Data HMAC- Plaintext N/A Scrap service Serve to authenticate Authentication SHA256 or tamper critical security Master Keys event parameters. (128 bit key) Internal DRBG Working AES CBC Plaintext N/A Scrap service, Serve to encrypt and Encryption 128 bits tamper event decrypt other Keys or power cycle internally used data. Internal DRBG Working HMAC- Plaintext N/A Scrap service, Serve to authenticate Authentication SHA256 tamper event other internally used Keys or power cycle data. (128 bit key) Internal DRBG Data AES CBC Encrypted N/A N/A Serve to encrypt and Encryption 128 bits decrypt other Keys internally stored critical security parameters. Internal DRBG Data HMAC- Encrypted N/A N/A Serve to authenticate Authentication- SHA256 other internally stored Keys critical security parameters. (128 bit key) Internal DRBG Transport RSA PKCS#1 Encrypted N/A N/A Serves to properly Signing V1.5 -2048 identify device after (private) Key shipping and to establish initial secure session. Internal DRBG PMD Signing RSA PKCS#1 Encrypted N/A N/A Used to support (private) Key V1.5 -2048 hosting device during its authentication services. Internal DRBG PSD Signing RSA PKCS#1 Encrypted N/A N/A Serves to setup (private) Key V1.5 -2048 regular secure sessions. Internal DRBG DPAG RSA PKCS#1 Encrypted N/A N/A Serves to decrypt the Decryption Key V1.5 -1024 mSecret. N/A mSecret SHA1 Encrypted Encrypted Entry N/A Serves to authenticate indicia. (128 bit) - page 14 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector DE 2011 - Security Policy Name Algorithm Storage Generation Establishment Destruction Purpose Internal DRBG Ephemeral KAS SP800- Not N/A Zeroized after Serves to derive Diffie-Hellman 56A -2048 persistently use session keys for the stored Cryptographic Officer. N/A Remote HMAC -SHA1 Not Key Agreement/ Zeroized after Serves to Session persistently Derivation use authenticate data Authentication stored during a remote Key secure session (CO role) (160 bit key, 112 bits of strength) N/A Remote 3TDES-CBC Not Key Agreement/ Zeroized after Serves to encrypt and Session persistently Derivation use decrypt data during a Encryption Key stored remote secure session (CO role). (192 bit key, 112 bits of strength) N/A FP Mac Secret N/A Encrypted Encrypted Entry N/A Used to authenticate proprietary data N/A Passphrase N/A Encrypted N/A N/A Used for User Identity based authentication Table 5: Critical Security Parameters - page 15 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector DE 2011 - Security Policy Public Security Parameters. The following public keys are stored in the device: Name of certificate Algorithm Storage Generation Purpose or public key FPRootCA 2048 bit RSA Plaintext N/A Serves to authenticate FDC and PKM keys key (certificate & public key) FDC 2048 bit RSA Plaintext N/A Serves to authenticate TransportKey key (certificate & public key) PKM 2048 bit RSA Plaintext N/A Serves to authenticate Cryptographic Officer key (certificate & public key) TransportKey 2048 bit RSA Plaintext Internal Serves to initially authenticate Postal key DRBG mRevenector DE 2011 (certificate & public key) PSDKey 2048 bit RSA Plaintext Internal Serves to authenticate Postal mRevenector DE key DRBG 2011 (certificate & public key) DPAGKey 1024 bit RSA Plaintext Internal Serves to encrypt the mSecret on the Postage key DRBG Point (certificate & public key) RootCABC 2048 bit RSA Plaintext N/A Serves to authenticate FDCBC and PMD keys key (certificate & public key) FDCBC 2048 bit RSA Plaintext N/A Serves to authenticate PMDKey key (certificate & public key) PMDKey 2048 bit RSA Plaintext Internal Used to support hosting device during its key DRBG authentication services. (certificate & public key) Firmware Verification 2048 bit RSA Plaintext N/A Used to verify firmware from Francotyp- Key key Postalia. - page 16 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector DE 2011 - Security Policy 9 Self-Tests 9.1 Power on self tests The following self tests are performed when the Postal mRevenector DE 2011 starts: Firmware Integrity Test The mRevenector checks the SHA 256 hash of the Postal mRevenector DE 2011 firmware of the cryptographic module and verifies this against a known signature generated with PKCS#1 V1.5 (Signature Scheme). Cryptographic Algorithm Tests The following table lists the cryptographic algorithm tests for approved and allowed security functions that are performed as part of the power-on self tests. For corresponding NIST certificates see * The Approved Signature Generation and Verification functions of this RSA implementation were issued NIST Certificate #731. Table 4. Security Function Type of self-test RSA 1024 bit Decryption Decrypt KAT DRBG Known answer test (KAT) AES 128 – ECB & CBC Encrypt and Decrypt KAT HMAC-SHA1 & HMAC-SHA256 KAT (includes SHA KAT) Key Agreement Scheme KAT RSA 2048 bit Sign/Verify using SHA-256 KAT RSA 2048 bit Verify using SHA-256 KAT TDES (ECB & CBC) KAT Table 6: FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Algorithm Tests Register consistency test This test checks the consistency of the redundantly stored postal registers. 9.2 Conditional Tests The following conditional tests are performed: Security Function Performed CTR-DRBG and NDRNG On usage: see FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 “Continuous RNG test 1”. Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement On key establishment: see FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 “Pair-wise consistency test 2”. RSA 2048 bit using SHA-256 On key generation: see FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 “Pair-wise consistency test 2”. RSA 1024 bit On key generation: see FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 “Pair-wise consistency test 2”. Runs an Encrypt-Decrypt Test. - page 17 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector DE 2011 - Security Policy Security Function Performed On loading of programmed firmware: Firmware Loading Test Performs RSA 2048 SHA 256 signature verification Continuous DRBG Test The cryptographic module uses a Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) based on a block cipher algorithm as specified in the recommendation NIST SP 800-90. The implemented CTR DRBG uses AES- 128 as its cryptographic function. The entropy input is at least 128 Bits. The DRBG uses a hardware- based random number generator as the entropy source. Consecutive outputs of the DRBG are compared to ensure that they differ. The module has a non-approved hardware implemented NDRNG. Consecutive outputs of the NDRNG are compared to ensure that they differ. 9.3 Error States In the event of an error being detected, the Postal mRevenector DE 2011 enters an error state and stores the reason (error identifier) persistently. The error state information can be retrieved via the Get Device Status service. - page 18 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL Postal mRevenector DE 2011 - Security Policy 10 Mitigating Other Attacks The device includes environmental failure protection means for the battery voltage. If an attack is detected then the contents of the cryptographic IC’s battery powered key storage are automatically zeroized, leaving the module inoperable. The device is designed in such a way that temperature changes outside the normal operating ranges will not compromise the security of the device. The device includes failure protection means for the frequency of the internal Real Time Clock (RTC). If an attack is detected then the contents of the cryptographic IC’s battery powered key storage are automatically zeroized, leaving the module inoperable. The device includes failure protection means for the main input voltage, the internal core voltage, and the main clock frequency. If one of these conditions is outside a defined range the device is held in the reset condition. The cryptographic module’s processor incorporates a layer of metal shielding as one of its layers, used to detect attempts at intrusion at a die level. In the event of an intrusion attempt being detected, the contents of its battery powered key storage are automatically zeroized leaving the module inoperable. The failure protection for the battery voltage and the RTC frequency and the tamper detection for the module’s processor are present using power from the battery even when the device is switched off. - page 19 of 19 - Version 1.4 NON-CONFIDENTIAL